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Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity,

and Change: An Eco-pragmatic
Reinvention of a First-Generation
Environmental Law
Mary Jane Angelo*

These sprays, dusts, and aerosols are now applied almost universally to
farms, gardens, forests, and homes -nonselective chemicals that have the
power to kill every insect, the "good" and the "bad," to still the song of
birds and the leaping of fish in streams, to coat the leaves with a deadly
film, and to linger on in soil-all this though the intended target may be
only a few weeds or insects. Can anyone believe it is possible to lay down
such a barrage of poisons on the surface of the earth without making it
unfit for all life?'
If Rachel Carson were alive today I believe she would give America a
mixed grade.2
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1. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 7-8 (40th anniv. ed., First Mariner Books 2002).
2. E.O. WILSON, Afterword of RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 362 (40th anniv. ed.,
First Mariner Books 2002).
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Recent scientific reports demonstrate that despite more than thirty
years of environmental regulation, bird and wildlife species as well as
ecosystem services, are in unprecedented decline. Pesticides are at least
in part to blame for these profound declines. U.S. pesticide law has failed
to carry out its mission of environmental protection. A number of
recently-filed lawsuits assert that the registration of certain pesticides
violates the federal EndangeredSpecies Act. One of the great ironies of
environmental law is that the ecological consequences of pesticide use,
which fueled the environmental movement of the late 1960s and early
1970s, largely have been ignored for the past thirty years. Only recently
has interestrenewed in the ecological (as opposed to human health) risks
posed by pesticides.Moreover, the explosion of pesticidal-genetically
modified organism (GMO) use in agricultureraises concerns regarding
the novel risks to biodiversityposed by these new pesticides. Surprisingly,
however, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) has not changed significantly with regard to ecologicalmatters
since 1972 and remainsprimarilya consumerprotectionstatute not wellsuited for ecologicalprotection. The EnvironmentalProtectionAgency's
(EPA) implementation of FIFRA has not kept pace with our developing
understanding of the uncertainty, complexity, and changing nature of
ecological systems. This Article breaks new ground by being the first to
use the new legal discipline of "eco-pragmatism" to analyze, and then
reinvent, US.pesticidelaw to betterprotect ecologicalresources.
Foryears, environmentallegal scholarshave sought a middle ground
between absolutist risk-based approaches to environmental regulation
and cost/benefit analysis approaches.In the past severalyears, scholars
have begun exploring the emerging field of eco-pragmatism-a dramatic
new framework for environmental decision-making developed by
Professor Daniel Farber-to achieve a workable middle ground
Although a number of prominent legal scholars have analyzed ecopragmatism in a general sense, none have applied an eco-pragmatic
framework to any environmentalpollution controllaw. This Article is the
first to do so. This Article builds on Farber's work and others by first
bolstering eco-pragmatism through consciously incorporatingprinciples
of ecologicalscience and then applying the strengthenedeco-pragmatism
to a long-overlooked area,pesticidelaw. As the first application of ecopragmatism to a field of en vironmentalpollution controllaw, this Article
is an important step in the development of this area of legal theory. By
analyzing currentpesticide law as well as EPA 's implementation of such
law through an eco-pragmaticlens, this Article identifies areasof the law
in need of revision and proposes revisions based on eco-pragmatic
principles, which if implemented would greatly enhance our ability to
protectcriticalecologicalresources.
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INTRODUCTION

If you heard a strange rumbling sound in late 2004, it may have been
Rachel Carson rolling over in her grave in response to the National
Audubon Society's alarming "State of the Birds" report.3 The report
3. In the fall of 2004, the National Audubon Society ("Audubon") published its State of
the Birds USA 2004 report in Audubon magazine (hereinafter Report). NAT'L AUDUBON
SOC'Y, STATE OF THE BIRDS USA (2004), http://www.audubon.org/bird/stateofthebirds/. In the
Report, Audubon evaluated the status of 654 bird species native to the continental United
States. The species evaluated inhabit the nation's four major types of natural habitat-grass,
shrubs, tree, and water. Id. The report revealed a very disturbing trend: large percentages of bird
species utilizing all of these habitats are in significant decline. The declines range from 13
percent to 70 percent depending on the habitat type used by the species. Press Release,
Audubon Society, Audubon 'State of Birds' Report Reveals America's Birds are in Trouble
(Oct. 19, 2004), http://www.audubon.org/news/press-releases/1004-SOTB-10-19-04.html. In
addition to the Audubon report, another significant report on the decline of bird species
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concludes that despite all of the environmental laws, regulations, polices,
and programs established since Rachel Carson first sounded the
environmental alarm, a large percentage of avian species found in the
continental United States are in a significant state of decline.' While
pesticides are only one of the many causes implicated in the bird
population declines,5 the fact cannot be ignored that despite Carson's dire
warnings, and more than thirty years of intensive regulation, pesticides
continue to pose significant risks to birds, other wildlife, and ecosystems
in general.
One of the great ironies of environmental law is that the ecological
consequences of pesticide use, such as the devastating impacts of DDT on
predatory bird populations, which fueled the environmental movement of
the late 1960s and early 1970s, largely have been ignored for the past
thirty years. Only recently has interest renewed in the ecological (as
opposed to human health) risks posed by pesticides.6 Moreover, the
explosion of pesticidal genetically modified organism (GMOs) use in
agriculture raises concerns regarding the novel risks to biodiversity posed
by these new pesticides. Surprisingly, however, the primary federal
statute governing pesticides, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),7 has not changed significantly with regard to
ecological matters since 1972 and remains primarily a consumer
protection statute not well-suited for ecological protection. Moreover, the
manner in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
implemented FIFRA has not kept pace with our developing
understanding of the uncertainty, complexity, and changing nature of
ecological systems.
For years, environmental legal scholars have sought a middle ground
between absolutist risk-based approaches to environmental regulation
and cost/benefit analysis approaches. In the past several years, scholars
have begun exploring the emerging field of eco-pragmatism-a
conducted by researchers at Stanford University was published in the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences in 2004. Cagan H. Sekercioglu, Gretchen C. Daily & Paul R.
Ehrlich, Ecosystem Consequences of Bird Declines, 101 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci., 18042-47
(2004). This report predicts that by the year 2100, 10 percent of all bird species are likely to
disappear and that another 15 percent could be on the brink of extinction. Id. Moreover, The
Center for Biological Diversity recently released a report that found EPA has approved
registrations for pesticides that put more than 375 Endangered Species Act (ESA) listed species
at risk. BRIAN LITMANS & JEFF MILLER, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, SILENT SPRING
REVISITED:
PESTICIDE
USE
AND
ENDANGERED
SPECIES
(2004),
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/REPORt.pdf.
4. Report, supranote 3.
5. The report identifies habitat loss as the leading cause of bird declines, with other
factors, such as pesticide poisoning, contributing to the declines. Id
6. See, e.g., Wash. Toxics Coalition v. EPA, No. C01-013132C (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22,
2004), availableat http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.htm.
7. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
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framework for environmental decision-making developed by Professor
Daniel Farber-to achieve a workable middle ground. At the same time,
scholars have begun to look at environmental law through the lens of
ecological science. Common themes of complexity, uncertainty, and
change permeate both eco-pragmatism and ecological science. Science
has only scratched the surface of understanding complex ecological
systems. What little is understood about ecological science teaches us that
ecological systems are extremely complex and ever changing. Ecopragmatism seeks to address concerns with complexity, uncertainty and
change. By incorporating ecological science into eco-pragmatism, these
challenging issues can be addressed more effectively. Accordingly, an
integrated approach drawing on the discipline of ecology-the study of
the interactions of living organisms and their environments -and ecopragmatism can provide a comprehensive framework to protect
ecological resources through environmental regulation. To date, no
significant attempts have been made to analyze FIFRA,8 and only a few
attempts have been made to comprehensively analyze any other
traditional pollution control law, under eco-pragmatism or principles of
ecological science.9
Pesticide law, perhaps more than any other pollution control law,
lends itself to such eco-pragmatic analyses. Since 1972 when FIFRA was
amended to take environmental concerns into account, considerable
advances have been made in the ecological sciences. Because FIFRA
regulates through national registration of products, risks are assessed on a
one-time nationwide basis. Accordingly, localized ecological concerns are
not considered. Moreover, pesticide regulation is unique in that, unlike
other areas of environmental protection where environmental laws can
seek to eliminate or minimize hazardous releases that result as
unintended consequences of manufacturing or other processes, pesticides
are intentionally released into the environment for the express purpose of
killing, injuring, or disrupting the behavior of living organisms in the
environment. In other words, simply keeping pesticides out of the
environment is not an option. Consequently, the complexity and
uncertainty manifest in ecological systems, as well as the disequilibria
inherent in such systems, must be considered in any system designed to
8. In fact, very few scholarly efforts have been made to analyze FIFRA in any
comprehensive way at all. For one of the more comprehensive scholarly works, see Donald T.
Hornstein, Lessons From Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of
Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1993) (using an analysis of FIFRA to
frame an argument for an alternative framework for environmental law reform, which more
aggressively addresses the causes of environmental problems, rather than relying on risk-based
priority setting).
9. One recent attempt to analyze the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000),
using ecological principles is Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Ouality
Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of PhysicalandBiologicalIntegrity, 33 Envtl. L. 29 (2003).

ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33:105

address ecological risks posed by pesticides. This Article advances ecopragmatism by consciously integrating ecological science into an ecopragmatic framework. In addition, by employing eco-pragmatism's
inherent experiential approach, this Article utilizes experience gleaned
from over thirty years of U.S. policy on pesticide regulation to propose
improvements to pesticide regulation within an eco-pragmatic
framework.
Part I of this Article provides an analysis of eco-pragmatic theory,
demonstrates the need for theory to better integrate ecological concerns,
and shows how ecological principles can further develop and support ecopragmatism. Part II lays out the history of ecological issues in pesticide
regulation and highlights the areas where current pesticide law does not
adequately address ecological concerns. The ecological risks posed by
traditional synthetic chemical pesticides and pesticidal genetically
modified organisms are set forth. Part II further demonstrates that for
pesticide regulation in particular, it is imperative to expand the role of
ecological considerations. Part III describes current U.S. pesticide law
and its application. Part IV evaluates FIFRA from an eco-pragmatic
perspective and concludes that, although some components of the statute
are surprisingly eco-pragmatic, substantially more could be done to use
eco-pragmatic theory to improve FIFRA's ability to protect ecological
integrity. Finally, Part V proposes a new eco-pragmatic approach to
pesticide regulation.
I.

A.

ECO-PRAGMATISM

The HistoricalRoots of Pragmatism

The roots of eco-pragmatism can be traced to early twentieth
century philosophical pragmatism." In its broadest sense, pragmatism is a
philosophy that relies on action, experimentation, and workable
solutions, rather than theoretical constructs." An aspect of philosophical
10. Philosophical pragmatism has been applied over the years to a variety of disciplines.
For example, Oliver Wendell Holmes is credited with developing legal pragmatism, an attempt
to apply pragmatism to legal theory. Legal pragmatism grew out of Holmes' belief that the law
evolves out of experience rather than logic. Other proponents of legal pragmatism include
Benjamin Cardozo and Richard Posner. See Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Merits of
Pragmatism as a Guide to Environmental Protection, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.REv. 1, 9-13
(2004).
11. For a good discussion of early philosophical pragmatism, see generally Mintz, supra
note 10. Philosophical pragmatism rejects dogma and particular outcomes in favor of a method
of using experience and experimentation to determine what "works. Id. at 1. In pragmatism,
decisions are measured by their consequences and the extent to which they fulfill the needs of
society. Pragmatism has been described as emphasizing "practice over theory." See J.B. Ruhl,
Working Both (Positivist)Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist)Middle in Environmental Law, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 531 (2000) (book review). Pragmatists believe that the value of an idea
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pragmatism particularly relevant to integrating ecological principles into
environmental law is pragmatism's flexibility, which is rooted in
acceptance of indeterminacy and the limitations of human
understanding. 12 Pragmatists embrace the idea that as more knowledge
becomes available and as society evolves ethical concerns also evolve.
This philosophical acceptance of indeterminacy and change complements
the ecological principles of uncertainty and change, discussed in greater
detail below.
Pragmatists also recognize that communities may hold many
conflicting values. Pragmatic methodology is designed to resolve conflicts
in the way that best serves the community.1' Conflicts over environmental
policy and law are born of the conflicting values held by those who seek
to reduce environmental risks as opposed to those whose primary
concern is economic efficiency. 4 Thus, pragmatism can serve as a useful
tool to reconcile the inevitable conflicts, which environmental policy must
address.15

stems from its practical ability to benefit the community and to solve society's problems. SIDNEY
A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 15 (2003). One of the most influential philosophical pragmatists of the
twentieth century, John Dewey, stressed the idea that knowledge is better gleaned from
experience than abstract reasoning. See generally JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE
(Eugene Freeman ed., 2d. ed. 1971). Other traditional philosophical pragmatists include William
James, Charles Pierce, Josiah Royce, and George Herbert Mead. Mintz, supra note 10, at 1-2.
See generally THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS (Milton Konvitz & Gail Kennedy eds., 1960). In
keeping with this practical measure of the value of ideas, pragmatists believe that ideas are
valuable and true when they are accepted by what is referred to as a "critical community of
inquiry." SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra at 16. In other words, only after a community has
analyzed, deliberated, and vetted an idea and found it to be beneficial in solving a problem does
that idea become valuable to the community. Further, the value of such ideas changes as the
community changes.
12. Early twentieth-century philosophical pragmatists were fascinated by the scientific
developments of the time. Darwin's theory of evolution led these early pragmatists to view
human thought in evolutionary terms, constantly evolving as a "problem-solving capacity,
oriented towards survival." SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 15 (quoting Thomas C.
Grey, Holmes andLegal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 796 (1989)). Decisions may change
as new experience or experimentation points to better ways to meet such societal needs.
13. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supranote 11, at 20.
14. See Ruhl, supra note 11, at 523. RuhI states:
Since almost immediately after its statutory big bang in the early 1970s, [footnote
omitted] two extreme and opposing philosophies-one devoted to protecting the
economy and the other to protecting the environment-have waged a war of
annihilation that has left in its wake a mish-mash of laws, regulations, judicial
opinions, and countless administrative decisions and policies that we today call
environmental law.
Id.
15.

SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supranote 11, at 21,52.
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Farber's"Eco-pragmatism"

16
Professor Daniel Farber's 1999 book, Ecopragmatism,
paved the

way for the recent flurry of scholarship attempting to use pragmatism as a
guiding principle for environmental regulation.17 Many environmental

16. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 35 (1999). Eco-pragmatism draws on the wider

movement in legal scholarship known as legal pragmatism. Id. at 9. Legal pragmatism holds that
decisions should be made by drawing on many sources. In the environmental setting, these
sources include scientific understanding and normative judgments as well as economic
considerations. Id. at 10. Professor Farber's book starts from the premise that the legitimacy of
environmental values is a given in the United States. The harder question, he maintains, is what
priority to assign to those environmental values and how to weigh them against other values such
as economic needs. A basic tenet of Farber's approach is that for environmental law to be
socially sustainable, it must be pluralist, flexible, and not overly draconian. In other words, to be
socially sustainable, environmental protection must proceed as "a marathon, not a sprint." Id.at
13.
17. Although Farber was the first to develop the field of eco-pragmatism, the field of
environmental pragmatism had been in existence since the late 1980s. See, e.g.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM (Andrew Light & Eric Katz eds., 1996). Environmental
pragmatism developed as a way to apply philosophical pragmatism to address environmental
concerns. Mintz, supra note 10, at 6. Although eco-pragmatism certainly derives much from
environmental pragmatism, Farber's eco-pragmatism attempts to apply pragmatism to
environmental laws and policies in particular. Id.at 14. Farber's book has been reviewed by a
number of prominent environmental law scholars, generating varied reactions. While some
scholars have expressed reservations over Farber's ideas, others have generally reacted
positively to the overall thrust of the book, if not to the specifics. See Lisa Heinzerling,
Pragmatistsand Environmentalists,113 HARV. L. REV. 1421 (2000) (book review) (criticizing
Farber's approach as too modest and not sufficiently transformative); Christopher H. Schroeder,
Clear Consensus,Ambiguous Commitment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1876, 1880 (2000) (book review)
(describing Farber's book as containing "valuable discussion[] of [environmental] problems
[and] offering important insights into dealing with them"); Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets,
Priests and Pragmatists,97 Minn. L. Rev. 1065, 1097 (2003) (stating that "[p]ragmatism's
essential appeal is thus that it is the best bet for putting environmental policy on a glide path to
the goals that the [environmental] prophets wants, and indeed the steepest glide path feasible");
J. B. Ruhl, supranote 11, at 545 (generally providing a very favorable review of eco-pragmatism
but expressing disappointment for its lack of passion). See also Paul Boudreax, Environmental
Costs, Benefits, and Values: A Review of DanielA. Farber'sEco-Pragmatism,13 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 125, 167 (1999) (book review) (stating that while Farber's eco-pragmatism provides a good
starting point for broad-based thinking about problems in environmental law, it fails in its
specific recommendations on how to apply pragmatism to environmental policy). Despite any
perceived shortcomings in the book, it cannot be denied that Farber's ideas have been
provocative and have led the way for a flurry of scholarly analysis of how pragmatic ideas could
be applied to environmental law. See, e.g., ENVTL. LAW INST., THE JURISDYNAMICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW (Jim Chen ed., 2003)(compiling writing on eco-pragmatism and related concepts including
works by Jim Chen, Daniel Farber, J.B. Ruhl, Dan Tarlock, Christine Klein, Jonathan Alder,
Christopher Schroeder, Douglas Kysar, James Salzman, Richard Lazarus, Lisa Heinzerling,
Holly Doremus, and Alyson Flournoy, among others); SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11,
at 46 (arguing that pragmatism provides the rationale for regulating based on risk, which has
been missing from debates on environmental policy); Jamie A. Grodsky, The Paradox of
(Eco)pragmatism,97 MINN. L. REV. 1037 (2003) (arguing that eco-pragmatism's middle-ground
compromise and flexibility must be tempered to include clear rules that can be adjusted over
time). Farber himself has continued to weigh-in on the subject. See Daniel A. Farber, Building
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law scholars seemingly have been yearning for a theoretical framework to
guide the development of an environmental middle ground between the
two extremes of absolute risk-based regulation, which does not
adequately take costs into account, and cost/benefit analysis, 8 which, as
described in section III.C.2.a below, has many shortcomings in the area of
environmental protection. Eco-pragmatism, for many, provides the
rationale for moving beyond the goal of economic efficiency to focus
instead on making all feasible reductions in human and environmental
risks.19 Nevertheless, despite the recent wealth of scholarship on ecopragmatism, few attempts have been made to apply the approach in any
systematic way to an existing environmental regulatory scheme.2 °
Farber outlines the four most difficult questions to be answered in
developing an environmental regulatory system: 1) how to determine
how much an environmental rule is worth, tapping into the long-standing
debate over risk-based approaches to environmental protection versus
cost/benefit approaches; 2) what is the appropriate baseline for
environmental decision-making, raising the issue of whether there is
some inherent value in environmental protection such that any error
should be on the side of protection; 3) how to determine how much to
spend today to achieve a benefit that may not accrue for decades, raising
the issue of the appropriate discount rate to use in environmental
valuation; 2' and 4) how to know when to proceed in the face of imperfect
Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and the EnvironmentalProspect,97 MINN. L.
REv. 851 (2003).
18. FARBER, supra note 16, at 35.
19. See generally SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11 (providing much of the
justification for a pragmatic approach to environmental law that Farber's book was criticized for
lacking).
20. One of the few attempts to apply an eco-pragmatic approach to environmental law is
J.B. Ruhl's article, Is the EndangeredSpecies Act Eco-pragmatic?.87 MINN. L. REV. 885 (2003).
Ruhl identifies what he refers to as the five pillars of eco-pragmatism: 1) drawing an
environmental baseline; 2) institutionalizing the precautionary principle; 3) integrating impact
assessment; 4) the importance of empiricism; and 5) adaptive management. Id. at 888-89. After
testing the Endangered Species Act (ESA) against these five pillars, RuhI concludes that "all the
eco-pragmatism pieces are there." Id. at 941. For example, RuhI identifies the ESA's jeopardy
prohibition as providing an environmental baseline, the ESA's take prohibition as an
institutionalization of the precautionary principle, the ESA's incidental take procedure as
utilizing impact assessment, the ESA's best available evidence standard as employing
empiricism, and the recent implementation of habitat conservation planning under the ESA as
incorporating adaptive management techniques. Id.
21. There is much debate over the appropriate discount rates that should be used in
environmental cost/benefit analyses or other forms of balancing such as constrained balancing.
Cost/benefit and other balancing analyses are influenced dramatically by the choice of discount
rate. The higher the discount rate, the more likely that the analysis will conclude that the
resource-using or resource-polluting activity is efficient. Whereas a low discount rate assigns
greater value to future benefits and, as a result, is more likely to conclude that the benefits of
regulation outweigh the costs. Eco-pragmatism argues in favor of the use of a low discount rate.
FARBER, supra note 16, at 89-90, 133. Although a detailed discussion of the appropriate
discount rate to use in environmental decision-making is beyond the scope of this Article, there
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information, raising the related issues of whether precautionary
approaches should be used in environmental decision-making and how to
incorporate adaptive management ideas into environmental laws. Farber
answers these questions within a pragmatic framework, finding that the
pragmatic answers to the four questions are: 1) economics should be
utilized in a hybrid approach bridging the gap between pure risk-based
and cost/benefit approaches; 2) environmental law should presumptively
favor the environment-an environmental baseline; 3) a low discount
rate should be employed in the valuation of long-term environmental
benefits; and 4) flexible, adaptive approaches are necessary to allow
regulation to adapt as new information becomes available. Despite the
strengths of eco-pragmatism, as described more fully below, the theory is
strengthened considerably by more consciously incorporating principles
of ecological science.
C
1.

Strengtheningthe Eco in Eco-pragmatism

BackgroundDiscussion

Professor J.B. Ruhl's review of Farber's work described ecopragmatism as a marriage of two themes: the "eco" theme, a
scientifically-based theme focusing on the dynamic character of natural
systems, and the "pragmatic" theme which draws on philosophical
pragmatism.22 As Ruhl describes it, the fusion of the dynamic nature of
ecological systems and environmental pragmatism form eco-pragmatism,
''a new approach to making environmental decisions in an uncertain
world."2 3 Despite his general affinity for eco-pragmatism, Ruhl expresses
disappointment that Farber's work fails to address, except in a very
are sound reasons for adopting a low discount rate. For instance, the consequences of
environmental decisions extend deep into the future. The further out in time we attempt to
predict environmental consequences, the more the accuracy of such projections diminishes.
FARBER, supra note 16, at 133. Using a low discount rate is a way to take the long view. Ruhl,
supra note 11, at 539. A low discount rate does not devalue long-term environmental benefits.
Moreover, our limited understanding of environmental issues lends support to more cautious
predictions of future benefits. As hard as it is to put a dollar value on today's environmental
resources, it is almost impossible to put a dollar value on what they will be worth in twenty or
thirty years. Our limited understanding of natural systems suggests we may not even begin to
understand the value that natural systems may hold in the future. High discount rates can make
significant future benefits look insignificant today. FARBER, supra note 16, at 151. Perhaps the
most compelling rationale for employing low discount rates is what is known as "intergenerational equity." There is so much that is not known about the value of natural systems
today that it would be reckless to fritter away resources today which may later be found to have
great value (utilitarian or otherwise) to future generations. Id. at 151-52. Thus, we should be
prudent in how much we discount the environmental benefits that natural systems hold for
future generations.
22. J.B. Ruhl, supranote 11, at 523-24.
23. Id. at 524.
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cursory fashion, the "eco" partner in the eco-pragmatism marriage.24 As
Ruhl points out, the past thirty years have evidenced dramatic changes in
the study of natural systems. 25 During this period, the field of ecology has
come into its own, and the new fields of conservation biology and
ecosystem management have been born. Unprecedented developments in
our understanding of natural systems have also occurred. Our onceaccepted simplistic view of the "balance of nature" has been challenged,
and we now are beginning to see nature as being considerably more
complex and dynamic than we once believed.2 6 Accordingly,
environmental decision-makers must accept and incorporate into their
decision-making the continually changing nature of ecosystems. 7
A close study of ecological principles reveals that they are consistent
in many ways with eco-pragmatism and, in fact, may serve to bolster and
further develop Farber's ideas. A good starting point for an attempt to
understand the complexity, uncertainty, and changing nature of natural
systems is an understanding of the numerous fields of inquiry and
terminology used to describe these systems. Ecology is the science of the
interactions of living organisms with each other and their physical
environments.2 8 Ecology has existed for many decades; however, only in
the last twenty years or so has ecology advanced to a preliminary
understanding of the importance of biodiversity to natural systems.
Biodiversity is defined as "the richness, abundance, and variability of
plant and animal species and communities and the ecological processes
that link them with one another and with soil, air and water. '29 The
measure of biodiversity is not merely an accounting of the number of
species present in an area; it also has a functional component.3"
Accordingly, a focus on preserving individual species from extinction is
not sufficient to preserve biodiversity unless ecological processes are also
maintained.3 Thus, an overriding goal of biodiversity protection is to
maintain all of the elements of biodiversity, including both structural
diversity (i.e., forms and levels of organization) and functional
biodiversity (i.e., ecological and evolutionary functions).32

24.
25.

Id.
Id

26. See generallyDANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990) and Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature:New Concepts
in Ecology,69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994).
27. Ruhl, supranote 11, at 528.
28.

RICHARD

O. BROOKS

ET AL., LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM

REGIME 7 (2002).

29.

MALCOM

L.

HUNTER, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSERVATION

BIOLOGY 20-21

(1996) (providing the 1993 Wildlife Society definition of biodiversity) (emphasis omitted).

30. Id.at 21.

31. See id.
32. Id.

ECOLOGYLA W QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33:105

Conservation biology, a relatively new applied scientific discipline,
addresses the complex relationship between human activities and the
protection of ecological systems. Professor Michael Soul6, one of the
founders of conservation biology, defined it as "a new stage in the
application of science to conservation problems, [which] addresses the
biology of species, communities, and ecosystems that are perturbed,
either directly of indirectly, by human activities or other agents. Its goal is
to provide principles and tools for preserving biological diversity."33
Although conservation biology is still a relatively young and illdefined science, certain postulates have been proposed. Professor Soule
divides these postulates into two categories: 1) functional postulates; and
2) ethical or normative postulates.34 He describes the functional
postulates as a set of fundamental rules gleaned from basic sciences,
including ecology, that are geared toward the maintenance of both the
form and function of natural biological systems." Perhaps most pertinent
for legal analysis are Soule's ethical or normative postulates which can be
utilized as a fundamental ecological baseline for an environmental
management or regulatory system: 1) biological diversity is good; and 2)
ecological complexity is good.36

33. Michael E. Sould, What is ConservationBiology in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
BIODIVERSITY 35 ( R. Edward Grumbine ed., 1994). Conservation biology has also been
described as a "regulatory science that seeks to develop scientific standards that can be applied
to regulatory criteria and then to develop the management strategies to meet those standards."
A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequi'brium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of
EnvironmentalLaw,27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1130 (1994). Conservation biology arose in the
late 1970s and early 1980s in reaction to the unprecedented worldwide extinction crisis that
many biologists believe is occurring due to the activities of humans. HUNTER, supranote 29, at
15. Accordingly, conservation biology is an applied "crisis" discipline that is to biology what
surgery is to physiology. Soul6, supra at 35. The driving force behind conservation biology is the
belief that, without serious efforts to reverse the trend of mass extinctions, millions of species
may be at risk of extinction. Id. at 48. The loss of species may have devastating consequences for
humans, as well as for the planet as a whole. Due to the permanence of extinction, rare species
are often the focus of conservation biology. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 228
(1992). The seminal works on conservation biology include: CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN
EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Michael E. Sould & Bruce A. Wilcox eds., 1980)
and CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT DECADE (Michael E.
Soul6 & Gordon H. Orians eds., 2001).
34. SoulA, What is ConservationBiology?, supra note 33, at 38-45.
35. Sould's functional postulates include: 1) many species are products of co-evolutionary
processes-i.e., in most communities, species make up a significant part of other species'
environment; 2) species are interdependent-i.e., mutualistic relationships exist between many
species, thus, there are always uncertainties about the impact that the extinction of one species
will have on another species; 3) many species are highly specialized-i.e., the majority of animal
species depend on a particular host, thus, if such a host becomes extinct, many other species may
be adversely affected; 4) extinction of "keystone species" can have long-term consequences; 5)
introduction of generalist species may reduce diversity; and 6) many ecological processes have
thresholds below which they become discontinuous, chaotic, or suspended. Id. at 38-42.
36. Id. at 42-44.
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Most law and policy initiatives concerning conservation biology and
biodiversity protection have focused on deciding which lands to preserve
based on their diversity, uniqueness, connectivity to other lands, or other
factors. While the importance of preserving significant lands cannot be
overstated, such preservation would be in vain if contamination of air,
water, and land, both inside and outside of preserved areas, is not
addressed. Environmental pollution is the most subtle form of ecological
degradation, and, despite the banning of numerous pesticides over the
past thirty years, pesticidal pollution remains one the most serious forms
of ecological degradation.37 No matter how strictly protected from human
activity, an area will never be truly protected if contaminants such as
pesticides enter through the water or air or if species that use the
38
protected area are exposed to harmful contaminants upon leaving.
Although some legal scholars have analyzed environmental law in a
general sense from a conservation biology perspective,39 to date the
attempts made to evaluate specific management or regulatory schemes
using such an approach have focused primarily on natural resources
management or the Endangered Species Act,4" rather than pesticide law
or pollution control law.
Another important ecological concept is that of ecosystem
management. Ecosystem management is a tool to carry out the principles
of conservation biology. Although environmental literature is rife with
varying descriptions and definitions of ecosystem management, a general
consensus appears to have arisen: the overriding goal of ecosystem
management is to protect long-term ecological integrity."1 Ecological
integrity is defined as the total native diversity of species, populations,

37.

RICHARD B. PRIMACK, ESSENTIALS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 145-46 (1993).

38. Although the primary threat to species and ecosystem diversity is habitat destruction,
even when habitats are preserved, many populations have been reduced to such an extent that
they are extremely vulnerable to other environmental stresses such as hazardous pollutants.
Moreover, the vast majority of land in the United States is privately owned, and it would be
naive to believe that enough property could be put into perpetual preservation to achieve true
ecological integrity on a large scale. Thus, it is necessary to complement land preservation
programs with effective regulatory programs that protect widespread ecological integrity while
allowing human activities to proceed.
39. See, e.g., Walter Kuhlmann, Making the Law More Ecocentric:Responding to Leopold
and Conservation Biology, 7 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 133 (1996); Robert B. Keiter,
ConservationBiology and the Law. Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911
(1994), Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence ofEcological Science on American
Law- An Introduction,69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994); and William H. Rodgers, Adaptation
of EnvironmentalLaw to the Ecologists'Discoveryof Disequilibnia,69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 887
(1994).
40. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the EndangeredSpecies Act, and the
InstitutionalChallenges of "New Age" EnvironmentalProtection,41 WASHBURN L.J. 50 (2001).
41. See R. EDWARD GRUMBINE, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
BIODIVERSITY 8-9 (R. Edward Grumbine ed., 1994).
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and ecosystems, and the ecological patterns and processes that maintain
such diversity.4"
Interestingly, at the same time that ecological science, conservation
biology, and ecosystem management were developing in the scientific
world, parallel ideas, including many of those that form the basis of ecopragmatism, were developing in the legal arena. While not couched in
terms of conservation biology, eco-pragmatism starts to look startlingly
like conservation biology when boiled down to its essentials. Parallels
between the cross-disciplinary applied science of conservation biology
and the legal theoretical construct of eco-pragmatism exist in a number of
respects. For instance, both approaches articulate the need to start from
an ecological baseline. Moreover, both disciplines recognize the
importance of adaptive management approaches to address the changing
nature of both biological systems and our ability to comprehend them.
Finally, although both systems argue in favor of accounting for costs in
environmental decision-making, neither approach elevates costs to the
level of being the deciding factor.43
Perhaps most significantly, both disciplines acknowledge that
although we can never completely prevent all human disturbances, we do
not necessarily need to. Human disturbances similar in characteristic,
magnitude, and duration to natural disturbances are not as likely to pose
significant risks to species or ecosystems as are human disturbances that
are substantially different in characteristic, magnitude, or duration from
natural disturbances." Individual species, as well as entire ecosystems,
have evolved to be resistant and resilient to the types and magnitudes of
natural disturbance that they would normally experience in nature.
2.

The Role ofEconomics In Eco-Pragmatism

Professor Daniel Farber's Eco-pragmatism analyzes from a
pragmatic standpoint what role economic considerations should play in
environmental decision-making. Farber offers a sound rationale for
reaching the conclusion that a hybrid, or feasibility, approach is the most
42. See id. at 8 (citing B. Norton, A New Paradigmfor EnvironmentalManagement 23-41
in ECOSYSTEM HEALTH (R. Costanza et al. eds., 1992)).
43. Leading conservation biologist Professor Reed Noss has described an approach to
applying principles of conservation biology to environmental law. See Reed F. Noss, Some
Principles of Conservation Biology, As They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 893, 897-900 (1994). Some of the guiding principles of conservation biology can be
summarized as follows: 1) ecosystems are more complex than science can understand; 2) the less
data or more uncertainty involved, the more conservative environmental decision-making should
be; 3) ecosystems are not static, but instead are constantly in a state of disequilibria; 4)
conservation biology is by its very nature value-laden and goal-driven; and 5) environmental
management decisions must be concerned with ecological processes at multiple levels of
biological organization. See id. at 898-900.
44. Meyer, supranote 26, at 882-83.
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pragmatic. Significantly, Farber's conclusions are further supported when
ecological principles are incorporated into the eco-pragmatic analysis.
a.

A Rejection ofPure Risk-Based and Cost/Benefit Standards

The past twenty years of environmental law scholarship is
characterized by a struggle between two opposite extremes-those who
believe environmental values are paramount and those who believe
economic interests are paramount.45 Environmental regulation in the
United States is frequently criticized as unrealistic because it is based on
protecting the public or environment from risks without considering the
costs associated with such protection.46 Of course, an attempt to eliminate
all environmental risks at all costs would be absurd.47 Opponents of pure
risk-based approaches contend that environmental regulations seek to
attain zero risk regardless of the costs of attaining such a goal. For the
most part, these criticisms are unfounded. " Despite the outcry of the
opponents of risk-based regulation, the vast majority of federal

45. FARBER, supranote 16, at 35.
46. As Supreme Court Justice Breyer and Professor Cass Sunstein have described, some
environmental risk reduction requires expenditures of money that go well beyond the bounds of
common sense. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 14 (1993) and Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1533 (1996).
47. FARBER, supranote 16, at 3.
48. Although examples of environmental excesses certainly can be found, many if not most
of such criticisms have been demonstrated to be without merit. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN supra
note 161, at 22. In one of the most comprehensive analyses of the costs of environmental
regulation to date, Lisa Heinzerling demonstrated that many of the oft-cited examples of the
excessive costs of environmental regulations are not accurate. Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory
Costs of Mythic Proportions,107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998). Heinzerling has shown that many of the
examples used by cost/benefit proponents are either exaggerations or are examples of
regulations that were considered but never adopted for a variety of reasons. Id. In this article,
Heinzerling scrutinizes the "Morrall table," developed in 1986 by John Morrall, an economist at
the Office of Management and Budget. Id. at 1983, 1987-89. The table includes information on
the costs of various risk-reducing regulations per life saved. Id. at 1987-88. The numbers from
this table have been relied on extensively by scholars, environmental policy-makers, and
politicians to support arguments that environmental regulations are not cost-effective and that
taxpayer money could be better spent elsewhere. See id. at 1983. Heinzerling demonstrates that
the estimates of the costs of environmental regulations developed by Morrall, and widely relied
upon by proponents of cost/benefit analysis, are seriously flawed. Id. at 1984. First, Heinzerling
shows how Morrall included a large number of regulations that were never adopted by the
regulatory agency. Id. at 1999-2014. Heinzerling demonstrates that the alleged highest-cost
environmental regulations on Morrall's table have never taken effect. Id. at 1983, 1999-2014. In
fact, some of these proposed rules were withdrawn by the agency specifically because of the high
costs associated with them. Id. at 2000-10. Moreover, Heinzerling shows how Morrall's use of
cost estimates skew the results by being up to 1000 times higher than the agency estimates. Id. at
1983, 1991-93. Further, Heinzerling shows how Morrall's estimates are misleading in that he
used a high (10 percent) discount rate. Id. at 2018. Heinzerling's analysis shows that by using the
agency's cost estimates and a lower discount rate, the cost per life saved for most of these
regulations falls well within the accepted range. Id. at 2041.
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environmental laws are not purely risk-based and few, if any, are zerorisk statutes.49 Instead, most environmental laws allow or require the
consideration of other factors such as the costs of regulation or the
economic feasibility of regulation. Even where zero-risk or absolutist
risk-based environmental laws have been tried, frequently the recognition
of the illogical outcomes of these approaches have led to either
interpreting the laws to account for other factors or amending the laws
imposing these strict risk-based requirements. 50 Because of the illogical
49. This is for good reason. It is impossible to eliminate all risk. First, as risks are reduced
to lower levels, the costs of eliminating remaining risks may be excessively high. Second, in many
cases it is impossible to attain zero risk because technology does not exist to measure very small
amounts of pollutants or very small environmental disruptions that may cause risk. Third, it is
not uncommon for risk reduction measures that are employed to address one risk to cause some
other unintended risk. Finally, risk is inherent in nature. FARBER, supranote 16, at 72-74.
50. Perhaps the most notable absolutist zero-risk-based law was the Delaney Clause of the
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994). As one of the few
environmental statutes to attempt to impose a zero-risk standard, the Delaney Clause was highly
controversial. In fact, EPA attempted to interpret into the statute a de minimis exception,
despite the absolutist language contained in the law. EPA's de minimis interpretation of the
Delaney Clause was struck down by the Ninth Circuit in Les v. Reilly. 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.
1992). After many years of controversy, in 1996, Congress eliminated the zero-risk language in
favor of the more flexible "safety" standard in the Food Quality Amendment Act, Pub. L. No.
104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified at 7 U.S.C.§§ 136-136y and 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-381 (2000). Prior
to 1996, food additives in or on processed foods were regulated under section 409 of the
FFDCA, whereas pesticide residues in or on raw agricultural commodities were regulated under
section 408 of the FFDCA. Section 408 deemed any poisons or deleterious pesticide chemical
that is not generally recognized as safe when added to a raw agricultural commodity to be unsafe
unless a tolerance is established and the pesticide residue is within the tolerance limit. Section
408 authorized EPA to establish tolerances "to the extent necessary to protect public health"
and mandated that in making such determination EPA give appropriate consideration to certain
factors including the necessity for the production of an adequate, wholesome, and economical
food supply. Thus, the standard for setting a tolerance under section 408 included economic
considerations. The term "pesticide chemical" is defined as any substance which, alone, in
chemical combination, or in formulation with one or more other substance is a pesticide within
the meaning of FIFRA and which is used in the production, storage or transportation of raw
agricultural commodities. 21 U.S.C. § 321(q) (2000). Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) is
defined as generally recognized among experts qualified by scientific training and expertise to
evaluate its safety as having been adequately shown through scientific principles (or for a
substance in food prior to January 1958, through either scientific procedures or based on
common use in food) to be safe under conditions of its intended use. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2000).
For processed foods, however, a completely different standard applied. Pursuant to the pre-1996
section 402 of the FFDCA, a food was deemed to be adulterated if it contained any food
additive not authorized by a food additive regulation under section 409. The standard for setting
a food additive regulation, however, was far different from the standard for a tolerance under
section 408. Under section 409, to issue a food additive regulation, EPA would have to find that
the use of the food additive under the conditions of use specified in the regulation would be
"safe." Further, section 409 contained the Delaney Clause which provided that no food additive
shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animals, or if
tests show it induces cancer in man or animals. Accordingly, section 409 contained a strict
"safety" standard and a complete prohibition of any carcinogenic food additive in any amount.
After many years of controversy over the disparity and unsuccessful attempts by EPA to
interpret the Delaney Clause as imposing a de minimis risk standard rather than a zero risk
standard, the 1996 FQPA amendments to FFDCA eliminated the absolutist Delaney Clause.
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outcomes of attempting to remove all risk and the diminishing returns
when trying to eliminate every last trace of risk, zero-risk is not a
reasonable goal. Even a pure risk-based standard that allows for a risk
above zero may be unreasonable if the costs of reaching such a level of
risk reduction are not feasible. Thus, eco-pragmatism rejects pure riskbased approaches.
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the pure risk-based
approaches to environmental regulation are those approaches that
elevate economic efficiency above all other considerations. Cost/benefit
analyses involve balancing the "social benefit" of a regulation against the
cost to society to comply with the regulation. 1 The argument in favor of
economic efficiency is that limited resources should be spent where they
will do the most good. Cost/benefit standards are based on the premise
that maximum economic efficiency is the goal of any regulatory system.52
The cost/benefit analysis measure of value is the consumer's willingness
to pay for goods or services. 3 The concept of willingness-to-pay does not
translate well to ecological values. 4 Moreover, relying on willingness-toFurther, the 1996 Act eliminated the prior standards in both section 408 and section 409 and
substituted a standard of "safety" in both sections. Accordingly, under the current law tolerances
must be established for pesticide residues in food, whether in raw agricultural commodities or
processed foods, at a level that is considered "safe." Safe is defined to mean there is a reasonable
certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue. This
"reasonable certainty standard," while still a risk-based standard, replaces the zero-risk Delaney
Clause with a negligible risk standard. It should be noted that prior to 1970, the Food and Drug
Administration regulated food additives as well as pesticide residues in food under the FFDCA.
Under the Reorganization Act of 1970, authority for the regulation of pesticides under both
FIFRA and FFDCA was transferred to the newly formed Environmental Protection Agency.
Reorganization Plan No. 3, 84 § 2086 (1970). Since 1970, EPA has regulated pesticide residues in
or on raw agricultural commodities under section 408 of the FFDCA and pesticide residues in or
on processed foods as food additives under section 409 of the FFDCA.
51. For a general overview of cost/benefit analyses, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COSTBENEFIT,STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002).
52. This makes sense in the context of choosing between two technologies to achieve the
same level of risk reduction. For example, if, all else equal, it would cost $10 million to install an
end-of-pipe technology that would reduce water pollutants and thereby save five lives, but it
would cost only $1 million to use alternative raw materials in the manufacturing process that
would achieve the same risk reduction goal, no reasonable person would question the decision to
utilize the more economically efficient risk reduction method. However, the real world is rarely
so clear-cut and typically environmental decisions are not a choice between two equally effective
risk reduction methods. More often they involve complex trade-offs in risk reduction, costs and
normative values that are not easily monetized. Consequently, cost/benefit analyses reach far
beyond the obvious and simple goal of achieving an environmental benefit for the lowest cost
possible. See FARBER, supra note 16, at 7.
53. FARBER supra note 16, at 36. The willingness-to-pay standard is a key component of
welfare economics. For a good general discussion of the Pareto Criteria, as well as other theories
of economic efficiency, including Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see generally Jules Coleman,
Efficiency, Utility,and Wealth Maximization, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO LAW (Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998).
54. It can be difficult to determine how much people would be willing to pay for a given
ecological service or benefit. Although it may be a relatively easy task to determine how much
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pay may skew cost/benefit analyses away from protecting environmental
values because the concept embeds an assumption that industry has the
right to utilize resources so that those wanting to protect those resources
have to be willing to pay for such protection."
people are willing to pay for certain types of values, such as how much more people are willing
to pay for a safe product versus an unsafe product, in the environmental arena many values that
are sought to be protected by environmental laws are what is known as "non-use" values. These
non-use values include "option value," how much people are willing to pay to leave open the
option of receiving a benefit in the future. An example of option value is the value people are
willing to pay to preserve tropical rainforests to preserve the option of obtaining plants with
medicinal value in the future. Farber, supra note 16, at 48. Another type of non-use value is
"existence value," how much people are willing to pay to protect something that they will never
directly benefit from. An example of existence value is how much people are willing to pay to
protect an endangered species even if they will never receive any direct benefit from that species
and in fact may never even see that species. Id. These non-use values are much more difficult to
monetize in a cost/benefit analysis than are other types of values that provide a more direct
impact to the person who is wiling to pay for them. Id. at 49. One way that economists attempt to
monetize these values is through a survey technique called contingent valuation. Cass Sunstein
has criticized this technique as unreliable because surveys asking people hypothetically how
much they would pay to preserve a particular non-use value may be skewed by people answering
in a way that makes them feel morally satisfied rather than stating their real valuation. Id. at 49
(citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 142-43 (1997)). On the other
side of the debate critics argue that contingent valuation is not an appropriate way to value
natural resources. John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 331 (1995).
55. The question then becomes one of how much are the environmentalists willing to pay
to protect the resources. If instead, one assumes that environmentalists have the right to protect
resources and that industry must pay environmentalists or the public if it wishes to utilizes those
resources, the question becomes one of how much are environmentalists or the public willing to
accept to allow the resources to be used. The amount of money an environmentalist is willing to
accept to allow a resource to be used is typically twice as high as the amount of money the same
environmentalist is willing to pay to protect the resource. FARBER, supra note 16, at 100.
Nevertheless, most cost/benefit analyses use willingness-to-pay. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 11, at 57. This is but one example of how cost/benefit analyses are not value-neutral. The
value-based assumptions that underlie the analyses can dramatically alter outcomes. See also id.
at 56 (explaining that willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept are typically different due to
the distribution of wealth in society). A person's wealth does not tend to limit willingness-toaccept in the same way it limits willingness-to-pay. As a result, willingness-to-pay tends to result
in less regulation. Id. at 56.
An example of the difference between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept
provided in Farber's book is the example of whalers desiring to kill a pod of whales. If one
assumes that the whalers have a right to kill the whales for their own economic benefit, the
question becomes how much environmentalists are willing to pay the whalers not to kill the
whales. This willingness-to-pay then becomes the economic value of the whales. If instead, one
assumes that the environmentalists have the legal right to protect the whales, the question
becomes how much are the whalers willing to pay the environmentalists for the right to hunt the
whales. Under this scenario, it is likely that the environmentalists will demand a much higher
price from the whalers than they would be willing to pay in the first scenario. One explanation
for this phenomenon is that by assuming the environmentalists have the right to protect the
whales and the consequent right to sell the hunting rights to the whales the environmentalists
have been made wealthier and more powerful. Thus, demand increases resulting in a higher
price to hunt the whales. Consequently, under the second scenario, whaling that may have been
economically efficient under the first scenario may no longer be efficient. FARBER, supra note
16, at 99. Another explanation for the difference between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
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Proponents of cost/benefit analysis believe that sound decisionmaking is based on market indicators whereas environmentalists believe
that such decisions should be based on political indicators, a distinction56
Farber refers to as "willingness-to-pay" versus "willingness-to-vote.
This distinction has been described as follows: "social regulation
expresses what we believe, what we are, what we stand for as a nation,
not simply what we wish to buy as individuals."57 Moreover, relying solely
on consumer choices excludes the possibility of decision-making based on
community analysis, deliberation, and vetting of ideas. 8 Critics of
cost/benefit analysis focus on the distinction between private consumer
choices and public choices based on public values.59 In the pesticide
accept may be that people tend to be attached to the status quo and that change can only be
purchased at a high price. Id. at 100.
56. FARBER, supra note 16, at 42.
57. Id. at 53 (quoting MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 17 (1988)). Professor Cass Sunstein made this point eloquently when
he explained human character as being more than simply the acts an individual chooses to do at
any given point in time. See id. at 54-55.
58. See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 60. For example, the fact that an
individual drives an SUV that gets poor gas mileage does not necessarily imply that such person
does not value clean air or energy efficiency. The individual may have purchased the SUV with
the primary consideration of safety and space for the family and its gear. Nevertheless, the
individual may value clean air and energy efficiency and may fully support the imposition of
tougher fuel economy standards on SUVs. The phenomenon of individual economic preferences
frequently conflicting with societal desires is well-illustrated by the following exercise that
Professor Scott Barrett of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University uses in his classroom. Professor Barrett's exercise can be seen as a variant of
the prisoner's dilemma to show how individuals may make different choices when acting in a
mode of consumer/wealth acquirer versus in a mode of democratic citizen. Barrett first hands
out two playing cards, one black and one red, to each student in his class. He then instructs the
students that each player will receive five dollars for keeping a red card plus one dollar for every
red card handed in by any other player. Thus, if there are twenty students playing and each
player hands in her red card, each of the twenty students will receive twenty dollars. If none of
the twenty players hands in her red card, each student will receive only five dollars. If six players
hand in their red cards, the other fourteen students receive eleven dollars each but the six who
handed in their cards only receive six dollars each. The incentive for each individual player to
keep her red card is obvious. Accordingly, when Barrett's class has played this game, less than
two-thirds of the players turn in their red cards. Barrett explains that this is what the economists
call a public good. All players benefit, and no player can be excluded from receiving that benefit.
When Barrett asks these same students to vote anonymously on whether to allow a government
regulation that would confiscate all of the red cards, thereby resulting in the best possible
outcome for all students (i.e., each student receives twenty dollars), invariably a majority votes
in favor of the government regulation. Frances Cairncross reaches the following interpretation of
this game: "in other words, left to themselves, individual players are selfish, but they yearn for
some outside force to make everybody behave better and improve the outcome of the game for
all the players." Frances Cairncross, What Makes Environmental Treaties Work?
CONSERVATION INPRACTICE, Spring 2004.
59. Nevertheless, economists do recognize a difference between private consumer choices
and environmental benefits. Economists consider many environmental benefits to be a public
good. Public goods may not be sufficiently provided solely through the marketplace because all
members of the public benefit from the good and charging all members of the public may be
difficult. The classic example of a public good in the environmental context is clean air. All
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regulation arena, an economic argument could be made that consumers'
purchases of food treated with chemical pesticides are conscious choices
based on economic and other factors. While consumers may purchase
such foods because they are generally significantly less expensive than
foods grown without chemical inputs, to assume that this consumer
choice means that consumers have consciously determined that the health
and environmental risks of pesticides in food are outweighed by the
increased cost of organically produced food is overly simplistic for
numerous reasons.
First, consumers may not be fully informed of the environmental and
health risks associated with pesticide use. The time and thought required
to sort out technical risk assessment information may be more than the
average consumer can, or desires to, commit.' Moreover, as described at
length in this Article, many of the risks of pesticides use are not well
understood, even by the experts. Thus, it would be unreasonable to
assume that consumers are able to make decisions on preliminary or
confusing data that experts are having difficulty grappling with. Second,
the price of food treated with pesticides does not reflect the true cost of
growing the food because of what economists refer to as negative
externalities.6" For example, the price of food treated with pesticides does
not reflect the price that society may have to pay later to clean up
pesticide contaminated sites, the long-term social costs of losing insect
pollinators, or the long-term social costs due to the development of pest
resistance resulting from overuse of pesticides. Third, the price of the
food is artificially low due to the combination of the externalities, such as
human health and environmental costs that are not reflected in the price
and the numerous government programs that encourage the use of
chemical inputs in agriculture.62 Crop subsidies, crop protection
members of the public breathe air, and thus, private enterprise cannot charge the public for the
air it breathes. Accordingly, private enterprise cannot profit by ensuring its operations result in
clean air. In recent years, Professor Cass Sunstein has introduced a modified form of cost/benefit
analysis, in which public values rather than private preferences govern environmental decisionmaking. See FARBER, supra note 16, at 95 (describing the proposal in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE
MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 139 (1996) involving a two-stage decision-making process. A
traditional quantitative cost/benefit analysis would constitute the first stage. The second stage
would take into consideration other non-quantifiable values).
60. The welfare economics assumption that the market results in resources being allocated
to their highest and best use assumes that all consumers in the market have full information on
which to base their choices. FOUNDATION OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 40-41
(Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998). If consumers do not have access to such information, the market
fails. Id.
61. Id.
62. For a detailed discussion of government policies that encourage pesticide use, see
Kenneth A. Dahlbert, Government Policies that EncouragePesticide Use in the United States,
in THE PESTICIDE QUESTION: ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS 281 (David Pimentel
& Hugh Lehman eds., 1993) (discussing a wide range of local, state, and federal programs
including price supports, incomes supports, farm credit programs, crop insurance programs,
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insurance, and other government programs provide economic incentives
for using pesticides, and economic disincentives for growing crops
without chemical pesticides result in artificially low food prices, which
may result in consumers purchasing more food grown with pesticides
than they would in a pure market. 63 Accordingly, in the agricultural
pesticide arena, as well as many other arenas, a cost/benefit analysis that
relies on market costs and benefits is unlikely to reflect consumers' true
preferences. Moreover, this example makes clear that the assumptions
upon which costs/benefit analyses are based, including perfect
information, no externalities, and a truly free market, deviate so far from
reality that a simplistic cost/benefit analysis, standing alone, is an
unreliable guide.
One controversial issue in the cost/benefit debate is whether
environmental values are significant only to the extent that they can be
translated into economic terms. 6 Opponents of cost/benefit analysis
''65
maintain that economists "price everything and value nothing.
Cost/benefit analysts tend to limit their view of the benefits of
environmental regulation to human lives saved or cancers averted.6 6 The
true benefits of environmental protection extend far beyond counting the
numbers of lives saved. For example, because non-lethal human health
effects, including subchronic neurological, behavioral, or reproductive
effects are not well understood and are not easily quantified, they are
rarely included in any meaningful way in cost/benefit analyses.67
Moreover, as described in detail below, ecological systems are not well
understood by science and the value of such systems is not readily

export policies, and tax policies). See also David Pearce & Robert Tinch, The True Price of
Pesticides, in BUGS IN THE SYSTEM: REDESIGNING THE PESTICIDE INDUSTRY FOR
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 50 (William Vorley & Dennis Kenney eds., 1998).
63. Id.For a good summary of agricultural price supports, see Robert L. Thompson,
Agricultural Price Supports, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, available at
http://www.econlib.org/librarylEnc/AgriculturalPriceSupports.html.
64. FARBER, supranote 16, at 35.
65. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). See also David Pearce &
Dominic Moran, The Economics of Biological Diversity Conservation, in CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY FOR THE COMING DECADE (Peggy L. Fiedler & Peter M. Kareiva eds., 2d ed. 1998).
66. FARBER, supra note 16, at 88. Cost/benefit analyses typically rely on the concept of
"statistical lives" saved because, under most risk assessments, it is impossible to identify the
actual person that would have died but for the environmental regulation. Typically people value
a statistical life less than an actual life. This is illustrated by the lengths that people will go, and
the money they are willing to spend, to save a child who falls into a well compared to how much
society is willing to spend to save an anonymous statistical person. See, e.g., SHAPIRO &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 64. In the ecological context, people go to great lengths to save a
beached whale but are only willing to spend a significantly lesser amount to save the statistical
dolphin from the shrimper's net. It is even harder to predict how much people will be willing to
spend to protect a statistical ecological service.
67. FARBER, supra note 16, at 88.
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quantified. Consequently, human disruptions to ecological systems are
rarely part of cost/benefit analyses. Furthermore, ethical, religious,
aesthetic, and other normative values of environmental protection are
not typically included in cost/benefit analyses. Finally, even those
components of the cost/benefit analysis that are more easily monetized,
such as the cost of compliance with environmental regulations, are
difficult to estimate. Frequently, regulatory agencies are asked to take
industry at its word,68 and often in retrospect, the true costs of compliance
are not as high as the pessimistic estimates suggested by industry.69
Another concern often raised by opponents of simplistic cost/benefit
analyses is that even when measured benefits exceed measured costs,
what is not considered is the social distribution of costs and benefits. In
other words, if a disproportionate share of the costs are borne by
segments of the population who do not share proportionally in the
benefits, is there truly a balance of costs and benefits? Environmental
risks tend to be disproportionately borne by vulnerable populationsfrequently people of color, low income, and/or weak political powerwho do not share the benefits gained by industrial pursuits. ° The benefits
of development and industry typically go to the advantaged segments of
society who typically do not bear a great portion of the risks resulting
from such activities. Environmental justice71 proponents point out that
cost/benefit analyses and other market-based systems can lead to the
creation of risk "hot spots," where, overall, the cost/benefit analysis may
weigh in favor of an activity going forward, but within a given segment of
society, typically economically and politically disadvantaged populations,
the cost/benefit analysis weighs in the opposite direction-i.e., hot spots
of risk with very little benefit. Accordingly, proponents of environmental
justice reject strict cost/benefit analyses.7
A similar argument can be made with regard to ecological resources.
Risk hot spots may emerge in situations where overall the cost/benefit
analysis weighs in favor of allowing a pesticide to be used, but in a
particular geographic area, or with a particular species or ecosystem, risk
68.

Id. at 90.

69.
70.

Id. at 167-68.

See generaly CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION (2002).

71. Although a detailed consideration of environmental justice is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is a compelling issue in environmental policy and it provides one example of how
cost/benefit analysis does not adequately address ethical, moral or fairness issues that cannot be
monetized. For an excellent discussion of how market-based approaches disproportionately
impact vulnerable populations. See id. at 33-37.
72. Proponents of cost/benefit analysis counter this argument by pointing out that segments
of society that are disadvantaged will not necessarily be better off under an inefficient system.
However, environmental justice advocates do not argue in favor of inefficiency for inefficiency's
sake, but rather they are willing to tolerate some level of economic inefficiency to accomplish
other important societal goals such as fairness.
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may be disproportionately high. This may occur with regard to sensitive
species, including threatened or endangered species, or with ecosystems
with low resistance and or low resilience. One example of such a risk hot
spot is the global amphibian crisis in which pesticides are implicated.73
Although the cost/benefit analysis for a particular pesticide may reflect
that the benefits outweigh the costs overall, this does nothing to protect
the highly sensitive and highly vulnerable amphibian populations that
may be disproportionately impacted by that pesticide.74
Finally, the values inherent in ecological integrity or biodiversity are
particularly ill-suited to be reduced to a dollar value. 5 Of course, many
ecological products and services have instrumental value. Many species in
nature can be eaten, made into medications, made into clothing or
shelter, burned for fuel, or otherwise used.76 However, what is
considerably more difficult to value are the aesthetic, inspirational,
religious, or spiritual reasons that many people value ecosystems.77 And
perhaps even more challenging is attempting to reduce to dollars and
cents the value that species have as members of ecosystems. For example,
species in an ecosystem may serve important roles as producers,
consumers, decomposers, competitors, dispersers, or pollinators.78 Each
of these roles provides value to other members of the ecosystem,
including humans.7 9 Another concern with the strict cost/benefit approach
which argues in favor of a cautious approach to cost/benefit analysis is the

73. See Carlos Davidson et al., Spatial Tests of the Pesticide Drift, HabitatDestruction,
UV-B, and Climate-ChangeHypotheses for CaliforniaAmphibian Declines, 16 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1588 (2002).
74. Moreover, the amendment of FIFRA by the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act to
include a "safety" standard for human food consumption may have resulted in a shift of risk
away from food consumers to occupational workers and ecological resources. For example,
organophosphate pesticides degrade quickly into benign breakdown products in the
environment and on agricultural food products. Thus, the FQPA standard of "safety" for human
food consumers may favor the use of organophosphate pesticides over other pesticides that do
not break down as quickly, and thus leave residue on foods. However, as described below,
organophosphates are highly acutely toxic to humans, other mammals, and birds and have been
implicated in thousands of bird deaths. Accordingly, relying more heavily on organophosphates
to meet the FQPA standard while reducing risks to food consumers may result in significantly
increased risk to vulnerable farm worker populations and to ecological resources. The risk to
farmworkers for pesticide exposure is extremely high. Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez,
Farmworkers: Among the Least Protected,in Rechtshaffen & Gauna, supra note 70, at 67-68.
Because the vast majority of farmworkers are ethnic minorities-primarily Latinos-these risks
raise significant environmental justice concerns. Id.
75. See, e.g., Ruhl, supranote 11, at 543.
76. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 43.
77. Id. Noted zoologist E.O. Wilson has coined the term "biophilia" to describe the deep
emotional and spiritual relationship that many people share with other living organisms and the
related sense of awe that frequently accompanies experience with the natural world. See
generallyEDWARD 0. WILSON, BIOPHILIA: THE HUMAN BOND WITH OTHER SPECIES (1984).
78. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 52.
79. Id.

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33:105

lack of knowledge and uncertainty regarding biological systems.' Our
current limited understanding of ecological systems and inadequate
methodologies for monetizing values prevent cost/benefit analyses from
being sufficiently precise to control environmental decision-making.8
In sum, although a strict cost/benefit approach offers a relatively
straightforward quantitative approach to addressing risk, and although
economic considerations cannot be ignored when determining whether a
regulation is warranted, the approach has a number of shortcomings.
First, current data and methodologies are not adequate for accurate and
precise analyses. Second, in practice, cost/benefit analyses do not
adequately address ecological values, community values, and other
normative considerations because reducing such values to monetary
terms is impossible. Finally, far from being value-neutral, cost/benefit
analyses are laden with biases in favor of those who seek to use resources
and away from those who seek to protect resources. Accordingly, ecopragmatism rejects the notion that cost/benefit analyses should control
environmental decision-making. Nevertheless, economic analyses are
considered to be useful factors to inform environmental decisionmakers.82 In other words, cost/benefit analysis should assist rather than
control environmental decision-making.83
b.

The Eco-PragmaticResponse: EmbracingFeasibility

In contrast to pure risk-based and strict cost/benefit approaches, ecopragmatism attempts to grapple with the complexities and lack of
understanding of species and ecosystem values. Eco-pragmatism also
recognizes that, in the real world, public policy decision-making must
occur within certain unavoidable constraints. Accordingly, one of the
foundations of pragmatism is a rejection of comprehensive rationality in
favor of bounded rationality. 4 In a perfect world with perfect scientific

80. For a discussion of the complexities and uncertainties of biological systems, see infra
notes 129-72 and accompanying text.
81. FARBER, supra note 16, at 42. Farber estimated the costs and benefits of a number of
environmental regulations from 1988 and determined that the costs ranged from 55 to 77 billion
and the benefits ranged from 16 to 135 billion dollars. Id. at 167-68. Thus, he concludes, the
return on every dollar spent ranged between 21 cents and $2.27. Id As Farber puts it "we were
either losing 80 percent of our investment or are more than doubling our money and we don't
know which!" Id. at 168.
82. FARBER, supranote 16, at 9; see also SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 63.
83. See Ruh], supranote 11, at 538.
84. Bounded rationality recognizes that institutions that make policy decisions do not have
complete information or unlimited time so as to enable them to make some theoretically optimal
choice in every case. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 23. The reality is that all
institutional decision-making is "bounded" by limited time, limited costs, and limited
information. Id. If these bounds did not exist, arguably cost/benefit analysis would be able to
provide optimal choices. Pragmatism does not ignore the existence of such bounds, but instead
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data on ecological risks and perfect cost/benefit methodologies that
adequately value all costs and benefits, a cost/benefit approach may be
compelling. However, with the complexity pervasive in ecological
systems, the dearth of good data, and the confused state of cost/benefit
methodology, all coupled with the need to act now, the pragmatist must
find another way. The pragmatist will look to what has worked best in the
experience of environmental law to date, and what has worked best is, at
least arguably, technology-based approaches.
All but the most staunch proponents of cost/benefit analysis seem to
recognize that cost/benefit analysis involves so many assumptions,
judgment calls, values, and unquantifiable factors, that viewing
cost/benefit analysis as a clear-cut quantifiable test, where all one has to
do is plug the numbers in and the "right" answer comes out, is overly
simplistic.' Eco-pragmatic theory recognizes many ethical considerations
go beyond mere economic efficiency and must be taken into account in
making environmental decisions.86
For all of the reasons discussed above, eco-pragmatism rejects pure
risk-based approaches and cost/benefit analysis in favor of a hybrid
approach based on the concept of feasibility.87 Under the hybrid
approach, environmental risks are reduced to the amount feasible and
cost/benefit analysis is used to assist, rather than control, decisionmaking. 8 This type of approach has been described as doing "the best we
can."89 While the goal is environmental risk reduction, there is
recognition that at some point the costs of further risk reduction become
too high to justify. Pragmatic risk regulation attempts to reconcile
conflicting values by using a "feasibility" standard. In other words, ecopragmatism "[strives] to achieve the maximum level of protection
consistent with reasonable costs." 90
Although there has been extensive academic debate over the
appropriateness of utilizing cost/benefit analyses or pure risk-based
approaches in environmental regulation, Congress has, for the most part,
rejected both pure risk-based and cost/benefit standards. Most of the
substantial environmental regulatory programs involve "hybrid"
standard-i.e., risk-based standards that take economic considerations
accepts these constraints and recognizes that decision-making must take them into account and
adapt as new information becomes available.
85. FARBER, supra note 16, at 94.
86. Id.at 9. As Shapiro and Glicksman have put it, we should be trying to do better than
simply attempting to "achieve the 'optimal' level of injury, death and environmental
degradation." SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 21-22, 50.
87. Farber defines feasibility as where costs are "not grossly disproportionate to the
benefits to be achieved." FARBER, supra note 16, at 94.
88. Id. at 122-23.
89. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supranote 11, at 22,50.
90. Id.at 147.
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into account but do not require strict cost/benefit balancing. Professors
Shapiro and Glicksman have surveyed existing environmental regulatory
statutes to determine which contain cost/benefit standards, which contain
feasibility standards, and which are pure risk-based. Their work
demonstrates that the majority of existing statutes contain standards that
require risk to be avoided to the extent feasible or to the extent that the
best available technology can achieve. Accordingly, these statutes are
referred to as technology-based statutes. The most common examples of
environmental statutes that utilize technology-based standards include
the Clean Water Act 91 and the Clean Air Act.9" While these standards
take costs into account, they are not purely cost/benefit balancing
standards.
The most common use of feasibility approaches in environmental
law is what Shapiro and Glicksman refer to as constrained balancing. This
approach is where the legislature establishes a level of environmental
protection to be achieved by identifying regulatory objectives based on
some model technology.93 In this way, costs are considered in choosing an
appropriate technology as the model, but costs are not directly weighed
against benefits to determine the overall worthiness of an approach or
objective.94 This approach is what is commonly referred to as "technology
based"95 standard setting and is also what Farber refers to as feasibility91. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2000) (setting forth technology-based standards for point
sources of water pollution).
92. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (2000) (specifying that existing stationary sources of air
pollution in nonattainment areas implement all "reasonably available control technology").
93. SHAPIRO& GLICKSMAN, supranote 11, at 37.
94. Id. at 37. Examples of this type of approach include: the Clean Air Act's requirement
for non-attainment areas that existing stationary sources implement all "reasonably available
control technology" as expeditiously as practicable, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1); and the Safe
Drinking Water Act's requirement that EPA establish maximum contaminant levels as close as
feasible to achieving the level at which no known or anticipated health effects will occur. 42
U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4) (2000).
95. Technology-based standards are credited with much of the pollution reduction that has
occurred since the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s. See Wendy E. Wagner, The
Triumph of Technology-Based Standards,2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 85 (2000). Technology-based
standards are the dominant mode of controlling the amount of pollution released into the
environment in the United States. Id.at 88. These standards are typically developed by EPA in
response to a congressional mandate for EPA to establish pollution limitations based on some
prescribed standard such as the "best available technology. " Id.at 88-89. Once Congress has
mandated the use of a particular technology-based standard, EPA will conduct a review of
currently available technologies for specific industrial sectors and choose the technology that
best fulfills the congressionally-prescribed standard. Id.at 89. Typically, the specific technology
chosen is not required to be employed. Instead, EPA determines the level of pollution control
that can be achieved using the chosen standard. Id.Industry is then free to utilize any technology
it chooses that complies with the numerical standard. Accordingly, industry has an incentive to
develop the most efficient technology to meet the numerical standard. One drawback to using
feasibility as a standard is that feasibility will vary with the economic strength of the industry.
FARBER, supranote 16, at 83. For example, a strong manufacturing sector may be able to install
costly pollution control technology while it may be infeasible for a weak sector of the economy
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based decision-making. Under constrained balancing or feasibility
approaches, risk reduction is sought to the point that additional reduction
would result in extraordinary or disproportionate costs.96
Although eco-pragmatism rejects pure strict cost/benefit balancing in
favor of feasibility, it does recognize a range of approaches to considering
costs that fall somewhere in between strict cost/benefit balancing and
feasibility. For example, Shapiro and Glicksman describe a second
category of balancing approaches as "open-ended balancing," which they
describe as a type of balancing whereby the legislature prescribes the
factors that the agency must consider in making a decision but does not
dictate the weight the agency must give to any particular factory
Interestingly, Shapiro and Glicksman describe FIFRA as an open-ended
balancing statute. While a facial reading of the statutory standard of
"unreasonable effects" arguably reveals an open-ended balancing
statute-whereby the agency is directed to consider a variety of risk and

to install the same technology. As a result, more economically successful industries are penalized
for their success with stricter rule applications not imposed on less successful industries. Id.
Many justifications have been expressed for using technology-based approaches to
environmental protection. These approaches tend to better address non-economic values while
still taking economic concerns into account. See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 65.
In addition, feasibility-based approaches recognize and account for bounded rationality See id.
at 65. See also supra note 84 and accompanying text. A feasibility standard is pragmatic in the
sense that it is consistent with widely-shared beliefs that environmental protection is important
to society. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 21. Feasibility approaches tend to prod
industry toward environmental risk reduction until the point where additional protection
becomes technologically or economically infeasible. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 11, at 537.
Moreover, some commentators maintain that technology-based standards are the best standards
available because we do not have enough data to conduct true cost/benefit analyses for most
environmental decisions. Adam Babich, Too Much Science in EnvironmentalLaw, 28 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 119 (2003). Finally, from a pragmatic perspective, technology-based approaches have
worked well in the United States' thirty year history of environmental law implementation. See
generally Wagner, supra note 95. After conducting an extensive analysis of the role of
technology-based standards in environmental law over the past thirty years, Professor Wendy
Wagner concludes that technology-based approaches are one of the most important innovations
in environmental law. Id at 86. Wagner also lauds technology-based standards for being
relatively easy to promulgate, readily enforceable, even-handed, adaptable, and efficient. Id. at
94-106 (finding that the rate of promulgation for technology-based standards outpaces other
standards by three to ten times and describing how technology-based standards apply equally to
all members of the regulated industry within a given category). Wagner explains that
technology-based standards are easily enforceable because the numerical level of pollution
allowed is clearly prescribed by rule. Id. at 100. Once emissions or discharges are sampled for
pollutants, regulated entities either meet the numerical standard or they do not. Id. at 101-02.
How they choose to meet the standard is irrelevant. For the same reason, technology-based
standards are very predictable. Id. at 101. Regulated entities can readily determine what
numerical standards they are expected to comply with by looking at the EPA rule for that
industry category. Id. at 100. See also Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Ouality, Technology, and
Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 199 n. 194 (1983).
96. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supranote 11, at 52.
97. Id. at 39.
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benefit factors but has not been directed as to how to weigh such
factors-in practice, EPA has interpreted and applied FIFRA as a
cost/benefit balancing statute requiring a pesticide's benefits to outweigh
its costs in order to be registered. EPA's interpretation has been
articulated in agency orders98 and upheld in many judicial decisions. 9
Thus, despite the significance of pesticides in the development of
environmental law, FIFRA virtually stands alone in its cost/benefit
approach to environmental protection. 1w
3.

The Necessity of a Baseline

One of the most significant concepts in Farber's work on ecopragmatism is the idea of starting with an environmental baseline. Farber
argues that some overarching principle is needed to guide decisionmaking and serve as a "tie-breaker" in the close cases.' 0' Farber posits
that environmental risks should be reduced to the extent feasible and that
the environmental baseline should be protected except in the case where
the costs of protecting the baseline "are grossly disproportionate to the
benefits."'0 2 Eco-pragmatism's baseline starts with a presumption in favor
of the environment. 3 However, Farber does not provide a
comprehensive explanation of what the baseline should be. Ecological
principles can be used to assist in developing an appropriate baseline.
Farber's primary justification for starting with an environmental
baseline is the long-term commitment to environmental protection in the
United States." Farber posits that there is a general recognition that
98. Stevens Indus., Inc., 1 E.A.D. 9 (June 2, 1972) (Consolidated DDT Hearings).
99. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
100. The only other major environmental statute employing a strict cost/benefit balancing
approach is section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2000), which has
been rendered impotent by the Fifth Circuit decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947
F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that EPA did not have a reasonable basis to conclude that
asbestos presents an unreasonable risk and that EPA failed to choose the least burdensome
alternative to protect against such risk).
101. FARBER, supra note 16 at 93, 104.
102. Id at 12.
103. Ruhl, supra note 11, at 537. As Farber explains, for any environmental regulatory
scheme at least three possible baselines could be employed. FARBER, supra note 16, at 103. The
first such baseline would be a neutral baseline in which there is neither a presumption in favor of
the environmental nor one in favor of industrial/economic pursuits. Id. at 103. The second such
baseline is a presumption in favor of industrial/economic pursuits. Under this baseline, regulated
interests begin with a presumptive entitlement. Id. The third such baseline is a presumptive
entitlement assigned to those who stand to benefit from the regulatory program. Id. In other
words, the third baseline is a presumption in favor of environmental protection. Farber asserts
that the environmental baseline is the appropriate baseline to use.
104. FARBER, supra note 16, at 94. Farber has been criticized for overstating the public
commitment to environmental protection. See Paul Boudreaux, Environmental Costs, Benefits,
and Values: A Review of Daniel A. Farber'sEco-Pragmatism,13 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 125, 148-49
(1999) (asserting that Farber has "overstretched" and that although Americans like to label
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nature has inherent value that goes far beyond the purely utilitarian uses
of nature for human purposes." 5 Other justifications for an
environmental baseline include: limited scientific understanding,
enormous data gaps, complexity, and uncertainty of environmental
issues." Without a full understanding of the complex issues involved,
prudence suggests a presumption in favor of environmental protection.
Consequently, environmental law should take a stance in favor of
environmental protection instead of attempting to be neutral. Under ecopragmatism, there is a presumption in favor of environmental protection,
but the presumption can be rebutted where the costs of protecting the
baseline are disproportionately large."
Deciding to establish an "environmental baseline" raises the issue of
what is an environmental baseline, particularly in the area of ecological
protection. Is the environmental baseline a zero-risk baseline, or is some
other measure of environmental protection more appropriate? Farber
does not attempt to answer this question. In the area of ecological
protection, establishing an environmental baseline takes on additional
complexity beyond that of human health protection." 8 This Article
proposes maintenance of ecological integrity as an environmental
baseline. One significant component of ecological integrity is
biodiversity-a measure of species abundance and richness used by
themselves as environmentalists, the depth of their commitment is unclear). Nevertheless, there
are numerous surveys and studies that consistently demonstrate the existence of such a
commitment. For a general discussion of American environmental values and public opinion
surveys regarding such values, see ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN
S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 8
(4th ed. 2003). One recent study conducted by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and
Policy indicates that most Americans are seriously concerned about the country's environmental
health and want more attention paid to environmental problems. This survey also suggests that
most Americans, whether Democrat, Republican, or Independent, are as concerned with
problems of air pollution and toxic contamination of soil and water as they are with issues of jobs
and the cost of gas. See YALE CTR. FOR ENVTL. LAW & POLICY, YALE UNIV. SCH. OF
FORESTRY & ENvTL. STUDIES, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFICIT: SURVEY ON AMERICAN
ATrITUDES ON THE ENVIRONMENT
(2004), http://www.yale.edu/forestry/downloads/
yale-enviro-poll.pdf.
105. Moreover, to the extent to which nature provides utility, it is a public good that should
not be frivolously plundered to benefit a few. FARBER, supra note 16, at 108-09.
106. Id. at 12.
107. Id. Although beyond the scope of this article, Farber also asserts that the ecological
baseline should be adopted by the judicial system as canon of statutory interpretation, which he
refers to as a "green canon." Id. at 124. Farber looks to legislative intent, as well as to the more
formalistic view of the statutory mandate of NEPA, for the government to use all practicable
means consistent with other essential considerations of national policy to achieve certain
prescribed environmental goals, as bases for his green cannon. Id.at 124-27.
108. For example, in human health protection, a "no carcinogenicity" baseline could be
established. Alternatively, a de minimis risk baseline could be established (e.g., a baseline of one
cancer death per million). Other approaches could include establishing a baseline that is no
greater than the risk from ambient pollutant levels. In the ecological arena, however, the issues
are more complex.
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ecologists to assess the health of ecosystems.' 9 In addition to having
considerable scientific justification for protecting biological diversity, it is
important to remember that protection of biodiversity is mandated under
international law. The 1992 United Nations Environment Programme
Convention on Biological Diversity1 ' ("Convention") created the first
international obligation to protect biodiversity. However, although the
United States is a signatory, the Convention has not been ratified, and
therefore the United States is not formally bound by it. Nevertheless,
article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
a state that has signed a treaty must refrain from "acts that would defeat
the object and purpose of the [t]reaty."' Accordingly, the United States
is arguably prohibited from taking any action that would defeat the
purpose of the 1992 Convention to Protect Biological Diversity.'
Accordingly, at least some basis in international law supports an
argument that the United States is obligated to conserve biological
diversity.
U.S. domestic law also supports an ecological integrity baseline.
Various statutes express goals and policies directed toward maintenance
of ecological integrity. For example, the Clean Water Act provides the
broad environmental objective "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters.""' 3 Perhaps the

109. Professor Fred Bosselman has published a comprehensive analysis of scientific issues
that biologists recognize as inherent in the concept of "biodiversity." He maintains that the term
"biodiversity" lacks the precision needed for a workable legal standard and sets out to provide a
series of example to illustrate the various approaches that the law could take to address these
scientific issues. Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 364
(2004).
110. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. 20
(1993), 31 I.L.M. 818 (1993).
111. May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
112. Moreover, as Professor Daniel Tarlock has pointed out, Chapter 15 of Agenda 21,
which was approved by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
obligates states to develop strategies to conserve biodiversity and for sustainable use of
biological resources. A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation in the United States: A Case
Study in Incompleteness and Indirection,23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10529 (2002).
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000) (expressing one of the
objectives of the Clean Air Act as being to protect the public health and welfare from adverse
effects of air pollution). For further discussion of U.S. authorities that support an ecological
integrity baseline, see also Robert L. Fischman, Biological and Ecological Management.
BiologicalDiversity and EnvironmentalProtection. Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L.
435 (1992). In addition to the specific provisions related to ecological integrity that can be found
in domestic environmental pollution control laws, several commentators have argued that other
areas of the law support the protection of ecological or biological integrity. See, e.g., Robert L.
Fischman, The Meanings of BiologicalIntegrity,Diversity,and EnvironmentalHealth, 44 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 989 (2004) (analyzing the National Wildlife Refuge mandate "to ensure that the
biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the (Refuge) System are
maintained"); and Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the Balancing
Function of PropertyLaw, 28 ENVTL. L. 53 (1998) (arguing that ecological integrity should be a
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strongest support for such a baseline, however, can be found in the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).1 14 Section 101 of NEPA provides, among

other things, that it is the continuing policy of the United States
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
harmony."115
While biodiversity certainly is an important indicator
health, ecosystem health also relies on the integrity of the

to "create and
in productive
of ecosystem
physical and

chemical components of the system, as well as the relationship between

species and the physical world. Of course, one measure of ecological
integrity is the presence of a diversity of species. Nevertheless, not all
species within an ecosystem provide the same level of value to the other

members of the ecosystem. Conservation biologists have identified
certain types of species that provide greater value to ecosystems and
accordingly should be afforded greater protection. One

such type of

species, the "controller species," plays a major role in controlling the
movement of energy and nutrients within an ecosystem. 116 Another type of
species of special importance is known as the "keystone species,"
which provides more value to the ecosystem than would be predicted by
their limited abundance in the ecosystem. 117 Some conservation biologists

believe that the extinction of a keystone species could result in a domino
effect whereby numerous species go extinct and the entire ecosystem is
drastically altered. 118 "Umbrella species" typically have very large home

territories such that protecting an umbrella species' habitat will have the
guiding principle by which legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies interpret and apply property
rules).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347 (2000).
115. Id. § 4331. This section declares it is the policy of the United States to use all practicable
means to achieve a list of broad environmental goals. These goals include:
1)fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations; 2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings; 3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and
unintended consequences; 4) preserve important historic cultural and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity
and variety of individual choice; 5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
that will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 6)
enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum obtainable recycling
of depletable resources.
Id. For a detailed discussion of the possible use of NEPA as an environmental baseline that can inform
statutory interpretation, see generally Mary Jane Angelo, Crouching Textualist, Hidden Intentionalist:
Reclaiming Our Stolen "Green Destiny" out of the Judicial Sparring over the Interpretation of
Environmental Statutes, in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL
CLIMATE (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005).
116. Controller species typically include decomposer species. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 52.
117. One commonly cited example of a keystone species is the red-cockaded woodpecker, which
"excavates cavities in living trees, thereby providing habitat" for a variety of species that live in tree
cavities but are not capable of excavating their own cavities. Id.
118. Id. at 74.
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effect of protecting many other species as well." 9 Finally, species very
sensitive to pollutants and other environmental stresses-such that the
health of these populations serves as a good indicator of overall
ecological health-are known as "indicator species."' 0 Of course, while
certain types of species-such as controller species and keystone
species-may warrant greater protection, due to our extremely limited
understanding of the workings of ecological systems, a prudent
environmental baseline would assume that every component of an
ecosystem has some value unless proven otherwise.121
Moving beyond protection of individual species, even those of
particular ecological import, the protection of ecosystem 22 diversity is
crucial to the maintenance of overall ecological integrity. Ecosystems
themselves provide numerous services,23 some easily quantifiable and
some not. As Professor Laura Westra has stated, "[h]uman survival
depends on many of nature's 'goods and services' that are invisible to
markets and the economy; some are no doubt invisible to scientists."'24
Natural resource economists have identified numerous ecosystem
services that would be extremely expensive if not technically infeasible
for humans to replace. In fact, global ecosystem services have been
valued at $33 trillion.' Of course, as with individual species, a lack of

119. Id.at 54.
120. Id. at 55. The pelican's sensitivity to DDT made it a good indicator species for
organochlorine pesticide contamination.
121. DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR'S SHADOW: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF
WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 12 (1999). Both individual species and ecosystems exhibit a wide range
of resilience to human-induced changes. Id. at 6. Because of the dramatic differences between
species and between ecosystems and because so little is understood about the ability of a
particular species or particular ecosystem to tolerate or bounce-back after damage from human
activities, it is very difficult to determine whether a particular change will result in significant
habitat destruction. Id at 9. While saying that all ecosystems are so delicate and intricate that
removing one part will necessary cause the demise of the entire system may be gross
overstatement, it is not overstatement to say that removing one species from an ecosystem can
negatively affect other species and, in the words of Princeton conservation biologist David
Wilcove, "there is no way of knowing ahead of time where the chain reaction will end." Id at 12.
122. An ecosystem is defined as "a group of interacting organisms (often called a
community), and the physical environment they inhabit at a given point in time. HUNTER, supra
note 29, at 62 (emphasis removed).
123. One example of an ecosystem service is a wetland (a type of ecosystem) serving as a
filter to treat water supplies. Id.at 69. Other examples include beach dunes buffering upland
properties from the effects of storms, and saltmarshes supporting fisheries, air purification, soil
renewal, climate stabilization, and crop pollination. Id.; see also Ruh, supra note 11, at 544
(citing NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C.
Daily ed., 1997)).
124. Laura Westra et al., EcologicalIntegrity and the Aims of the Global IntegrityProject,
in ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY: INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENT, CONSERVATION, AND HEALTH 25
(David Pimentel et al. eds., 2000).
125. FARBER, supra note 16, at 67 (describing a 1997 report in the scientific journal
NATURE); see also Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and
NaturalCapital,387 NATURE 253 (1997).
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understanding of the workings of these complex systems leaves open the
very likely possibility that ecosystems perform many other valuable
services that we do not yet fully understand or are not yet able to
quantify.
Because ecology encompasses the relationships between the
physical, the chemical, and the biological, ecological integrity necessarily
includes physical integrity, chemical integrity, and biological integrity. To
fully address ecological integrity, a variety of indicators of ecosystem
health must be considered, including not only the number of organisms or
species or the status of threatened or endangered species, but also the
state of physical, chemical, and biological processes that, together with
biological considerations, comprise ecological integrity. Ecological
integrity can be measured by starting with looking "at a site with a biota
that is the product of evolutionary and biogeographic processes in the
relative absence of the effects of modern human activity."' 26 Then,
existing or predicted conditions can be compared to this baseline to
measure the extent of deviation. Conservation biology scholars have
made numerous attempts to define qualitatively, if not quantitatively,
biological or ecological integrity. For example, James R. Karr developed
an index of biological integrity (IBI) to address the objective articulated
in the Clean Water Act,'27 "to restore and maintain the chemical,
1 28
physical, and biological integrity of the Nations Waters.
Whatever metrics are employed to evaluate whether an
environmental regulatory program preserves ecological integrity, some
system of measurement is needed to account for diversity, health of
significant species, and integrity of the physical and chemical world. By
clarifying that ecological integrity will be the environmental baseline in
eco-pragmatism, a clear reference point can be established to which
ecological changes of proposed anthropogenic activities can be measured
against. Accordingly, when considering whether to impose a regulation,
the regulation must be sufficient, not to completely preserve the status
quo, but to maintain ecological integrity.

126. Westra, supranote 124, at 23.
127. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
128. James R. Karr, Health, Integrity, and Biological Assessment: The Importance of
Measuring Whole Things, in Westra, supra note 124, at 209, 219-23. The IBI has been compared
to the index of leading economic indicators, which considers a number of financial measures to
assess the overall state of the economy. Similarly, the IBI takes into consideration a number of
metrics to assess the overall condition of an ecological system. Examples of metrics used in
determining the IBI include species richness, stress intolerant and tolerant indicator species,
relative abundance of trophic guilds, presence of alien species, and the incidence of disease,
lesions, tumors, or other anomalies in the biota. The IBI does not call for the measurement of
physical or chemical parameters but instead assumes that their impacts will be manifest in
biological indicators. Because of the regional differences between ecological systems, the IBI
must be calibrated on a regional basis. Id.
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Lack of Information and ChangingInformation

The fourth question sought to be answered by eco-pragmatism is
when should we proceed in the face of imperfect information rather than
waiting for a better understanding of environmental issues after new
information becomes available. This question raises the related issues of
whether precautionary approaches should be used in environmental
decision-making and how to incorporate adaptive management ideas into
environmental laws.
The lack of scientific understanding of natural systems overshadows
the entire environmental decision-making process.'29 Science's limited
ability to provide clear answers to environmental questions has presented
ongoing problems in environmental law. 3 ' As described by Justice
Breyer, scientific uncertainty is involved in every stage of any risk
assessment. As he describes it, if ten independent steps in a risk analysis
each involves an uncertainty factor of two, the estimate of the total risk
has an uncertainty factor of one thousand.' Even beyond the complex
field of risk assessment, uncertainty pervades environmental decisionmaking. 3 ' The regulated community has taken full advantage of this
scientific uncertainty. Decisions to regulate, the community asserts,
should wait until science can conclusively demonstrate the need for such
regulation.'33 Of course, using a lack of certainty as an excuse not to act
can result in serious, and sometimes irreparable, environmental
consequences.
Our limited understanding of environmental issues, coupled with the
complexity of ecological systems, suggests caution when deciding whether
to allow potentially risky activities. The precautionary principle, adopted
by a variety of international environmental agreements,'4 is one
129. FARBER, supra note 16, at 1, 5.
130. See Tarlock, supra note 33, at 1135 (discussing the tension between scientific
uncertainty and the law's desire for clear standards).
131. FARBER, supra note 16, at 163 (citing Breyer, supranote 46, at 45).
132. See, e.g., Tarlock, supranote 33, at 1135-39.
133. See, e.g., id. at 1135-36.
134. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7 1992,31 I.L.M. 247 (hereinafter Maastricht
Treaty) (adopting the precautionary principle as a governing principle of European Union Law).
See also 1992 United Nations Environment Programme Convention on Biodiversity. The
preamble to the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety provides that it is
reaffirming the precautionary approach .. . contained in ...

the Rio Declaration on

Environment and Development ... Article 10(6) of the Protocol provides that [l]ack
of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge
regarding potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party or import. .. shall not prevent
that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, . . . in order to avoid or minimize
such potential adverse effects.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39
I.L.M. 1027, 1031 (2000).
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approach to proceeding cautiously. The precautionary principle resolves
scientific doubts in favor of the environment.135
As predictions are made further out in time, uncertainty tends to
increase. Accordingly, more caution is warranted when considering
effects that may not occur until long into the future. Moreover, the
precautionary principle takes into account the fact that inherent in any
13 6
scientific evaluation is the opportunity for scientific error to occur.
Opponents of the precautionary principle contend that it is based on
vague and baseless fears regarding environmental risks. But, the same
could be said to argue in favor of a precautionary approach. Often the
costs of regulation are based on vague and baseless fears about the
potential economic consequences of regulation, dire predictions of which
rarely come true. 37

Farber emphasizes the need to proceed cautiously. He maintains
that, when environmental risks are still uncertain, we should take
reasonable precautions."3 When making difficult regulatory decisions
with very incomplete or inconclusive data is necessary,3 waiting until
complete or conclusive data are available may be imprudent. For many
environmental decisions, a decision to wait is a decision to irreversibly
impact a resource. Such is the case with a decision to withhold regulatory
action on the protection of an endangered species due to incomplete
information. By the time complete information becomes available, the
species may be extinct or beyond recovery.
Because the ecological sciences are relatively new, scientific
uncertainty is perhaps even more profound in assessing risks to ecological
systems than in assessing human health risks."4 Once again, the
incorporation of ecological principles into eco-pragmatism lends further
support to the theory. Moreover, with regard to ecological issues, flexible
and adaptive approaches are even more critical than with human health
concerns. The science of understanding how species and ecosystems work
135. Ruhl, supranote 11, at 537.
136. Scientific type I errors are those that mistakenly conclude an effect is real when it is
not, whereas type II errors are those that mistakenly conclude that an effect is not real when it
really is. In the field of environmental protection, type II errors are of the greatest concern. If,
for example, a determination is made that allowing a particular activity to proceed will not cause
harm to an endangered species, and that decision is based on a type II error, the activity may
unintentionally result in jeopardy to the endangered species. FARBER, supranote 16, at 173.
137. Another way to view the precautionary principle is as a burden-shifting device, which
shifts the burden of proof to the resource users or polluter to demonstrate its activities should be
allowed. Id. at 171. By placing the burden of proof on the regulated entity, ties are resolved in
favor of the environment.
138. Id. at 164.
139. Id.
140. See generallyDaniel A. Farber, ProbabilitiesBehaving Badly: Complexity Theory and
Environmental Uncertainty,37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003) (describing the high level of
scientific uncertainty surrounding environmental problems).
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and how human disruptions may impact them is still in its infancy.141
During the early years of ecology natural systems were believed to be
stable and ecosystems were thought to have evolved in a predetermined
set of stages (known as succession) toward a stable "climax
community." 4 In the past twenty-five years, the paradigm that
ecosystems exist in a state of equilibrium has been replaced with the
more complex nonequilibrium paradigm. 43 In recent years, ecological
science has discovered that natural systems have multiple persistent states
and multiple "successional pathways." In other words, natural systems do
not necessarily follow a clear path from successional state to successional
state but instead may follow a variety of different paths.1" Thus, the
current dominant paradigm rejects the "balance of nature" paradigm. 4 '
To capture this concept, Professor Judy Meyer has coined the phrase
"dance of nature" to replace the outdated "balance of nature."'" In the
past twenty years, ecologists also have begun to realize that natural
systems are episodically and repeatedly disturbed by natural phenomena
such as fire, flood, drought, and disease and pest outbreak, as well as by
similar types of disturbances resulting from human activity. 47 Functioning
ecosystems have a certain level of resilience and resistance to such
disturbances. Consequently, human disturbances that mimic these natural
disturbances are not necessarily "bad" for natural systems. 4 ' The goal for
141. FARBER, supra note 16, at 167. Professors Bosselman and Tarlock review four periods
of ecological thought during the twentieth century and analyze how each period influenced
environmental law and policy. Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of
EcologicalScience on American Law: An Introduction,69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 847 (1994),
142. See generallyMeyer, supra note 26, at 876.
143. See generally BOTKIN, supra note 26. The nonequilibrium paradigm was not widely
accepted until the 1980s. See Tarlock, supra note 33, at 1129.
144. Meyer, supra note 26, at 876.
145. Id at 877.
146. Id.
147. Id.at 876.
148. Ruhl, supra note 20, at 906-07. Despite the complex and delicate nature of interactions
between species in an ecosystem, both history and disequilibria theory teach that change,
including human disturbance, is not necessarily detrimental to overall ecosystem health.
Ecosystems do possess the ability to resist certain disturbances and to recover from those that do
have a detrimental effect. In ecological terms, "resistance" is the degree to which an ecosystem
changes in response to a disturbance whereas "resilience" is the degree to which an ecosystem
recovers after it has been disturbed. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 74. Thus, while not all human
disturbance is detrimental to ecosystems, the frequency of the disturbance, the magnitude of the
disturbance, and the nature of the disturbance determine whether the ecosystem will suffer longterm negative effects. Meyer, supranote 26, at 882. Ecosystems tend to respond better to human
disturbances that mimic those that occur in nature. In addition, the overall health of an
ecosystem determines how well the ecosystem will respond to disturbances. For example,
species-rich areas may be both more resistant and more resilient to human disturbances than
ecosystems lacking a great abundance and diversity of species. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 86-91.
Genetic variability within a species improves the likelihood that the species will survive and
evolve in response to environmental change. Id. at 86-87. Likewise, variability between species
within an ecosystem can improve the chances for an ecosystem to survive and evolve in response
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environmental protection, thus, should not be to suppress all humancaused disturbances, but rather to prevent human-caused disturbances
that are not in line with the natural disturbance regime of the
ecosystem. 4 9 To proceed consistently with natural disturbance regimes,
therefore, requires knowledge of the historical record of an ecosystem. 5 '
Unfortunately, this type of long-term historical monitoring data rarely is
available.
The non-equilibrium paradigm, however, should not be understood
to imply that, because ecosystems naturally experience change, all
anthropogenic change is acceptable. 5' Anthropogenic changes frequently
differ from natural changes in character, magnitude, and frequency.'52
Moreover, natural systems frequently react to anthropogenic
disturbances in unpredictable ways.'53 Even very small disturbances can
"'flip' ecosystems into vastly different behavioral states, sometimes well
after the event that started the reaction."' 54 Thus, as Meyer concludes,
"[a]nthropogenic change is acceptable only if that change is within
15 The limits depend on the specifics of the ecosystems and its
limits.""
ability to keep pace with the changes that occur.156
In addition to precautionary approaches, eco-pragmatism favors
developing flexible regulatory systems that allow decisions to be modified
as additional information becomes available.'57 One of the most
significant aspects of pragmatism in general is the recognition that the
combination of limited information and an ever-changing society cannot
tolerate static decision-making. Instead, mechanisms must be in place to
ensure that, as new information becomes available or as society's values
evolve, the law must be able to adapt incrementally and accordingly.'5 8

to human disturbances. Id. In fact, a lack of genetic diversity may cause problems even in
ecosystems not experiencing change. For example, genetically uniform species may experience
low fertility and high mortality rates among offspring, as evidenced by the experiences in many
zoos. Id. at 88. Likewise, ecosystems that have not been compromised by chemical
contamination may respond better than those that have.
149. Meyer, supranote 26, at 879.
150. Id. at 879.
151. Id. at 882. See alsoTarlock, supra note 33, at 1130 (explaining that the nonequilibrium
paradigm does not undermine the case for protection of ecosystems).
152. Meyer, supranote 26, at 882.
153. See Ruhl, supra note 20, at 906.
154. Id. This phenomenon is frequently analogized with the "tipping" point of a canoe. A
canoe can be progressively tipped more and more with only minor effect, until it reaches its
tipping point, at which point the canoe completely capsizes. Once a tipping point is reached, the
entire system can collapse or undergo dramatic change.
155. Meyer, supra note 26, at 882.
156. Id.at 882.
157. FARBER, supra note 16, at 12.
158. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 24-27. Shapiro and Glicksman
have referred to such incremental adjustment as "muddling through" and argue that it is often
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Thus, eco-pragmatism suggests that environmental laws must have
mechanisms built into them to allow regulatory agencies to make
incremental adjustment to regulation to take into account new
information, as well as to correct old mistakes.19 Under the existing
regulatory system, agencies such as EPA tend to be so concerned with
making the "right" decision up front, that any controversy or lack of
information tends to paralyze them. Instead, a pragmatic approach would
enable agencies making the best available decision based on the best
currently available information with a corresponding recognition that
such decisions will be adjusted over time."6 Of course, one reason that
agencies are so concerned with making the perfect front-end decisions is
that changing course in mid-stream is generally extremely difficult and
61
time-consuming under the existing regulatory system.
The inherent complexity and unpredictability of natural systems, 62
coupled with a limited scientific understanding of such systems, has led to
the ground-breaking development in the field of conservation biology
called adaptive management. 163 Adaptive management developed in the
context of natural resource management." 6 Nevertheless, it has not yet
been used widely in environmental regulation.16 Adaptive management
requires both a willingness to make environmental policy decisions with
limited scientific information and recognition that such decisions must be
continually monitored, evaluated, and adjusted as new information or
changed circumstances warrant. 166
the most rational way to make policy. Id at 24. In fact, pragmatism shies away from dramatic
reforms in favor of such incremental adjustments. Id. at 26.
159. Id,
160. See id. at 25. Willingness to change as new information becomes available must work
both ways-i.e., on the one hand, if a regulation is found not to be protective enough, a
mechanism should adapt quickly to provide the requisite protection. If a regulation is too
stringent, a mechanism should provide quick regulatory relief. FARBER, supra note 16, at 12.
161. The stasis inherent in the regulatory system stems in part from the time-consuming and
cumbersome requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000), the
agencies' fear that any "opening up" of the rulemaking process will invite legal challenges, and
the expectation on the part of the regulated community that once a decision is made, they will be
able to rely on it indefinitely.
162. The developing theory of dynamic systems is also referred to as complexity theory or
chaos theory. See FARBER, supra note 140, at 146. Farber's article explores the uncertainty
about environmental problems in the context of complexity theory. Farber posits that
complexity theory provides strong support for adaptive management. Id. at 147.
163. For a detailed discussion of adaptive management and how it is used in a number of
environmental programs, including Habitat Conservation Planning under the ESA, U.S. Forest
Service management planning, and everglades restoration, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive
Ecosystem Management and RegulatoryPenalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism,97
MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003).
164. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supranote 11, at 167.
165. Id.
166. Id. Previous experience is used to inform adjustments to policy. Perhaps Bosselman
and Tarlock said it best:
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More flexible regulatory systems are needed to adapt to change or to
incorporate new information. In addition, regulatory systems must place
greater emphasis on acquiring necessary data through monitoring
outcomes of environmental decisions. Using the information of the
effects of a particular regulatory action acquired through monitoring
programs, adjustments can be made to produce better, more sciencebased regulations. 167 Eco-pragmatism calls for a more experimental
approach in which regulatory actions are implemented, monitored, and
adjusted based on the results of the monitoring. 6'
The difficulty with these types of flexible or adaptive schemes is that
neither the law nor the regulatory agencies that implement the law are
quick reactors to change. Eco-pragmatism attempts to address this
problem by proposing more decentralized approaches whereby decisions
can be modified to adapt to new information on a local level and smaller
scale more quickly than could be accomplished in a large centralized
system. 69 A decentralized system tends to be more flexible and to
respond more quickly to new information. 7 One mechanism for
accomplishing decentralization is devolution of regulatory responsibility
to state and local governments. However, although localized decisionmaking has certain advantages, delegating too much authority to states or
local governments could result in a "race to the bottom."'' Thus,
safeguards are necessary to prevent a disintegration of environmental
protection. Such safeguards could include national minimum standards
and national oversight of state regulation.'72

Ecosystems are patches or collections of conditions that exist for finite periods of time
[footnote omitted]. The accelerating interaction between humans and the natural
environment makes it impossible to return to an ideal state of nature. At best,
ecosystems can be managed rather than restored or preserved, and management will
consist of a series of calculated risky experiments...
that must be judged against a moving target.
Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 39, at 869-70. Although environmental experimentation is rife
with risk, it may be the only effective way to proceed. For any system or organization to adjust to
changing information or circumstances, feedback loops are necessary. See Tarlock, supra note
33, at 1139. To date, such feedback loops have not been widely used in environmental law, which
tends to favor the consistency and predictability of clear fixed rules. Id. In fact, environmental
law has tended to adhere so strongly to scientific findings that it fails to reconsider such findings
even as new data prove them to be incorrect. Id. at 1039-40.
167. FARBER, supra note 16, at 179.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 180.
170. Ruhl, supra note 11, at 540.
171. FARBER, supra note 16, at 182-83. For an excellent analysis of the race to the bottom
theory, see Kirsten H. Engel, State EnvironmentalStandard-Setting:Is There a "Race" and is it
to the "Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997). For an opposing view of the theory, see Richard
L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to
Critics,82 MINN. L. REv. 535 (1997).
172. FARBER, supra note 16, at 182-83.
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In sum, eco-pragmatism provides a useful framework for
environmental decision-making. Many of the shortcomings of ecopragmatism can be overcome by consciously integrating principles of
ecological science. An eco-pragmatic evaluation of pesticide law must
start with an understanding of the history of pesticide use and the
ecological risks posed by pesticides.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE PESTICIDE/ECOLOGY RELATIONSHIP

A.

History ofPesticide Use

Scientists believe that humans have used pesticides for over two
thousand years." 3 Although metals such as arsenic, lead, and copper were
used as pesticides extensively in the early twentieth century, most pest
control until that time was accomplished by cultural controls such as
cultivation, 174 sanitation, 175 crop rotation, 7 6 and sowing and harvesting
practices. 177 Not until the latter half of the twentieth century did the
173. Homer described how Odysseus used burning sulfur as a fumigant to control pests.
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (Edward McCrorie transl., 2004). For a more complete description of
the history of pesticide use, see Clive A. Edwards, The Impact of Pesticides on the Environment,
in THE PESTICIDE QUESTION, supra note 62. Additional documentation of pesticide use such as
the use of arsenic to kill insects can be found in literature dating back to the time of Christ.
There is documentation that arsenic has been used to control insects dating back to 70 A.D.
when Pliny the Elder recommended the use of arsenic to kill insects. Arsenic was also used as a
pesticide in sixteenth century China. Id.
174. HELMUT F. VAN EMDEN & DAVID B. PEAKALL, BEYOND SILENT SPRING:
INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT AND CHEMICAL SAFETY 115-17 (1996). Many pest insects
live out at least part of their life cycle in soil, weeds, or accumulated crop debris in farm fields.
Plowing the top layer of soil kills many of these pest insects. Accordingly, soil tillage historically
was a critical component of agricultural pest management. It was not until relatively recently
that, as a way to minimize soil erosion, tillage was abandoned in favor of zero or minimum tillage
systems, which rely on herbicide usage to control weeds. The demise of tillage as a core
component of modern agricultural systems has resulted in a dramatic increase in certain soildwelling pests. Id. at 115. Other cultivation pest control techniques used historically include
mulching, compacting, and manuring. Id. at 115-17.
175. Sanitation practices are one of the most effective pest control practices used in both
ancient and modern agriculture. Id. at 117-18. By destroying residues of crops left in fields after
harvesting, many pest populations that live in such residues are destroyed. Related practices
such as destruction of weed hosts and selective pruning also serve as effective pest control tools.
Id. at 118-19.
176. Crop rotation, one of the oldest forms of pest control, is a very effective pest control
technique for minimizing soil-dwelling pests. By alternating the planting of different crops in a
particular field, populations of soil-dwelling insects that feed on a particular crop will not be able
to build up during periods when their food crop is not present. Thus, when the crop eventually is
planted, populations of the pest species generally will not be high enough to cause serious
problems. Id. at 120-21.
177. Timing sowing and planting dates to avoid pest outbreaks or to ensure the crop plant is
in a resistant growth stage when pest outbreaks are likely to occur, as well as carefully tailoring
seed and planting rates and early harvesting can be effective tools for avoiding pest damage to
crops. Id. at 121-23.
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development of synthetic chemical pesticides lead to a global explosion of
pesticide use.178 Because these new synthetic chemical pesticides were
spectacularly effective at controlling a wide variety of pests, they quickly
gained favor and, before long, were ubiquitous. Estimates of global
pesticide use are staggering. More than 1,600 types of pesticides are
currently available.179 More than five billion pounds of pesticides, with a
value of over thirty billion dollars, are used annually in the world. 80
Pesticide use in the United States accounts for 27 percent of global
pesticide usage, with U.S. exports to other countries exceeding 450
million pounds of pesticides per year."8
The rapid worldwide adoption of synthetic chemical pesticides began
during World War II with the development of two primary categories of
chemical insecticides: the organochlorines and the organophosphates.
The organochlorines, which include the notorious pesticide DDT, 82 were
first considered highly desirable because, while very toxic to a broad
range of invertebrates, they are not highly acutely toxic to humans or
other mammals. 83 Organochlorine pesticides such as DDT are credited
with saving thousands of lives from insect-borne diseases during World
War IIV' Furthermore, these pesticides also are extremely persistent in
the environment, which makes them highly effective for long-term
effective pest control. However, their persistence became their downfall
when the long-term ecological consequences of these pesticides became
apparent. It soon became evident that these pesticides accumulated in
living tissues and bioconcentrated as they moved through the food
chain.' This resulted in serious impacts to predators at the top of the
food chain including the American Bald Eagle. Consequently, most
organochlorine pesticides were either banned or severely restricted, at
least in the developed countries of the world.Y

178. Edwards, supranote 173, at 13.
179. These figures are based on EPA pesticide market estimates for the years, 2000-2001.
See E.P.A., PESTICIDE INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE, 2000 AND 2001 MARKET ESTIMATES
(May 2004), http://www.epa.gov/oppbeadl/pestsales/0lpestsales/market-estimates200l.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Edwards, supranote 173, at 13.
182. DDT is the abbreviation for synthetic insecticide, 1, 1, 1-trichloro-2, 2-bis (pchlorophenyl) ethane. ROBERT E. PFADT, FUNDAMENTALS OF APPLIED ENTOMOLOGY 755 (3d

ed. 1978).
183. Edwards, supranote 173, at 14.
184. Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, and Public
Health: Explaining the Paradox of Modern PesticidePolicy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. Rev. 1, 6
(2002).
185. Stevens Indus., Inc., 1 E.A.D. 9, 16 (June 2, 1972) (Consolidated DDT Hearings).
186. Edwards, supra note 173, at 14. A number of international agreements exist to restrict
the use of persistent organic pollutants, such as the organochlorine pesticides. For a detailed
discussion of such agreements, see Michael P. Walls, InternationalChemicals Update 2005, SK
058 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 661 (2005). It should be noted that there has
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The other major category of pesticides developed during World War
II is organophosphate pesticides, initially developed as wartime nerve
gases.'87 Although these pesticides have the environmental advantage of
being far less persistent in the environment than organochlorine
pesticides, organophosphates tend to be highly acutely toxic to humans,
other mammals, and birds."8 These pesticides became the pesticides of
choice in the United States after most organochlorine pesticides were
banned or severely restricted. Organophosphates remain the largest
category of chemical insecticide in use in the United States today.189 In
addition to posing risks of acute poisoning to farm workers, these
pesticides have been implicated in a large number of avian and wildlife
poisonings. 9°
Although, from an ecological standpoint, narrow-spectrum pesticides
are preferable, broad-spectrum synthetic pesticides continue to dominate
U.S. pesticide usage.' This phenomenon is at least in part attributed to
the time and costs associated with bringing a new pesticide to the
market."9 The average time to bring a new pesticide to commercialization
is five to ten years with an associated cost of ten to twenty million
dollars.' 9 ' Moreover, the average life-span of a pesticide for a specific use
is ten years."9 Accordingly, pesticide manufacturers may be inclined to
been a recent resurgence in efforts to loosen restrictions on DDT due to its potential use in
combating malaria and other insect-borne diseases. See, e.g., Morriss & Meiners, supranote 184.
187. Edwards, supranote 173, at 15.
188. Id.
189. See E.P.A., supra note 179.
190. Id Other categories of chemical pesticides include the synthetic pyrethroids and
carbamates. Pyrethrum is a naturally occurring pesticide derived from chrysanthemum flowers.
Id. Synthetic pyrethroids are synthetically produced versions of pyrethrum. These pesticides
have the environmental benefit of having very low mammalian toxicity and low environmental
persistence. Id. Nevertheless, they are highly toxic to a broad range of invertebrates, including
many beneficial insects. Id. They are also highly toxic to fish and other aquatic organisms.
Carbamates are more persistent than organophosphates in the environment and are generally
broad-spectrum, having adverse impacts on many different groups of organisms. Id Other
commonly used pesticides are: nematicides, which not only are of high mammalian toxicity and
broad-spectrum but also are very transient in soil; herbicides, which generally are not highly
toxic to mammals but travel easily in water where they may be toxic to fish and aquatic
organisms; and fungicides, which vary greatly in their toxicity. Id.
191. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 407 (West, 2d ed. 1994). Narrowspectrum pesticides are those that only affect a small group of organisms, where as broadspectrum pesticides are those that affect a wide range of organisms.
192. Id. at 407-08.
193. Id.
194. Id. The reasons for the relatively short life span of pesticides include the tendency for
pests to develop resistance to pesticides, rendering the pesticides obsolete for that pest, and the
fact that FIFRA allows for "me-too" registration, which tends to reduce the market share of the
original pesticide. A me-too registration allows a pesticide manufacturer, in lieu of developing its
own data to support registration, to rely on data generated by a previous registrant provided the
me-too applicant makes an offer to compensate the previous registrant for the use of the data. 7
U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii) (2000).
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adopt research and development strategies that favor broad-spectrum
pesticides with broad market opportunities in order to get the biggest
bang for the buck during the limited life span of a pesticide. 95
In the past ten years, the biotechnology sector of the pesticide
industry has undergone tremendous growth. Naturally-existing microbes
have been genetically modified to make them toxic to insects and other
pests.196 In addition, agricultural crop plants themselves have been
genetically modified to produce substances that have pesticidal effects.' 97
These pesticidal living organisms pose novel ecological risks by virtue of
their ability to reproduce and spread in the environment.
B.

EcologicalRisks of Pesticides

Scientists estimate that as many as ten million species, or 99 percent
of the earth's wild biodiversity, not including cultivated and weedy
species are in a "precarious condition."' 98 Causes and contributors to the
decline of so many species include indirect habitat destruction through
clearing for agriculture and development, the spread of non-native
invasive species, pollution, over-harvesting of species, and disease.' 99
Although direct habitat destruction is undoubtedly the leading
contributor of species loss (estimated as being implicated in 85 percent of
U.S. species decline), pollution, including pesticide pollution, is
implicated in 24 percent of U.S. species decline.2 ° Pesticide poisoning of
fish and wildlife is a significant factor in species decline.2°'

195. RODGERS, supra note 191, at 407-09.
196. See Microbial Pesticides; Experimental Use Permits and Notifications, 58 Fed. Reg.
5,878 (Proposed Jan. 22, 1993).
197. See Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for
Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772 (July 19, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
152, 174).
198. Edward 0. Wilson, forward to DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR'S SHADOW, supra
note 121, at xiv.
199. Id
200. WILCOVE, supra note 121, at 8.
201. Moreover, the spread of non-native species is implicated in 49 percent of U.S. species
decline. In one study of the decline of fish species in the United States, Canada and Mexico, it
was determined that the destruction of physical habitat was implicated in 73 percent of the
decline, the displacement by introduced species was implicated in 68 percent of the decline, the
alterations of habitat by chemical pollutants was implicated in 38 percent of the declines,
hybridization with other species and subspecies was implicated in 38 percent of the declines, and
over harvesting was implicated in 15 percent of the declines. The numbers add up to more than
one hundred because more than one factor is implicated in many of the fish population declines.
WILSON, supra note 33, at 253-54. Thus, while pesticide usage in itself may not directly destroy
habitat (although clearing for agriculture certainly does), chemical pesticides may be a
significant contributor to species decline, and pesticidal GMOs, which pose risks of spread in the
environment similar to non-indigenous species release, may also be important contributors.
Habitat destruction, spread of nonnatives, pollution, overkill, and disease have been referred to
as the five horsemen of the environmental apocalypse. WILCOVE, supra note 121, at 8.
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Because pesticides, by definition, are intended to kill or disrupt
living organisms and because they are intentionally released into the
environment, often in large quantities over large areas, it is not surprising
that pesticides pose a wide array of risks to individual species as well as to
overall ecosystem function. Many pesticides are broad-spectrum,
affecting diverse species, including many nontarget organisms.2" 2 Others
are more narrowly targeted to pest species. However, even these
narrowly targeted pesticides may have significant impacts on nontarget
species closely related to the intended targets.2 3 Some pesticides persist
in the environment for weeks, months, and even years, while others
breakdown relatively quickly. 4' Moreover, living organisms vary
significantly in their susceptibility to pesticides.2 5 The potential ecological
risks of pesticide use depend on a number of factors, including toxicity or
other hazards of the pesticide, method of application, persistence in the
2°6
environment, amount used, and susceptibility of nontarget organisms.
Further, not many data are available on the environmental effects of
pesticide usage on many species. Accordingly, the ecological risks of
pesticides cannot be easily described or quantified. Nevertheless, some
generalizations can be made.
Many pesticides in current use in the United States and other parts
of the world are highly acutely toxic and are known to cause adverse
effects on nontarget mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish, and
invertebrates.' Birds and other wildlife may be exposed through direct
spraying, ingesting pesticide granules, drinking water contaminated by
pesticides, or eating prey organisms contaminated by pesticides. While
the banning and severe restriction of certain pesticides such as DDT over
the past thirty years has dramatically reduced certain risks to wildlife,
many risks remain.2' In addition to effects from direct exposure to
202.
203.

See RODGERS, supranote 191 and accompanying text.
See Edwards, supranote 173, at 17-24.
204. Id. at 17.
205. Id. at 18.
206. Id.
207. For a detailed discussion of the risks pesticides cause to wildlife species, see Comments
on the Proposed Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations.
Letter from Defenders of Wildlife and twenty-nine other commenters to Gary Frazer, Assistant
Director for Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., and Phil Williams, Chief,
Endangered Species Div., Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries (April 16, 2004) (on
file with author).
208. For example, when roughly ten thousand dead birds were tested for the presence of
West Nile Virus in 2000, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
determined that pesticides and other chemicals were actually responsible for more bird kills than
the virus. Laura A. Haight, Local Control of Pesticides in New York: Perspectives and Policy
Recommendations,9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 37, 51 (2004). As further evidence of the effects
on bird populations, studies have shown substantially higher nesting rates of birds, as well as
significantly higher bird abundance and avian species richness, on organic farms compared to
conventional farms that use synthetic pesticides. Nancy A. Beecher, Ron J. Johnson, James R.
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pesticides, birds and other wildlife may also be exposed to pesticides by
ingesting contaminated prey animals.' °
Other less visible species are also at considerable risk from pesticide
exposure. For example, for the past decade, considerable concern and
debate existed in the scientific community over the worldwide decline of
amphibians. Significant data now support a conclusion that certain
pesticides, such as the herbicide atrazine, may be contributing to the
world-wide decline in amphibian populations.1 0
Although the most obvious adverse effects of pesticide use are those
on humans and large animals such as. mammals and birds, the most
significant adverse effects of pesticides are likely to be those on
invertebrates, which are closely related to target pest species."1 ' Casualties
from this "friendly fire" are widespread in the invertebrate world.
Brandle, Ronald M. Case, & Linda J. Young, Agroecology of Birds in Organicand Nonorganic
Farmland,16 CONS. BIOL. 1620 (2002).
209. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation found that a number
of different avian species, such as screech owls, red-tailed hawks, American kestrels, and other
raptors, died as a result of eating small rodents that had consumed rat poison. Haight, supra note
209, at 51.
210. Haight, supra note 208, at 51. For example, in 2002, the organization Californians for
Alternatives to Toxics (CATS) filed suit seeking an order requiring the state Department of
Pesticide Regulation to reevaluate the state registration of pesticide products containing the
active ingredients malathion, chlorpyrifos, diazinon, methidathion, endosulfan, chorothalonil,
and trifluralin. The lawsuit contends that these pesticides may be responsible for significant
population declines of several species of amphibians in the Sierra Nevada mountains. Until very
recently, many studies on the effects of pesticides on amphibians have been puzzling because
pesticide levels in nature tend to be much lower than levels found to be lethal in the laboratory
setting. See Rick Relyea, PredatorsMake Pesticides More Lethal, in 5 CONSERVATION IN
PRAC., Spring 2004, at 5 (excerpting Rick A. Relyea, PredatorCues and Pesticides: A Double
Dose of Danger for Amphibians, 13 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1515 (2003)). See also
Davidson et al., supra note 73. A recent study sheds new light on this dilemma. Scientists have
determined that the combination of the pesticide carbaryl and stress from the presence of
predators was more lethal in certain amphibian species than the pesticide by itself. Id, In other
words, a synergistic affect appears to be at work between pesticides and predators making the
combination of the two more lethal than the sum of the parts and resulting in even low
concentrations of pesticides in nature being highly lethal to amphibians. Of course, amphibians
in nature must cope with other stress, such as the presence of predators, in addition to the stress
of pesticides. Accordingly, this study demonstrates that amphibians in nature may be
significantly more sensitive to pesticides than they are in the sterile isolated confines of the
research laboratory. Id.
211. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 156-57.
212. See May Berenbaum, Friendly Fire, WINGS: ESSAYS ON INVERTEBRATE
CONSERVATION, Spring 2004, 8. For example, the insect Order Lepidoptera contains not only
many pest moth species but also contains many non-pest butterfly species. These butterfly
species may be beneficial pollinators and may be aesthetically pleasing, colorful, and interesting
varieties such as the monarch butterfly. Also, Lepidoptera contains a number of butterfly species
listed as threatened or endangered under the federal Endangered Species Act. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11
(2005). Pesticides used to kill pest moth species generally do not discriminate within the
Lepidoptera order and will also kill non-pest, beneficial butterflies including endangered species.
See HUNTER, supranote 29, at 157-58. Mosquito control pesticides have been indicted as one of
the threats to the continued survival of the endangered Miami Blue Butterfly over the past few
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Perhaps equally if not more important than direct acute effects on
nontarget organisms are the chronic effects upon growth, physiology,
reproduction, and behavior.213 Much less is known about these chronic
effects than is known about acute effects. 214 Even a pesticide not toxic
enough to kill an organism can have very significant sublethal effects on
the organism by affecting its life span, growth, physiology, behavior, and
reproduction.215 Moreover, pesticides have been documented to have
significant indirect effects on nontarget organisms by reducing the
populations of animals or plants that serve as food or cover for other
species."'
One of the most insidious risks posed by pesticides is the tendency of
certain synthetic pesticides to mimic hormones, such as estrogen, in
humans and wildlife. Only recently has science begun to understand these
complex effects.21 ' Estrogen-mimicking substances include a number of
pesticides as well as a wide variety of other products in common use, such
as toiletries, spermicides, and plastics.1 Exposure to these compounds,
particularly when the exposure occurs to a fetus or young children, has
been correlated with a large number of effects in humans including
decreased sperm counts, breast and testicular cancer, endometriosis,

decades. Jaret C. Daniels & Thomas C. Emmel, Florida'sPrecious Miami Blues, in WINGS:
ESSAYS ON INVERTEBRATE CONSERVATION, Spring 2004, 3. This recent issue of the Xerces
Society publication was devoted exclusively to butterfly conservation; four out the five articles
listed pesticides as a significant contributor to butterfly population declines. See id. Moreover,
recent studies demonstrate a reduction in the abundance of nontarget butterflies on
conventional farms as compared to butterflies on organic farms. D.J. Hole et al., Does Organic
FarmingBenefit Biodiversity, 122 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 113 (2004).
213. Edwards, supra note 173, at 24.
214. Id.
215. Id, For example, extreme low doses of some pesticides have been determined to disrupt
honeybees' homing flight behavior, thereby adversely affecting pollination. Helen M.
Thompson, Behavioural Effects of Pesticides in Bees-Their Potential for Use in Risk
Assessment, 12 ECOTOXICOLOGY 317 (2003).
216. Edwards, supra note 173, at 28-29.
217. Although the term "environmental estrogen" was coined in the 1970s, not until the past
fifteen years were any scientific studies conducted to support the hypothesis that environmental
exposure to certain synthetic chemicals could cause estrogenic effects. For a detailed discussion
of the risks of endocrine disrupting chemicals and the legal shortcomings in addressing such
risks, see generally Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine
Disrupting Chemicals,24 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 289 (1999). See also THEO COLBURN ET AL., OUR
STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SURVIVAL? A
SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1997); Matthew P. Longnecker et al., The Human Health

Effects ofDDT (Dichlorodiphenylytrichloroethane)
and PCBs (PolychlorinatedBiphenyls) and an Overview of Organochloninesin PublicHealth,
18 REV. OF PUB. HEALTH 211 (1997); Louis J. Guilletteet al., Developmental Abnormalities of
the Gonad and Abnormal Sex Hormone Concentration in Juvenile Alligators from
Contaminatedand Control Lakes in Florida, 8 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 680 (1994); David
Crewset al., Endocrine Disruptors.-PresentIssues, Future Directions,75 Q. REV. OF BIOLOGY
243 (2000).
218. Sachs, supra note 217, at 302-07.
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deformed or stinted reproductive organs, neurological defects, and low
birth weights. 19 In addition to causing these human health effects, these
substances have also been implicated in numerous wildlife harms
including deformed alligators and reproductive difficulty in birds, fish,
22 These estrogenic effects can be extremely complex,
and mammals.1
unpredictable, and difficult to understand.2 1
Another concern with the ecological risks of pesticides is the
uncertainty regarding the effects of pesticides on ecologically significant
microorganisms. Very little is known about the complex ecology of
microorganisms.2 Although few studies have been conducted to evaluate
whether most types of pesticides pose significant risks to microorganisms,
soil fumigants, designed to destroy soil microorganisms and applied at
very high doses, may pose substantial risks to beneficial
microorganisms.22 ' For example, the killing of soil microbes and
invertebrates resulting from pesticide use may actually cause crops to
become more susceptible to disease and may thereby reduce crop growth.
In addition, populations of nitrogen-fixing organisms may be reduced,
thereby requiring higher levels of fertilizer application.224 Critical
ecological services provided by microorganisms, including decomposition,
may also be affected by certain pesticides.2 2
219. Id. at 293-98.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 300. For example, DDT exposure has caused female gulls to begin sharing nests
with other females rather than males and young gulls to have grossly feminized reproductive
tracts. See Susan M. Salvatore, Estrogens in the Environment, 69 FLA. B.J. 39, n. 35 (1995).
Moreover, a large number of studies on various species of fish exposed to estrogenic compounds
have shown effects such as increased time to maturity, smaller gonads, and reduced fertility. Id.
at n. 36. Similarly, declines in the reproductive rates of mammals, such as minks, has been linked
to ingesting fish contaminated with estrogenic substances. Id. at n. 37. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service has reported that between 1985 and 1990, 67 percent of male Florida panthers were born
with one or more undescended testes, compared with only 14 percent ten years earlier. Id. at n.
38. Although the phenomenon is not fully understood, scientists suspect a link with exposure to
estrogenic substances in the environment. Perhaps the most widely cited examples of endocrine
dysfunction in wildlife are the feminization of alligators and occurrence of masculinized female
fish in Florida. Interestingly, although the estrogenic effects of certain pesticides are only
beginning to be understood, in her 1962 book, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson predicted such
effects:
A substance that is not a carcinogen in the ordinary sense may disturb the normal
functioning of some part of the body in such a way that malignancy results. Important
examples are the cancers, especially of the reproductive system, that appear to be
linked with disturbances of the balance of sex hormones . . . [t]he chlorinated
hydrocarbons are precisely the kind of agent that can bring about this kind of indirect
carcinogenesis.
supra note 1, at 235.
222. Edwards, supra note 173, at 18.
223. Id
224. Id at 31.
225. David Pimentel et al., Assessment of Environmental and Economic Impacts of
Pesticide Use, in THE PESTICIDE QUESTION, supranote 62, 47, 68-69.
CARSON,
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The ecological risk from pesticide exposure is exacerbated by the
tendency of certain pesticides to undergo a phenomenon known as
bioaccumulation. Bioaccumulation of pesticides became widely
recognized during the 1960s as a result of Rachel Carson's book, Silent
Spring. Carson explained how DDT and other organochlorine pesticides
can persist in the environment for years if not decades and can also
accumulate in the tissue of animals and humans.226 These pesticides
accumulate in animals on the bottom of the food chain and then pass
from prey to predator, eventually resulting in very high concentrations in
top predators, a phenomenon known as biomagnification. Pesticides that
persist, accumulate, and biomagnify are especially insidious in that they
can adversely affect organisms far removed in both time and space from
the original release of the pesticide into the environment.227
Moreover, although agricultural systems are not natural systems per
se, they are generally in close proximity to natural ecosystems and often
contain within their borders sizable natural and semi-natural
ecosystems.228 Thus, pesticide usage in agricultural systems may
negatively affect ecosystems within the farm boundaries as well as
contaminating nearby ecosystems by pesticide runoff in water, drift
through the air, or movement of contaminated organisms.
As described above, loss of invertebrate nontarget species may be
the greatest risk from pesticide use. Loss of invertebrate biodiversity,
however, is not the only concern. Equally concerning is the ecological and
economic disruptions that frequently occur as a result of nontarget
predators and parasites being killed by pesticides. Many pest populations
are naturally kept in check by organisms that feed on pest species.
Consequently, if these predators or parasites are eliminated or greatly
reduced in number, the populations of pest species will explode. In
addition to existing pest species population increases resulting from
pesticide usage, new pest species may be created.229
In the past ten years, a completely new suite of risk concerns have
emerged regarding the use of pesticidal genetically modified organisms
226. CARSON, supranote 1, at 21-23.
227. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 156. Other risks posed by pesticides have only recently
begun to be studied. For example, in recent years the extent of atmospheric transport of
pesticides has come to light. Edwards, supra note 173, at 32-33. Moreover, the pesticide methyl
bromide has been determined to be a significant contributor to the thinning of the stratospheric
ozone layer. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Process for Exempting Critical Uses from
the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,982 (Dec. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 82).
228. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 276.
229. Id. at 277. An example of new pest creation resulting from pesticide use is the
bollworm, which is now a major economic pest of cotton. HUNTER, supra note 29, at 158.
Although the bollworm existed previously, it was not a pest until pesticides used to control the
boll weevil, another pest of cotton, killed the natural enemies of the bollworm, allowing its
population to explode. Id.
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(GMOs). Although many of the risk considerations for biotechnology
pesticides are similar to those of traditional chemical pesticides, these
new pesticides pose a number of novel risks. One of the most significant
novel risk considerations for pesticidal GMOs is the potential for spread
of the living organism or the organism's genetic material. For example,
plants can reproduce sexually and/or asexually and, as a result, the
genetic material introduced into the plant enabling the plant to produce
pesticidal substances could spread through agricultural or natural
ecosystems. Thus, if a plant that produces a pesticide can spread in the
environment or can spread its genetic material to other plants, a greater
potential would exist for exposure to nontarget organisms than would be
for a pesticide produced in a plant that can only grow in a limited
geographic area or does not have the ability to cross-fertilize with other
plants.23 ° This is a particular concern for pesticides produced in plants that
have wild relatives in the United States. 31 If these wild relatives acquire
the ability to produce the pesticide though cross-fertilization, many
additional nontarget organisms could be exposed to the pesticide.232 One
of the most cited concerns regarding pesticidal GMOs is the potential for
development of "superweeds" through the outcrossing 33 of pesticidal
GMOs to wild relatives.2" Development of such a superweed has the
potential to substantially disrupt agricultural and natural ecosystems. 35
230. For a detailed discussion of the potential risks and benefits of pesticidal GMOS, see
Mary Jane Angelo, GeneticallyEngineeredPlantPesticides:Recent Developments in the EPA 's
Regulation of Biotechnology,7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 257 (1996).
231. Id. at 287.
232. The potential for a GMO or its genetic material to spread from one plant to another
raises additional risk issues beyond those of exposure to humans and non-target organisms. One
potential risk of biotechnology products parallels the risk of the introduction of any non-native
species into a new environment. David J. Earp, Comment, The Regulation of Genetically
EngineeredPlants: Is Peter Rabbit Safe in Mr. McGregor's Transgenic Vegetable Patch?, 24
ENVTL. L. 1633, 1666-69 (1994). Even very small genetic manipulations can significantly change
an organism's ability to survive and flourish in a particular ecosystem. Id Examples abound
regarding the disastrous but unpredicted effects of introducing non-native species into the
environment, displacing native species. See Judy J. Kim, Out of the Lab and Into the Field
Harmonization of Deliberate Release Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms, 16
FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 1160 (1993). Introducing GMOs into the environment could have similar
impacts. See Earp at 1653. One of the most significant risks is the risk of a genetically engineered
plant becoming a weed or pest itself or outcrossing to related species to create new weeds or
pests. Id. at 1654-55. Once released into the environment, the spread of a GMO may be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control. Id.
233. Outcrossing is where one variety or species of a plant pollinates another species or
variety to form a hybrid of the two.
234. For example, the ability to produce a pesticide that makes a plant resistant to insect or
viral pests can be spread to a wild relative and subsequently passed on to the relative's
subsequent generations. Consequently, the wild relative, by virtue of its newly acquired ability to
resist insects or viruses, has the potential to become a hardy weed, or superweed.
235. For a GMO plant to transfer its genes to related existing weed species, wild relatives of
the GMO plant must grow in the geographic areas where the GMO plant is introduced. See
Earp, supra note 232, at 1666-69. Most crops grown in the United States are of foreign origin.

ECOLOGYLA W QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33:105

Perhaps the most serious concern with pesticidal GMOs stems from
the uncertainty of the risks of GMOs. Moreover, although the risk of
GMO release creating a new superweed or disrupting the balance of
natural ecosystems may be small, the consequences could be disastrous
and irreversible.236 The precise nature and magnitude of the risk is
difficult to predict because of the almost infinite variety of potential
GMOs, the ability of GMOs to reproduce and spread, the complexity
inherent in natural ecosystems, and the dearth of long-term data on the
effects of GMOs.237
Thus, the risk of hybridization between transgenic crops and wild relatives is unlikely in the
United States. Most of the major U.S. crops, including soybeans, corn, and wheat, have been
bred to the point where they have lost their ability to compete with wild species in the
environment. Thus, these crops are unlikely to become weeds when genetically altered. Id. at
1654. Nevertheless, once these GMOs are exported (intentionally or otherwise) to other parts of
the world that have wild relatives of the GMOs, the risks become more profound. Although
beyond the scope of this Article, the risks posed by GMOs to human health, particularly by
exposure through foods that have been genetically modified are a significant concern. Another
issue that has received considerable attention is the potential for plant-incorporated protectants
in foods to pose a risk of human allergenicity. The primary concern appears to be that if a gene
that leads to the production of a pesticide is moved from one plant to another plant, for example
from a peanut to corn, people who know they are allergic to peanuts will not know to avoid the
corn plant. Thus, if the pesticide derived from the peanut plant contains an allergen from the
peanut plant, allergic consumers could be put at risk. See generallyJudith E. Beach, No "Iller
Tomatoes' Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically EngineeredPlants,53 FOOD DRUG L.J.
181, 187 (1998). In addition, the movement of genes from animals to plants may concern
subpopulations of people with special dietary preferences such as vegetarians or persons who
observe kosher (Jewish) or halal (Muslim) laws. D. Douglas Hopkinset al., Envtl. Def. Fund, A
MUTABLE FEAST: ASSURING FOOD SAFETY IN THE ERA OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 45 (1991),
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/2612-MutableFeast.pdf.
Finally,
GMO
herbicide-tolerant plants may result in increased herbicide usage. Recently, studies show a
reduction in biodiversity in the vicinity of some genetically modified herbicide-tolerant crops
due to increased herbicide use causing a decrease in weeds and other plants that produce seeds,
for insects, birds, and other species. L.G. Firbank et al., THE IMPLICATIONS OF SPRING-SOWN
GENETICALLY MODIFIED HERBICIDE TOLERANT CROPS FOR FARMLAND BIODIVERSITY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE FARM SCALE EVALUATIONS OF SPRING SOWN CROPS (2003),
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/gm/fse/results/fse-commentary.pdf.
236. See John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the
EnvironmentalLaw of GeneticEngineering,74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 818 (2001).
237. See Steen, supra note 235, at 764. This discussion of the risks of GMOs is not intended
to suggest that these pesticides have no benefits. In fact, many scientists believe that GMO
pesticides may provide a less risky alternative to chemical pesticides. Many GMOs are less toxic
than chemical GMOs, more narrowly targeted towards the intended pest, and released into the
environment in smaller quantities. Nevertheless, the purpose of this discussion on the unique
ecological risks posed by GMO pesticides is merely to highlight the complex ecological risks at
issue and the large amount of uncertainty regarding such risks. It is worth noting that although
no catastrophic damage has been caused by GMOs in the marketplace for the past several years,
the pesticidal GMOs commercialized to date are largely innocuous from an ecological
standpoint. All of the commercialized products to date include genes from bacteria and viruses
non-toxic to humans and naturally ubiquitous in the environment and have been applied widely
to food crops in their microorganism form for decades. For example, the B.t. delta-endotoxin
produced by numerous plant-incorporated protectants in wide use is essentially the same B.t.
toxin that occurs naturally in soil and is ubiquitous in the environment. However, thousands of
GM products in the research and development stage are not so innocuous or well understood.
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History of EcologicalIssues in PesticideRegulation

First introduced in the 1930s and eventually banned in the early
1970s, the pesticide DDT starkly illustrates the meteoric rise of a
pesticide based on significant economic and human health benefits and
the subsequent dramatic fall based on severe ecological and human
health risks. Starting in 1939 and continuing through World War II, the
U.S. military used DDT extensively to control insect vectors of deadly
diseases such as typhus.238 DDT is credited with saving millions of lives
from such diseases during the war.2 39 By 1945, DDT had become a
favorite agricultural pesticide, used in most of the world to control a
variety of agricultural pests as well as biting insects such as mosquitoes.24 °
At its peak in the 1950s an estimated six thousand tons of DDT were
released annually into the environment in the United States alone.241
Rachel Carson's 1962 book Silent Spring first brought to the public's
attention the downside of the seemingly miracle pesticide. In her book,
Carson raised a number of significant ecological concerns regarding the
widespread use of DDT including the killing of beneficial as well as pest
insects, the disruption of the natural ecological balance, and the
bioaccumulation of the pesticide in the food chain resulting in risks to
aquatic organisms, avian species, and humans.242 Carson's book led to a
public outcry against the threats of DDT and other persistent pesticides.
After establishing a link between DDT and the dramatic decline of
numerous bird species, including the American Bald Eagle, a movement
developed to ban the use of DDT. Images of avian egg-shell thinning,
deformed birds, and other ecological effects caused by DDT and its
relatives fueled the public's new concerns over environmental issues and
played a significant role in developing the environmental movement of
the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1969, the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
the agency in charge of pesticide registration at the time,243 cancelled
certain uses of DDT and initiated an intensive review of other uses. 2 "
Shortly after its creation, EPA began a formal review under FIFRA of
the remaining uses of DDT. In 1972 EPA issued the final order canceling
Research is being done on just about every genetically modified product that human ingenuity
can conceive, including corn plants that produce a spider silk that can be used to make
bulletproof jackets and soy plants that produce a scorpion toxin. These new products must be
approached with much greater caution.
238. Morriss & Meiners, supra note 184, at 7.
239. Id.
240. Stevens Indus., Inc., 1 E.A.D. 9 (June 2, 1972) (Consolidated DDT Hearings).
241. Id.
242. See generally CARSON, supra note 1.
243. Prior to the creation of EPA in 1970, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was
responsible for administering FIFRA. In 1970, these responsibilities were transferred to EPA.
Reorganization Plan No. 3, 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
244. See Stevens Indus., Inc., 1 E.A.D. 9 (June 2,1972) (Consolidated DDT Hearings).
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the registration for most uses of the pesticide DDT.245 In the final order,
EPA concluded that the long-range risks of continued use of DDT were
unacceptable and outweighed any economic or societal benefits it
provided. 2"
The DDT controversy, which gained attention through the
publication of Silent Spring, became one of the primary motivators
behind the 1970 establishment of EPA. The controversy also paved the
way for a 1972 major overhaul of FIFRA, which had been on the books in
a somewhat less ambitious form for over sixty years. The origin of FIFRA
traces back to the federal Insecticide Act of 1910.247 The 1910 Act was a

consumer protection statute addressing concerns with false claims about
the effectiveness of many pesticide products that turned out to be useless
and the converse problem of pesticides that were too strong and thus
caused crop damage.2 ' This consumer protection emphasis carried over
into the first enactment of FIFRA in 1947. The 1947 Act contained the
first registration requirement for pesticides (referred to by the Act as
"economic poisons"). 249 The 1947 Act, however, did not establish
significant safety standards for pesticides. A pesticide could be registered
if the composition of the pesticide warranted the proposed claims for it
and if the pesticide and its labeling complied with the FIFRA
requirements. 2 ° The 1947 Act remained intact until 1972. The 1972
amendments to FIFRA completely overhauled the statute and for the
first time included provisions aimed at protecting environmental
interests. The 1972 amendments form the backbone of the current
FIFRA.
Despite the focus on ecological risks that dominated the DDT
controversy and paved the way for the 1972 overhaul of FIFRA,
ecological concerns played a much more modest role in the
implementation of FIFRA during the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, during that
period EPA brought only a handful of cancellation or suspension actions
based primarily on wildlife or other ecological risks. The only reported
judicial or administrative case in which regulatory action was based
primarily on risks to wildlife was Ciba-Geigy v. EPA25 1 in which EPA
proposed canceling certain uses of diazinon on golf courses and turf due

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Insecticide Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-152, 36 Stat. 331 (1910), repealed by Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163, 172 (1947).
248. RODGERS, supranote 191, at 412-13.
249. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61
Stat. 163, 172 (1947).
250. Id.
251. 874 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1989).
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in large part to the risk to wild birds.252 In addition to the diazinon case,
EPA considered canceling certain uses of pesticides based on risks to
wildlife during the 1980s and 1990s. However, EPA failed to take any
significant action to address such risks.253
In the past few years, there have been a number of controversies
over the adverse impacts to wildlife species, including threatened and
252. Id. at 278. This case involved the effects on birds of the use of diazonin on golf courses
and turf. Id. Specifically, the case addressed the question of whether FIFRA requires a precise
determination of risk or harm (e.g. the chemical has adverse effects 51 percent of the time it is
used) in order to support cancellation of a registration. Id. at 279. Another related point of
contention was whether a devastating effect on bird populations or merely a significant adverse
effect will justify cancellation. Id. at 279-80. In this case, the chemical company's contentions,
that there should be more exact thresholds and more significant effects on the overall bird
population, were rejected by the court. Id. at 280. The Fifth Circuit held that FIFRA gives the
Administrator sufficient discretion to conclude that recurring bird kills are an unreasonable
adverse environmental effect regardless of whether they significantly reduce bird populations.
Id. Ultimately, the case was remanded to the Administrator to rectify the former administrator's
failure to read the word "generally" as meaning "usually," "commonly," or "with considerable
frequency." The phrase "generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" is
also read to include any potentialgeneral causation of adverse effects. Id. at 279-80.
Further, despite suffering a stinging defeat in 1989 at the hands of environmental groups
claiming that EPA's continued registration of the pesticide strychnine was a violation of the
federal Endangered Species Act, EPA continued to register, and allow the continued
registration of, pesticides that pose risks to threatened and endangered species. Defenders of
Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989). In Defenders, the court found that EPA's
continued registration of the pesticide strychnine constituted a taking under section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act, even though there was no evidence as to the chain of possession of the
strychnine or other links between EPA's registration of the pesticide and the ultimate death of
the listed species. Id. at 1301. The court held, in essence, that EPA's decision to allow the
registration to remain in effect, rather than suspending or canceling the registration, subjected
the agency to section 9 liability. Id. In concluding that "EPA's decision to register pesticides
containing strychnine or to continue those registrations was critical to the resulting poisoning" of
the endangered species, the court clearly was influenced by the fact that the pesticide could not
legally be sold or distributed except under an EPA registration. Id.
253. For example, in 1991, EPA proposed the cancellation of the pesticide ethyl parathion
due to risks to both humans and wildlife from the high acute toxicity of this pesticide. After
negotiating with the manufacturers of ethyl parathion, however, EPA accepted a settlement
which involved the cancellation of only the ground application uses of the pesticide, which posed
significant risks to human farm workers, but did not include the cancellation of aerial
application, which posed the greatest risks to birds and other wildlife due to spray drift
associated with this form of application. See Notice, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,061-01 (Dec. 13, 1991);
Notice of Issuance of Amended Cancellation Order, 57 Fed. Reg. 3,500-01 (Jan. 29, 1992);
Notice of Issuance of Corrections of Amended Cancellation Order, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,168-01 (Feb.
20, 1992). In fact, ethyl parathion had been implicated in the deaths of thousands of birds.
Nevertheless, EPA declined to take regulatory action to prevent or minimize these risks. 56 Fed.
Reg. 65,061 (Dec. 13, 1991). Ultimately, the remaining uses of ethyl parathion were voluntarily
cancelled in 2001 after a concerted campaign led by the American Bird Conservancy in
partnership with Defenders of Wildlife, the Pesticide Action Network, and the World Wildlife
Fund to pressure EPA and the manufacturer of the pesticide to end all uses. Ethyl Parathion:
Notice of Use Cancellation, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,667-01 (Sept. 13, 2001). However, despite the fact
that ethyl parathion was considered to be one of the most toxic pesticides in current use and had
been documented to cause thousands of bird kills, and despite decades of study by EPA, the
agency itself failed to take regulatory action to protect wildlife.
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endangered species, from pesticides. One such controversy started in
2002 when forty environmental groups, including the American Bird
Conservancy and Defenders of Wildlife, sent EPA a Notice of Intent to
Sue for Violations of the Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, and Administrative Procedures Act Concerning the Registration of
the Pesticide Fenthion due to the high risks the pesticide posed to avian
species. Later that year, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recommended
that EPA immediately cancel existing registrations for fenthion due to its
unreasonable adverse effects to avian species protection under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 254 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA) 5 When EPA did not take action to reduce the risks from
fenthion, in October 2002 Defenders of Wildlife, the American Bird
Conservancy, and the Florida Wildlife Federation filed suit against EPA
in federal district court alleging EPA had violated the ESA and MBTA.
In 2003 the manufacturer of fenthion voluntarily canceled its registration
of fenthion.
In addition, in September 2004 environmentalists won a significant
victory when the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's 2004 order that
found that EPA had violated the ESA because it had failed to take steps
to ensure that the registration of fifty-four pesticides would not
jeopardize the survival of listed salmon species.256 The court of appeals
upheld the district court's injunction, which imposed detailed buffer
zones restricting the use of more than thirty pesticides along listed
salmon-supporting waters in California, Oregon, and Washington
states. 57
As these recent cases illustrate, EPA has been reluctant to take
regulatory action to prevent registration of, or cancel the registration of, a
pesticide that poses significant ecological risks. In fact, EPA has failed to
take such actions even when challenged by environmental organizations.
Instead, such challenges have led manufacturers to voluntarily cancel
their registrations, as in the case of fenthion, rather than EPA taking
254. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
255. Id. §§ 703-711.
256. See Wash. Toxics Coalition v. EPA, No. C01-013132C (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.html. This order was the third in a series of
orders granting injunctive relief to the environmental plaintiffs in this matter. See also Wash.
Toxics Coalition v. EPA, No. C01-013132C (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.htmil.; Wash. Toxics Coalition v. EPA, No. C01-013132C
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 8,2003), availableat http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.htmi.
257. Id. On September 1, 2005, CropLife America filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
have the case reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Another case alleging that the EPA violated
the ESA by registering six pesticides without reviewing the negative effects on the Barton
Springs Salamander, a listed species, settled when EPA agreed to a schedule to analyze the
effects of the pesticides on the salamander. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Johnson, No. 1:04-cv00126-CKK, Settlement Agreement (D.C. Cir. 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/
oppfeadl/cb/csb-page/updates/bartonsprings-agreemt.pdf.
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action to reduce ecological risks. EPA's reluctance to take action to
address purely ecological concerns of pesticide use illustrates the broader
problem that much of environmental protection law is focused
predominantly on human health issues, with ecological concerns receiving
little or no attention.
It should not be considered a bold statement to assert that
environmental protection law is intended to protect the environment, yet
it is. As the illustrations above show, implementation of FIFRA seems
largely to have ignored any such intent. If environmental protection is the
goal, it would be logical to expect environmental protection law to be
guided by the science of ecology, the study of the interactions of living
organisms and their environments. However, after more than thirty years
of significant public concern over environmental protection and more
than thirty years of implementation of numerous environmental
protection laws, it is surprising how little these laws have been used to
address environmental concerns, and how little ecological science has
informed environmental law. Typically, environmental concerns are
addressed only where there is a sufficient, independent, human healthrelated motivation. Moreover, many of the first-generation
environmental laws developed ad hoc in reaction to the particular
environmental crisis of the moment 58 This collection of piece-meal laws
have not kept pace with the science's ever-increasing understanding of
ecological systems." 9
In recent years, there have been greater attempts to incorporate
ecological principles into environmental law and policy decisions.
Professor Dan Tarlock has argued that environmental law derives its
legitimacy from science. 2' Toxicology, engineering, and other sciences
have certainly played a significant role in environmental law. The role of
the ecological sciences, however, has been much more modest. Although
the science of ecology has informed certain areas of environmental law,
such as endangered species protection,"' most pollution-focused laws
have not incorporated ecological principles in any significant way.
258.

See BROOKS ET AL., supranote 28, at 26-29.
259. For a proposal to create a single umbrella environmental statute, see Lakshman
Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the EnvironmentalMind? 1989 Wisc. L.
REV. 463 (1989).
260. Tarlock, supra note 33, at 1122. Tarlock explains how science not only has been used to
identify environmental harms, but also to develop ways to remedy such harms. Tarlock argues
that science remains the primary justification for environmental protection policy. Without a
scientific foundation, Tarlock states, "environmentalism would be the marginal aesthetic
movement that it was between the progressive conservation era and the late 1960s." Id. at 113637. But see Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Why Better
Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1034 (arguing that science alone
cannot solve difficult environmental policy problems).
261. See Tarlock, supra note 33, at 1125 (describing how environmental law draws on three
disciplines: economics, engineering, and ecology).
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Indeed, if ecological sciences have significantly informed any area of
environmental law, it is in natural resource management, endangered
species protection, and wetlands protection rather than the myriad of socalled pollution control laws that form the complex regulatory web of
environmental regulation. The manner in which EPA has implemented
the classic pollution control law-the Clean Water Act (CWA),262 the
Clean Air Act (CAA),263 the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),26 and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)2 65-tends to be highly focused
on protection of human health and tends to treat protection of the
environment as almost an afterthought.2 6 Of course human health
protection is of primary concern to most people, and few would place the
value of protecting a bird, let alone an insect, above protecting human
life. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that these environmental
protection laws were intended to protect both human health and the
environment and that environmental concerns not related to human
health provided the impetus for the development of these regulatory
programs. Even the bulk of scholarly literature in environmental law has
failed to adequately grapple with ecological concerns.267 In addition to the
higher priority that human health concerns assume, the limited attempts
to protect the environment probably stem, at least in part, from the fact
that despite years of study, the ecological sciences have barely scraped

262. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (2000).
263. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
264. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
265. Id. §§ 6901-6992k.
266. Robert L. Fischman, BiologicalDiversityandEnvironmentalProtection:Authorites to
Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435, 441 (1992) (stating that while virtually every statute that EPA is
responsible for implementing contains language that would enable EPA to address ecological
concerns in its regulatory programs, EPA has failed to utilize these broad authorities to address
ecological concerns). A few of the many examples of EPA's broad authority to address
ecological risks include: 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2000) (directing EPA to develop water quality
criteria that accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge on the effect on the health and
welfare, including but not limited to the effects on including plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife,
plant life, shorelines, beaches, esthetics, and recreation, as well as on the concentration and
dispersal of pollutants or their byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes
and on biological community diversity); 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (2000) (EPA's national
contingency plan for hazardous discharge clean-up that must take into account the potential for
the destruction of sensitive ecosystems). The Clean Air Act requires EPA to promulgate
secondary national ambient air quality standards to protect the public welfare. The statute
defines the term "welfare" to include the effects of pollution on soils, water, vegetation, animals,
wildlife, and the climate. Id. § 7409(a)(1)(B). For a more comprehensive discussion of EPA's
statutory authority to consider ecological concerns in its regulatory programs, see generally
Fischman supra.
267. Both Professors J.B. Ruhl and Lisa Heinzerling have criticized the scholarly discourse
on environmental law as being too focused on human health concerns and not focused enough
on the important goals of protecting natural systems. Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory
Reform, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 459, 461 (1997); Ruhl, supra note 11, at 541.
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the surface of understanding the complex machinery of the natural world.
What little is known teaches us that ecological systems are extremely
complex and ever-changing. 6 Accordingly, it is difficult to design
regulatory programs to protect what we do not fully understand and what
can be perceived as a moving target.
Ill.

FIFRA (A LICENSE TO KILL)

Regulation of pesticides in the United States is conducted primarily
under the authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).269 FIFRA requires that all pesticides27 ° sold or
distributed in the United States be registered by EPA.271 Generally, a
pesticide may be registered only if it will not cause an "unreasonable
adverse effect on the environment."2
Accordingly, in determining
whether to register a pesticide, EPA engages in a cost/benefit analysis,
weighing the costs or risks associated with the use of a pesticide against
the economic and social benefits of the pesticide. A pesticide may be
registered only if the benefits of the pesticide outweigh the costs resulting
from the use of the pesticide.273 To determine whether or the extent to
which FFIRA is eco-pragmatic, i.e., addresses the issues of uncertainty,
complexity, and change, a close analysis of FIFRA and its
implementation by EPA is warranted.

268. For a comprehensive discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's understanding and use of
ecological principles in its decision-making in environmental cases, see Robert W. Alder, The
Supreme Courtand Ecosystems. EnvironmentalScience in EnvironmentalLaw, 27 VT. L. REV.
249 (2003).
269. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
270. Under FIFRA, the term "pesticide" means "any substance or mixture of substances
intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest... "Id. § 136(u).
271. Id § 136a(a). This subsection provides:
Except as provided by this subchapter, no person in any State may distribute or sell to
any person any pesticide that is not registered under this subchapter. To the extent
necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the
Administrator may by regulation limit the distribution, sale or use in any State of any
pesticide that is not registered under this subchapter and that is not the subject of an
experimental use permit under section 136c of this title or an emergency exemption
under section 136p of this title.
Id.
272. Id, § 136a(c)(5). FIFRA provides that the term "environment" includes "water, air,
land, and all plants and man and other animals living therein and the interrelationships which
exist among these." Id.§ 136j.
273. Under FIFRA, cost/benefit terminology is used opposite to the way it is used in
discussing most environmental regulation. Typically, in a cost/benefit analysis, the regulatory
agency compares the costs of regulation (e.g., the cost of installing pollution controls) to the
benefits of regulation (e.g., lives saved or cancers avoided). Under FIFRA, however, the costs
are considered to be the costs of allowing the use of the pesticide (e.g. cancer deaths), whereas
the benefits are considered to be the benefits of allowing the use of the pesticide (e.g., reduction
in crop loss from pest insect damage).
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Registrationand Other Approval Mechanisms

FIFRA section 3(a) provides that the administrator shall register a
pesticide if the administrator determines that, when considered with any
restrictions imposed, its composition warrants the proposed claims for it,
its labeling and other submitted materials comply with the requirements
of FIFRA, it performs its intended function without unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment, and when used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause
unreasonable adverse affects on the environment.274 As defined by
FIFRA, unreasonable adverse affects on the environment are any
unreasonable risks to man or the environment, taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide.275 Accordingly, when determining whether to register a
pesticide, EPA must consider not only any risks the pesticide poses to
man or the environment, but also the economic and social implications of
using the pesticide. Noticeably, however, while Congress did direct EPA
to take into account economic factors in defining unreasonable adverse
effect on the environment, it did not explicitly mandate that EPA
conduct a strict cost/benefit analysis.276 In fact, the legislative history of
FIFRA suggests that adverse affects were not intended to be tolerated in
absence of "overriding benefits" from the use of the pesticide.2 7
Nevertheless, for more than thirty years EPA has interpreted FIFRA to
require a cost/benefit balancing, and this interpretation has been upheld
by courts. 78

274. Id. §136a(c)(5) provides:
The Administrator shall register a pesticide if the Administrator determines that,
when considered with any restrictions imposed under subsection (d) of this section(A)its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it;
(B)its labeling and other material required to be submitted comply with the
requirements of this subchapter;
(C)it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment; and
(D)when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice it
will not generally cause unreasonable adverse affects on the environment.
275. Section 136(bb) defines the term "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" as
any "unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide... " Id. § 136(bb).
276. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, at 32,39.
277. See RODGERS, supra note 191, at 451-53.
278. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA (heptachlor-chlordane), 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert.denied,431 U.S. 925 (1977); In re Chapman Chem. Co., FIFRA Dockets No. 246, 1
E.A.D. 199, 203 (EPA 1976) (stating that "before any pesticide can be cancelled under the
FIFRA [EPA] must be persuaded that the risks to man or the environment from continued use
of the pesticide outweigh the benefits of its continued use."); In re Protexall Prod., Inc., FIFRA
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Significantly, although one prong of the test for registration requires
EPA to determine the pesticide "will perform its intended function"
without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, 279 FIFRA
expressly states that EPA shall not make any lack of essentiality a
criterion for denying registration of any pesticide and that, where two
pesticides meet the requirements for registration, one should not be
registered in preference to the other.280 Thus, to obtain a registration,
there is no requirement to demonstrate that a pesticide is essential.
Moreover, the availability of alternative pesticides for the same use does
not preclude registration. Further, FIFRA expressly authorizes EPA to
waive all data requirements pertaining to efficacy and EPA has, by rule,
281

done so.
One of the most important requirements is that the registrant submit
data in support of registration. 282 FIFRA gives EPA discretionary
Docket No. 625, 2 E.A.D. 854 (EPA 1989) (stating that "the risk-benefit assessment.. involves a
balancing of the risks ... against the benefits").
279. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C).
280. Id.§ 136a(c)(5) provides that:
The Administrator shall not make any lack of essentiality a criterion for denying
registration of any pesticide. Where two pesticides meet the requirements of this
paragraph, one should not be registered in preference to the other. In considering an
application for the registration of a pesticide, the Administrator may waive data
requirements pertaining to efficacy, in which event the Administrator may register the
pesticide without determining that the pesticide's composition is such as to warrant
proposed claims of efficacy.
281. 40 C.F.R. § 158.640(b)(1) (2005). The burden of providing EPA with the necessary
information to determine whether the standard for registration is met rests at all times with the
registrant or applicant for registration. The procedures for registering pesticides are set forth in
the statute and regulations. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Pt. 152 (2005).
282. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2000) provides:
Except as provided by this subchapter, no person in any State may distribute or sell to
any person any pesticide that is not registered under this subchapter. To the extent
necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the
Administrator may by regulation limit the distribution, sale or use in any State of any
pesticide that is not registered under this subchapter and that is not the subject of an
experimental use permit under section 136c of this title or an emergency exemption
under section 136p of this title.
Id.§ 136a(c)(2)provides:
The Administrator shall publish guidelines specifying the kinds of information which
will be required to support the registration of a pesticide and shall revise such
guidelines from time to time. . . . In the development of these standards, the
Administrator shall consider the economic factors of potential national volume of use,
extent of distribution, and the impact of the cost of meeting the requirements on the
incentives for any potential registrant to undertake the development of the required
data....
Data requirements are found at 40 C.F.R. Part 158 and provide for the submission of
health and environmental effects data. The applicant for registration must bear the cost of
gathering and generating the necessary data. To avoid duplicative data generation, the statute
encourages joint development of data and provides that applicants seeking to reach agreement
on the terms of a data development arrangement may seek binding arbitration. Id. §
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authority to register products in certain situations even though not all
data necessary to make a decision on registration have been generated.
This is called "conditional registration." Conditional registration can be
used for products with composition and proposed uses identical or
substantially similar to currently registered pesticides, products with
proposed new uses, or certain products with a new active ingredient. 23
For the first two categories, EPA must determine that despite the lacking
data, approval of the conditional registration would not significantly
increase the risk of any unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment.' For new active ingredients, EPA must determine that the
use of the pesticide during the period of conditional registration will not
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment and use of the
pesticide is in the public interest.285
Most environmental risk reduction measures under FIFRA are
achieved through labeling restrictions. An applicant for registration must
submit all proposed labeling with the registration application.' A
FIFRA "label" is the written, printed, or graphic matter on or attached to
the pesticide.287 The term "labeling" under FIFRA includes the label as
well as all other written, printed, or graphic matter that accompanies the
136a(c)(1)(F)(iii). Data already submitted to the agency to support an existing registration may
be relied upon to support a new registration application provided the applicant for the new
registration offers to pay compensation to the registrant who originally submitted the data. Data
submitted to support a registration the first time a particular active ingredient is registered are
protected by the "exclusive use" provisions of FIFRA and cannot be considered by EPA to
support additional registrations for a period of ten years. Id. In addition, FIFRA 7 U.S.C. 136h
generally governs the disclosure of information submitted to EPA pursuant to FIFRA
requirements. 7 U.S.C. 136h(d) provides that health and safety data must be made available to
the public, except that 7 U.S.C. 136h(g) prohibits disclosure of health and safety data to
multinational pesticide producers except during public proceedings under law or regulation.7
U.S.C. 136h(b) and(d) provide that other confidential business information ordinarily may not
be released and provide specific protection for the formula and information on inert ingredients.
Exemptions from these confidentiality protections are provided to avoid imminent public health
risks and when the Administrator determines that disclosure is in the public interest during a
proceeding to determine whether a pesticide causes unreasonable adverse effects. Any such
release of information is subject to procedural protections involving prior notice and opportunity
for district court review.
283. Id. § 136a(c)(7), registration under special circumstances, provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (5)(A) The Administrator may conditionally register or amend the registration of a
pesticide if the administrator determines that (i) the pesticide and proposed use are
identical or substantially similar to any currently registered pesticide and use thereof,
or differ only in ways that would not significantly increase the risk of unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment, and (ii) approving the registration or amendment
in the manner proposed by the applicant would not significantly increase the risk of
any unreasonable adverse effect on the environment.
284. Id. § 136a(c)(7)(A).
285. Id.
286. Id.§ 136a(c)(1)(C).
287. Id. § 136(p)(1).
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pesticide or to which reference is made on the label.288 All registered
products must bear a label or labeling setting forth precautionary
statements, warnings, directions for use of the product, and an ingredient
statement. A product whose label or labeling does not contain the
information required by EPA or which sets forth false or misleading
information is misbranded. 289 FIFRA requires users of pesticides to
follow all label directions.2 ' The requirement for users to follow label
instructions is the only obligation FIFRA imposes on users of pesticides.
Thus, the label is the only mechanism to regulate user behavior to
accomplish risk reduction goals.
Under section 3(d)(1), a pesticide may be classified for either general
or restricted use.29 1 A restricted use pesticide may be used only by or
under the supervision of a certified applicator and is not available for
purchase by the general public.29 A pesticide classified for restricted use
would cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment absent
such a restriction. 93 Certification of applicators is primarily a state
function. State certification plans must conform to certain standards
enumerated in the statute. 94
FIFRA provides for several forms of pesticide approval in addition
to registration under section 3. First, EPA may grant an emergency
exemption under FIFRA section 18.95 Section 18 provides that the
Administrator has discretion to exempt any federal or state agency from
any provision (normally, the registration requirement) of the Act if
emergency conditions require such an exemption.296 An emergency
condition means an urgent, non-routine situation and is deemed to exist
288. Id. § 136(p)(2).
289. Id. §§ 136(q) and 136j(a)(1)(E).
290. Id. § 136j(a)(2)(G) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to use any
registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling.
291. Id.§ 136a(d)(1).
292. Id
293. Id.
294. Id. § 136i, regarding the use of restricted use pesticides, provides:
Use of restricted use pesticides; applicators
(A) certification procedure
(1) Federal certification
In any State for which a State plan for applicator certification has not been approved
by the Administrator, the Administrator, in consultation with the Governor of such
State, shall conduct a program for the certification of applicators of pesticides....
(2) State certification
If any State, at any time, desires to certify applicators of pesticides, the Governor of such State
shall submit a State Plan for such purpose. The Administrator shall approve the plan submitted
by any State [meets certain general conditions regarding the state's legal authority, funding
mechanisms, etc.].
295. Id.§ 136p.

296. Id
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when: no effective pesticides are available under the Act that have
labeled uses registered for control of the pest under the conditions of the
emergency; no economically or environmentally feasible alternative
practices which provide adequate control are available; and the situation
involves the introduction or dissemination of a new pest, will present
significant health risks, will present significant environmental risks, or will
cause significant economic loss.297
In addition to federal pesticide registration under FIFRA, states may
issue registrations of pesticide products or uses of such products to meet
special local needs under FIFRA section 24(c). 298 A section 24(c)
registration may be issued to: 1) allow use of a new formulation of a
federally registered pesticide; 2) amend federal registration to permit use
on additional crops or pests or at additional sites, or to permit use of
different application techniques, rates, and equipment; 3) amend federal
registration with special label directions necessary to prevent adverse
effects or to ensure efficacy under local conditions; or 4) for any other
purposes consistent with FIFRA. Valid state registrations are treated as
federal registrations under FIFRA.299
FIFRA section 5 authorizes EPA to issue Experimental Use Permits
(EUPs) for field testing of unregistered pesticides. 3' The Administrator
may issue an EUP if she determines that the applicant needs such a
permit to accumulate information necessary to register a pesticide under
section 3 of FIFRA. 3 1 Finally, Section 3(a) authorizes EPA, to the extent
necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, to
issue regulations limiting the distribution, sale, or use of any pesticide
that is not registered under the Act and that is not subject to an EUP
under section 5 or an emergency exemption under section 18."
B.

ContinuingDuties of Registrants

Once a pesticide is registered, registrants face a number of
continuing responsibilities, particularly with regard to supplying
additional data. In 1978, Congress added a provision to FIFRA, section
3(c)(2)(B), giving EPA the authority to require holders of existing
registrations to provide data to support the continued registration of a
pesticide.3 3 Section 3(c)(2)(B) allows the Agency at any time to require
additional data to support an existing registration. The penalty for failure

297.
298.

Id.
Id.§ 136v(c)(1).

299. Id.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.§ 136c.
Id.§ 136c(a).
Id.§ 136a(a).
Id.§ 136a(c)(2)(B).
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to supply this data is suspension of the registration, which results in a
prohibition on sale and distribution of the product. °4 Prior to suspension
under section 3(c)(2)(B), a registrant has a right to a limited adjudicatory
hearing. The only issues to be considered at such a hearing are whether
"the registrant has failed to take the action" which is the basis of the
suspension and whether the disposition of existing stocks is consistent
with the Act.3 °5
In addition to information required to be submitted under section
3(c)(2)(B), registrants are under a continuing obligation under FIFRA
section 6(a)(2) to submit factual information regarding unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment of the pesticide whenever the
registrant has such information. 3' EPA has adopted a rule which
describes specifically the types of information that must be reported and
the time frame for submission of these reports."
The 1972 revisions to FIFRA included a tougher standard for initial
registration of pesticides and mandated that the Agency reexamine
previously registered pesticides. °8 This reexamination or "reregistration"
reflects a congressional determination that previously-registered
pesticides ought to be as "safe" as newer ones and a recognition that the
data EPA had for these older pesticides were not as complete or up-todate as that for newer pesticides. Reregistration has proved to be one of
the most critical and one of the most difficult regulatory tasks for EPA's
pesticide program.'°9 Because reregistration efforts were moving so
slowly, in 1988 Congress enacted a new section 4 of FIFRA that
prescribes specific reregistration requirements intended to dramatically
304. Id. § 136a(c)(2)(B)(iii).
305. Id. § 136a(c)(2)(B)(iv).
306. Id.§ 136d(a)(2).
307. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 159 (2005). In addition to authority to require information reporting, EPA
has broad enforcement authority, which it shares with the states under FIFRA. EPA generally is
responsible for manufacturer/producer enforcement, while the states have primary responsibility
for user enforcement. The manufacturer/producer enforcement provisions give the Agency
authority to register pesticide establishments, to inspect and to take samples, to inspect books
and records, and to issue "stop sale, use or removal" orders and to institute seizure actions. 7
U.S.C. §§ 136e-g, k (2000). Pursuant to section 27 of FIFRA, a state must have adequate
pesticide laws and regulations and must be implementing such laws and regulations in order to
maintain primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use situations. Id § 136v. The Agency
can respond to an emergency requiring immediate action if a state is unwilling or unable to
respond. Id. § 136w-1. Under section 16(c), the Agency is authorized to seek an injunction
against violations of the Act in federal district court. Id. § 136n(c). A person who violates any
provision of the Act may be subject to civil penalties under section 14(a). Id § 1361. The amount
of the penalty is determined by a consideration of the appropriateness of the penalty to the size
of the business, the effect on the violator's ability to stay in business, and the gravity of the
violation. Id. § 1361(a)(4). Moreover, a person who knowingly violates any provision of the Act
may be subject to criminal penalties which carry larger fines and the possibility of a prison
sentences. Id. § 1361(b).
308. Id.§ 136a-1.
309. RODGERS, supra note 191, at 431.
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change both the pace and the nature of reregistration.31 ° The 1988
amendments require EPA to complete, over a nine-year period, the
reregistration review of each registered product containing any active
ingredient initially registered before November 1, 1984.311 The
amendments redirected the initial burden of identifying data gaps from
EPA to the affected registrants. Moreover, the amendment establishes a
multi-phased process with a number of deadlines that ensures that
reregistration moves at a more accelerated pace. Failure of registrants to
meet the prescribed deadlines may result in suspension or cancellation of
registration.312
C

Cancellationand Suspension

EPA may cancel or suspend existing registrations based upon certain
risk/benefit determinations. FIFRA section 6(b), which specifically
addresses cancellation, states that EPA may issue a notice of intent to
cancel if a pesticide or its labeling does not comply with FIFRA or if,
when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized
practice, the pesticide generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment.313 Under section 6(b) there are two types of cancellation
actions: section 6(b)(1)-notice of intent to cancel or change
classification; and section 6(b)(2)-notice of intent to hold a hearing to
determine whether registration should be cancelled or classification
changed.314 For both sections 6(b)(1) and 6(b)(2), EPA must make a

310. 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. § 136d(b). FIFRA requires review of the proposed cancellation notice by the
Secretary of Agriculture (USDA) and the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP). The statute
dictates that the notice must be submitted to USDA and the SAP sixty days prior to notification
of the registrant or publication, whichever comes first. If USDA and the SAP do not submit
comments within thirty days, EPA may publish the notice. If USDA and the SAP do submit
comments, EPA may, after reviewing such comments, withdraw the notice, issue a final notice
without modification, or modify the notice, as appropriate. Once the notice is published, persons
adversely affected have thirty days to request a hearing. If no such hearing is requested, the
notice of intent to cancel becomes final. If a hearing is requested, the hearing is considered a
formal adjudicatory proceeding and is held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Such a
proceeding is governed by the Agency's rules at 40 C.F.R. Part 164.
314. Id § 136d(b).
Administrative review, suspension
(b) Cancellation and change in Classification
If it appears to the Administrator that a pesticide or its labeling ... does not comply
with the provisions of this subchapter or, when used in accordance with widespread
and commonly recognized practice, generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment, the Administrator may issue a notice of the Administrator's intent
either-
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finding that the risks appear to outweigh the benefits. For section 6(b)(2),
however, a hearing may be held when the Administrator's judgment
concerning the risks and benefits of a pesticide is only tentative."' Before
taking final action under section 6(b), the Administrator must determine
whether any unreasonable risks posed by a pesticide's use can be
sufficiently reduced by regulatory measures short of cancellation. Such
measures include imposition of additional labeling restrictions and/or
classification of the pesticide for restricted use. If the Administrator
determines that adequate risk reduction cannot be achieved by such
regulatory measures, the registration of the pesticide for that use must be
cancelled. An EPA Final Order on a cancellation is reviewable in district
court.31

6

FIFRA also authorizes EPA to suspend the registration of a
pesticide based on certain findings. FIFRA provides for two types of
suspension proceedings- "ordinary" and "emergency" suspension.317
(1) to cancel its registration or to change it classification together with the reasons
(including the factual basis) for the Administrator's action, or
(2) to hold a hearing to determine whether or not its registration should be canceled
or its classification changed.
... In determining whether to issue any such notice, the Administrator shall include
among those factors to be taken into account the impact of the action proposed in
such notice on production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food prices,
and otherwise on the agricultural economy. At least 60 days prior to sending such
notice to the registrant or making public such notice, whichever occurs first, the
Administrator shall provide the Secretary of Agriculture with a copy of such notice
and an analysis of such impact on the agricultural economy.

The proposed action shall become final and effective at the end of 30 days from
receipt by the registrant, or publication, of a notice..., unless within that time either
(i) the registrant makes the necessary corrections, if possible, or (ii) a request for a
hearing is made by a person adversely affected by the notice... In taking any final
action under this subsection, the Administrator shall consider restricting a pesticide's
use or uses as an alternative to cancellation and shall fully explain the reasons for
these restrictions, and shal include among those factors to be taken into account the
impact of such final action on production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail
food prices, and otherwise on the agricultural economy.
Id § 136d(b).
315. There is no distinction between section 136d(b)(1) and section 136d(b)(2) hearings in
the manner of conduct, burden of proof, or nature of initial decision by AL. One issue generally
considered as part of the cancellation process is whether the agency should allow the continued
sale and use of existing stocks of the pesticide.
316. Of the more than sixty pesticide cancellations and suspensions, only approximately one
third have been judicially reviewed. RODGERS, supra note 191, at 480. EPA's refusal to initiate
proceedings to cancel or suspend a registration is considered a final order reviewable in district
court. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
317. 7 U.S.C. §136d(c) (2000) Suspension
...

(1) Order
If the Administrator determines that action is necessary to prevent an imminent
hazard during the time required for cancellation or change in classification
proceedings, the Administrator may, by order, suspend the registration of the
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Ordinary suspension is issued where such action is necessary to prevent
an imminent hazard during the time required for cancellation proceeding.
"Imminent hazard" is defined as a substantial likelihood of serious harm
during the duration of cancellation proceedings. 318 The term is not limited
to a concept of crisis. The function of a suspension action is to assess the
evidence required to determine the risks and benefits for the period
involved, not an ultimate resolution of the cancellation issues.319 In an
ordinary suspension, notification to the registrant of the intent to suspend
and an opportunity for a hearing is required prior to effectiveness of
suspension. Only a registrant may request an adjudicatory hearing. The
order becomes effective either after a favorable decision following a
hearing, or five days after notification if no hearing is requested.2 ° If no
hearing is requested, the suspension order is not reviewable by a court.321
If a hearing is requested, an expedited administrative adjudicatory
hearing is held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in which

pesticide immediately. Except as provided in paragraph (3) no order of suspension
may be issued under this subsection unless the Administrator has issued or at the
same time issues, a notice of intention to cancel; the registration, or change the
classification of the pesticide under subsection (b) of this section. Except s provided in
paragraph (3), the Administrator shall notify the registrant prior to issuing any
suspension order. Such notice shall include findings pertaining to the question of
"imminent hazard." The registrant shall then have an opportunity ... for an expedited
hearing before the Administrator in the question of whether an imminent hazard
exists.
(2) Expedited hearing
If no request for a hearing is submitted to the Administrator within five days of the
registrant's receipt of the notification . .. , the suspension order may be issued and
shall take effect and shall not be reviewable by a court. If a hearing is requested, it
shall commence within five days of the receipt of the request for such hearing unless
the registrant and the Administrator agree that it shall commence at a later time.
(3) Emergency order
Whenever the Administrator determines that an emergency exists that does not
permit the Administrator to hold a hearing before suspending, the Administrator may
issue a suspension order in advance of notice to the Registrant. The Administrator
may issue an emergency order under this paragraph before issuing a notice of
intention to cancel the registration or change the classification of the pesticide under
subsection (b) ... In the case of an emergency order, paragraph (2) shall apply except
that (A) the order of suspension shall be in effect pending the expeditious completion
of the remedies provided by that paragraph and the issuance of the final order on
suspension, and (B) no party other than the registrant and the Administrator shall
participate except that any person adversely affected may file briefs within the time
allotted by the Agency's rules.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. § 136(1).
Id. § 136d(c)(1).
Id. § 136d(c)(2).
Id.
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interested persons can intervene. The sole issue at the hearing is whether
an imminent hazard exists.3 2
An emergency suspension order, which is effective immediately, may
be issued if an emergency exists that does not permit even an expedited
hearing before suspension takes place.313 Registrants have five days to
request an expedited hearing and the hearing must begin within five days
of the Agency's receipt of such a hearing request. 24 If an expedited
hearing is requested, the emergency order remains in effect until the
issuance of a final suspension order following the hearing." No party
other than the registrant and the Agency may participate in the expedited
hearing except for the filing of briefs.32 6 An emergency suspension order
3 27
is subject to immediate review in district court.
D.

Enter GMOs

Pesticidal GMOs are regulated under FIFRA in much the same way
as are traditional chemical pesticides. " For pesticidal GMOs, this means

322. Id.
323. Id. § 136d(c)(3).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id § 136d(c)(4).
Section 17(b) provides:
(b) Cancellation Notices Furnished to Foreign Governments. - Whenever a
registration, or cancellation or suspension of the registration of a pesticide becomes
effective, or ceases to be effective, the Administrator shall transmit through the State
Department notification thereof to the governments of other countries and to
appropriate international agencies. Such notification shall, upon request, include all
information related to the cancellation or suspension of the registration of the
pesticide and information concerning other pesticides that are registered under
section 136a of this Act and that could be used in lieu of such pesticide.
Id.§ 136o(b).
328. The decision to treat GMOs similarly to traditional pesticides is rooted in the early U.S.
biotechnology policies of the 1980s. The U.S. Government's first systematic attempt to address
the regulation of biotechnology in a comprehensive fashion was with the publication of the 1984
document entitled "Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology."
49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (Dec. 31, 1984). The purpose of this document was "to provide a concise
index to U.S. laws related to biotechnology, to clarify the policies of the major regulatory
agencies that will be involved in reviewing research and products of biotechnology, to describe a
scientific advisory mechanisms for assessment of biotechnology issues, and to explain how the
activities of the Federal agencies in biotechnology will be coordinated." Id.In 1986, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) published in the Federal Register "Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology: Announcement of Policy;Notice for Public
Comment" ("the coordinated framework"). 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986). This approach
was based on a belief that rDNA technology in itself does not create risk. See Celeste Marie
Steen, Note, FIFRA's Preemption of Common Law Tort Actions Involving Genetically
Engineered Pesticides, 38 ARIz. L.R. 763, 766 (1996). Instead, certain types of products of
biotechnology may pose risks that can be addressed in the same fashion as regulatory agencies
address the risks posed by traditional chemical products. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the
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using FIFRA to regulate the "pesticide" rather than targeting regulation
at the process by which the pesticide is created.329 GMOs that are
intended to kill, disrupt, repel, or mitigate pests are regulated in much the
same way as traditional chemical pesticides under FIFRA. As described
above, section 2(u) of FIFRA defines the term "pesticide" as: "(1) any
substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying,
repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of
substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliator, or desiccant."
This definition is very broad and can include living organisms and
substances produced by living organisms as well as traditional chemical
pesticides. The definition of "pesticide" in FIFRA does not depend on
the process by which a particular pesticide is produced. EPA has
interpreted this definition to include biological pesticides and genetically
modified pesticides. Thus, pesticidal GMOs must be registered under
FIFRA prior to sale or distribution in the United States. The standard for
registration is the same for pesticidal GMOs as they are for traditional
chemicals. EPA has developed some data requirements specifically
geared to address potential risks from microbial pesticides, including
microbial GMOs.33 °

One category of pesticidal GMOs regulated by EPA under FIFRA
includes microbial GMOs. EPA has regulated naturally-occurring
microbial pesticides, such as B.t., for many years. Microbial pesticides are
executive branch of the U.S. Government was focused on promoting biotechnology as the
United States' hope for strong economic future. The feeling at the time was that the United
States had allowed Japan to beat it in the electronics industry. The federal government was
determined not to allow this to happen with the biotech industry. The message was clear that
regulatory agencies were not to stand in the way of biotechnology. There would not be any new
biotechnology legislation, and agencies would continue to rely on existing regulatory programs.
For pesticidal GMOs, this meant FIFRA. Moreover, a raging debate ensued over whether
regulatory agencies should be regulating the "process" of genetic engineering or the "products"
of genetic engineering. At that time, it was determined that, from a risk standpoint, the process
was irrelevant and that agencies should regulate only products of biotechnology. Under the
coordinated framework, the regulatory approach taken by U.S. regulatory agencies, including
EPA, has been to rely on existing statutes and to focus on the "product" rather than the
"process" used to create the product. Id
329. EPA's primary authority for regulating agricultural biotechnology products can be
found in two statutes: FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000), and FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392
(2000). Under FIFRA, EPA has the authority to address all environmental and human health
issues associated with pesticide use. Under FFDCA, EPA has the authority to set tolerances for
pesticide residues in or on food. EPA also regulates biologicals and biotechnology products that
are not pesticides, food, or drugs under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§
2601-2692 (2000). TSCA grants EPA the authority to screen new chemical substances and
impose controls to prevent unreasonable risks and, through rulemaking, to acquire information
and impose restrictions to prevent unreasonable risks on existing chemical substances. Although
some agricultural biotechnology products may fall within the purview of TSCA, the majority of
agricultural biotechnology products regulated by EPA are considered pesticides under EPA's
broad definition of the term and, thus, are regulated under FIFRA and FFDCA.
330. The data requirement for microbial pesticides can be found at 40 C.F.R. § 158.740
(2005).
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regulated in much the same way as traditional pesticides at the large-scale
testing and registration stages. EPA has expressed concern about the
potential for adverse effects associated with small-scale environmental
testing of certain microbial pesticides, both naturally-occurring and
genetically engineered. Small-scale testing of most traditional pesticides is
generally considered to pose very limited risks and, thus, typically is not
regulated by EPA. Because microbial pesticides are living organisms that
have the potential to reproduce and spread in the environment, however,
even small-scale testing can present unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment.3" Thus, EPA has promulgated a rule that requires
notification prior to any small-scale testing of certain microbial pesticides,
including microbial GMOs.332

Another category of pesticidal GMOs regulated by EPA under
FIFRA are pesticidal genetically modified plants, or "plant-incorporated
protectants. ''333 In July 2001, EPA published its long-awaited rule for the
regulation of plant-incorporated protectants under FIFRA.3' The plantincorporated protectant rule took approximately ten years to develop.
Countless public hearings, scientific advisory council meetings,
congressional hearings, and interagency negotiations were held.335
Despite all of these efforts, however, the resultant rule is quite modest
and does not really tackle the complex and novel risks of GMOs. The
thrust of the new rule merely defines the scope of what types of pesticidal
GMOs EPA believes warrant regulation. 336 EPA has identified several
331. See Microbial Pesticides; Experimental Use Permits and Notifications, Final Rule, 59
Fed. Reg. 45,600 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 172).
332. 40 C.F.R. § 172 (2005).
333. A plant-incorporated protectant is defined as a pesticidal substance that is intended to
be produced in a living plant, or in the produce thereof, and the genetic material necessary for its
production. 40 C.F.R. § 152.3 (2005).
334. Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for PlantIncorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772 (July 19, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174). EPA does not yet have any rules governing GM animals.
For an historical discussion of the Plant-Incorporated Protectant Rule, see Angelo, supra note
230.
335. Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for PlantIncorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772 (July 19, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174).
336. Under EPA's definition of plant-incorporated protectants, all substances produced by
plants and intended for a pesticidal purpose are within EPA's jurisdiction, regardless of whether
the plant is genetically modified. However, not all plant-incorporated protectants within EPA's
jurisdiction warrant regulation under FIFRA. EPA believes that many plant-incorporated
protectants do not warrant any regulation under FIFRA because they pose low probability of
risk and will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. For example, in 1982
EPA promulgated a regulation under FIFRA section 25(b) that exempted all biological control
agents from the requirements of FIFRA, except for certain microorganisms. 40 C.F.R.
§152.20(a)(3) (2005). This exemption was promulgated because EPA found that
macroorganisms used as biological control agents were adequately regulated by other federal
agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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categories that it has exempted from any FIFRA regulation because they
are low risk.337 One such category is GMOs that closely resemble the
types of plants that could be created naturally or through traditional plant
breeding. An example of this would be introducing a substance normally
produced by one variety of corn into another variety of corn as opposed
to introducing a substance normally produced only in bacteria into corn.
This type of plant-incorporated protectant would be exempt because it is
not posing any new risks that would not have evolved naturally or
through traditional breeding.338 If a pesticidal GMO does not meet one of
these exemptions, however, the regulatory process is virtually identical to
the regulatory process for all pesticides-namely, registration based on a
cost/benefit analysis and labeling restrictions on use.339 EPA has not yet
established specific data requirements for genetically modified plants that

act as pesticides.3"

337. EPA's first attempt to describe its plans to regulate plant-incorporated protectants was
in early 1994. On January 21, 1994, EPA held a joint meeting of a sub-panel of the Agency's
Scientific Advisory Panel and the Biotechnology Science Advisory Committee to address certain
scientific issues related to the regulation of pesticidal substances produced in plants. For the
meeting, EPA made available to the public a draft proposal of a comprehensive policy and four
draft proposed rules, together referred to as the "draft proposal," developed under FIFRA and
FFDCA. On November 23, 1994, EPA published in the Federal Register somewhat modified
versions of these draft documents (hereinafter together "the proposal"). 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496
(Nov. 23, 1994); Plant-Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act; Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,519 (Nov. 23, 1994); Plant-Pesticides Subject to the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; Proposed Rule, Plant-Pesticides; Proposed
Exemption From the Requirement of a Tolerance Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,535 (Nov. 23, 1994); Plant-Pesticides; Proposed Exemption From the
Requirement of a Tolerance Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for Nucleic
Acids Produced in Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,542 (Nov. 23, 1994); and Plant-Pesticides; Proposed
Exemption From the Requirement of a Tolerance Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act for Viral Coat Proteins Produced in
Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,545 (Nov. 23, 1994). The proposal was intended to clarify the status of
plant-incorporated protectants (referred to as "plant-pesticides" in the 1994 proposal) under
FIFRA and FFDCA and outline the scope of what types of plant-incorporated protectants EPA
believed warranted regulation based on risk/benefit considerations. Under the proposal, many
plant-incorporated protectants would not be subject to regulation because they pose a low
potential for risk to humans and/or the environment. Others would be subject to regulation but
would be regulated somewhat differently than conventional pesticides because of the unique
nature of plant-incorporated protectants. The proposal outlined how EPA intended to assess
plant-incorporated protectants at different stages of environmental testing and at the sale and
distribution stage. The final plant-incorporated protectant rule, promulgated in 2001, adopted
some, but not all of the exemptions proposed in 1994.
338. 40 C.F.R. § 174.25 (2005).
339. EPA has not adopted any specific registration, data, or labeling requirements for plantincorporated protectants. See generally Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed.
Reg. 37,772 (July 19, 2001).
340. Id.
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IV.

IS FIFRA ECO-PRAGMATIC?

Although the basic regulatory framework of FIFRA dates back to
1972, with some of its provisions, such as the misbranding prohibition,
dating back to the early consumer-protection statutes of the early
twentieth century, and despite the fact that a statute with the word
"rodenticide" in it would hardly be expected to be cutting-edge, FIFRA
is surprisingly eco-pragmatic. In fact, somewhat ironically given the state
of pesticide regulation today, the earliest applications of FIFRA have
threads of eco-pragmatism running through them. Even by today's
standards, the 1972 DDT cancellation decision represents a fairly
sophisticated ecological analysis focused on: the tendency of DDT and its
metabolites to persist in the soil and aquasphere; the tendency of DDT to
be readily transported by leaching, erosion, run-off, and volatilization;
DDT's fat soluble characteristic, which enables it to collect and
concentrate in animal fat tissue; DDT's ability to bioaccumulate as it
moves up the food chain; and the fact that, once accumulated, DDT is
toxic to animals and humans and inhibits the ability of fish and other
wildlife species to regenerate. 41 EPA did not shy away from tackling the
difficult issue of how to take into account the risks that may occur in the
future due to the persistent nature of the pesticide. EPA also was not
paralyzed by a lack of certainty in data. For example, even though EPA
recognized the degree of transportability of DDT was unknown, EPA
considered data showing that DDT was found in remote areas of the
world and in ocean species, such as whales, as providing enough evidence
from which a logical inference could be drawn that DDT is readily
transported in the environment. 42 Moreover, EPA concluded that
persistence and biomagnification in and of themselves were a "cause of
concern, given the unknown and possibly forever undeterminable longrange effects of DDT in man and the environment. 3 43 Thus, even in 1972
EPA recognized the uncertainty surrounding ecological effects data,
while at the same time employing a precautionary approach to prevent
uncertain, possibly devastating effects that may occur in the long term.
When the group petitioners who opposed cancellation argued that
DDT is only one toxic substance in a polluted environment and that
therefore, whatever its laboratory effects, it cannot be shown as the
causative agent of injury to wildlife, EPA responded that this argument
"does not redeem DDT, but only underscores the magnitude of effect
that will be necessary for cleaning up the environment." 3" Persuaded by
evidence showing metabolites of DDT cause eggshell thinning in certain
341. Stevens Indus., Inc., 1 E.A.D. 9 (June 2, 1972) (Consolidated DDT Hearings).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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bird species, EPA found it sufficient despite some contradictory evidence
that there was "laboratory data and observation data, and in addition, a
scientific hypothesis, which might explain the phenomenon. 34 5 EPA
further found that no label restrictions could completely prevent effects
on nontarget organisms, persistence and transport in the environment, or
biomagnification. Accordingly, cancellation was the only available riskreduction measure.
EPA's analysis of the benefits of DDT in formulating its decision to
cancel was also fairly sophisticated and in some ways did a better job of
considering benefits than many more recent EPA decisions regarding
cancellation or suspension of pesticides. The benefits analysis focused on
the availability of alternatives including non-chemical pest management
programs and the fact that the crops protected by DDT were not in short
supply. EPA found that DDT was not necessary to ensure adequate
supply of cotton at a reasonable cost, given that only 38 percent of the
cotton-producing acreage at the time was treated by DDT.3" In contrast
to many recent EPA decisions, where non-chemical pest control
alternatives and emphasis on availability of crops are conspicuously
absent, or at least play a very minimal role, in the decision-making
process, EPA's 1972 DDT cancellation decision takes a broader look at
the cost/benefit analysis rather than merely counting dollars and cents on
each side of the equation. In fact, EPA's 1972 DDT cancellation decision
has other indicia of an eco-pragmatic approach. For example, in the final
order, EPA's statement that "the risk/benefit equation is a dynamic one"
foreshadows arguments for flexibility and adaptive management at the
center of eco-pragmatic scholarship.
Subsequent to the DDT cancellation, EPA brought a number of
cancellation and suspension actions through which the agency's
interpretation of the statutory standard-"unreasonable risks to man and
the environment" -developed
further. 7 This series of FIFRA
cancellation and suspension cases cemented the interpretation of FIFRA
as containing a cost/benefit balancing standard rather than the openended balancing standard that, at least arguably, it was intended to
have. 48 According to the legislative history of FIFRA as described by
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA (heptachlor-chlordane), 548 F.2d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); In re Chapman Chem. Co., FIFRA Docket No. 246, 1
E.A.D. 199 (EPA 1976); In re Protexall Prod., Inc., FIFRA Docket No. 625, 2 E.A.D. 854
(E.P.A. 1989).
348. See, e.g., In re Chapman Chem. Co., FIFRA Docket No. 246, 1 E.A.D. 199 (EPA 1976)
(canceling certain uses of mercury in pesticides based on a finding that the risks of continued use
outweighed the benefits); In re Protexall Prod., Inc., FIFRA Docket No. 625, 2 E.A.D. 854
(EPA 1989) (describing the registrant's burden in challenging a proposed cancellation as
requiring a showing that the "benefits of continued use justify the risks").
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Professor William Rodgers, the "unreasonable adverse effects" language
was intended to create an environmentally stringent standard for
registration.349 The Senate Commerce Committee, which created the
standard, described it as not tolerating any adverse effects "unless there
are overriding benefits from the use of a pesticide.""35 Accordingly, the
standard as contemplated by the Senate drafters of the 1972 FIFRA
amendments apparently intended that, although economic and social
factors should be considered and balanced against environmental risks,
the balancing would not be a simple accounting of dollars and cents on
each side of the equation, with the pesticide winning the right to
registration as long as the scale was tipped, no matter how slightly, in
favor of the benefits provided by the pesticide. Instead, the senate
drafters appeared to intend that, where environmental risks exist, the
analysis would favor registration only where the risks were outweighed
by "overriding benefits." For example, an overriding benefit might be
where a particular pesticide is important to fighting a significant public
health problem, such as West Nile disease, and where other less risky
control alternatives are not available or are too costly.3 1 Other overriding
benefits might include situations where a particular pesticide is necessary
to maintain a segment of agriculture where nonchemical or less risky
alternatives are not available, and when growing the crop without the
pesticide would result in severe economic losses or dramatically increased
food prices. However, an overriding benefit would not be found in a
situation where, if the pesticide were taken off the market, the evidence
showed only that chemical companies would lose money or farmers
would have to switch to other existing alternative pest control practices
which might involve some additional cost. If FIFRA were amended to
make clear that only overriding benefits could outweigh significant
environmental risks, then potential registrants would face a more
stringent standard and pesticides that posed significant risk would not
routinely be registered.
Certainly much can be done to mold FIFRA into a more ecopragmatic law. Nevertheless, eco-pragmatic themes such as adaptive
management and an ecological integrity baseline run throughout the
349. RODGERS, supra note 191, at 451.
350. Id.(quoting S.REP. No.92-970 (1972)).
351. The important role pesticides can play in preventing significant public health problems
is specifically addressed by FIFRA. The definition of "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment" provides that:
[tihe Administrator shall consider the risks and benefits of public health pesticides
separate from the risks and benefits of other pesticides. In weighing and regulatory
action concerning a public health pesticide under this subchapter, the Administrator
shall weigh any risks of the pesticide against the health risks such as the diseases
transmitted by the vector to be controlled by the pesticide.
7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000).
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existing statute. The concept of an ecological baseline can be found in a
number of places in FIFRA. Specifically, the standard for registration
under FIFRA addresses a large array of ecological concerns as well as
human health concerns. FIFRA's regulatory standard aims to prevent
"unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." 352 The word
"environment" is defined very broadly by FIFRA to include "water, air,
land, and all plants and man and other animals living therein, and the
interrelationships which exist among these." "' Thus, FIFRA not only
broadly includes land, water, air, and plant and animal resources within
the
definition
of
"environment,"
but
also
includes
the
"interrelationships" among these resources as encompassed within the
definition.
Moreover, FIFRA contemplates an ecological baseline in its
premarket evaluation. Under FIFRA, registration is required prior to the
sale, distribution, or commercialization of any pesticide product. Except
for limited circumstances qualifying for an exemption, some level of
regulatory review is required prior to the environmental release of any
pesticide even if only for experimentation purposes. Unlike some other
environmental regulatory programs, such as the Toxic Substance Control
Act (TSCA),354 FIFRA imposes a somewhat precautionary approach in
that pesticides are, by definition, intended to kill or disrupt living
organisms and are presumed to pose unreasonable risks, and, therefore,
they cannot be sold or distributed without a pre-market environmental
review. "'
FIFRA's precautionary approach also manifests in its allocation of
the burden of proof. While not expressly stated in the language of
FIFRA, pursuant to a series of administrative and judicial decisions, the
burden of proof that a pesticide does not pose an unreasonable adverse
effect on the environment remains at all times on the proponent of
registration or continued registration.356 Thus, a proponent of registration
must demonstrate it meets this burden prior to a pesticide being
352. See, e.g., id. § 136(1), 136(x), 136(ee)(2).
353. Id.§ 1360).
354. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
355. In contrast, new non-pesticide chemicals entering the marketplace do not require a
premarket environmental review under TSCA. Id § 2604. Instead, prior to manufacturing these
new non-pesticide chemical substances under TSCA, all that is required is a ninety day
notification to EPA. Id. § 2604(a). During the premarket notification period, EPA conducts a
cursory review of the proposed new chemical, but unless a determination is made that
generation of new data is required, EPA typically does not require environmental testing. Id. §
2604. If a non-pesticide substance is later found to pose unforeseen risks, EPA can require
additional testing or impose regulations to reduce the risk from such a substance. Id. §§ 2603,
2606.
356. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA (heptachlor-chlordane), 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA (DDT II), 439 F.2d 584,
593 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Steams Elec. Paste Co. v. EPA, 461 F.2d 293, 304 n.32 (7th Cir. 1972).
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registered. Further, if EPA proposes cancellation of a pesticide or use of
the pesticide, the burden of proof rests on the proponent for continued
registration during any cancellation or suspension hearing that may
ensue.
With regard to adaptive management, FIFRA also shows surprising
signs of being eco-pragmatic. Many of FIFRA's provisions are specifically
designed to seek new information, to adapt to new information, or to
tailor the level of regulation to the level of certainty of risks based on the
sufficiency of available data. For example, FIFRA establishes two
different levels of registration- full registration and conditional
registration. EPA may conditionally register a pesticide under certain
circumstances despite the fact that sufficient data have not been
generated to support full registration. As described above, such
circumstances may include a new proposed use for a pesticide already
registered for another use. In such a situation, sufficient data exist to
support the existing use, but additional data may be required to support
full registration of the newly proposed use. Under such circumstances,
EPA may conditionally register the pesticide for the new use if
conditional registration would not significantly increase the risk of any
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. Accordingly, through
the conditional registration process, a degree of flexibility is built into
FIFRA allowing products to be used in new ways prior to full data
generation.357
Other provisions of FIFRA allowing unique circumstances and
changing information to be considered include the emergency exemption
provisions, the state registration provisions, and the experimental use
permit provisions. The emergency exemption provision of section 18 of
FIFRA authorizes EPA to grant an emergency exemption to any state or
federal agency in emergency conditions-i.e., urgent non-routine
conditions for which no economically or environmentally feasible
alternative practices that provide adequate control are available.5 8 Thus,
section 18 provides flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, which
could include the outbreak and spread of a new pest or the spread of a
public health disease. In such circumstances, EPA is authorized to act
quickly to control the problem before the pest or disease vector is widely
disseminated and to minimize the harm without waiting for complete
data to support registration.359
The state registration provision in section 24(c) authorizes states to
issue registration to meet special local needs.3" Accordingly, this
357. Of course, should the new data demonstrate that the new use does not meet the
standards for full registration, full registration will not be granted.
358. 7 U.S.C. § 136p (2000).
359. Id.
360. Id. § 136v(c).
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provision allows states to consider local circumstances warranting use of
pesticide products-or particular uses of those products-not generally
approved under FIFRA for nationwide use. Thus, in a state where a
particular pest causes more severe harm than in other states, the
cost/benefit analysis for the use of the pesticide in that state may have a
different result from the nationwide cost/benefit analysis for that use, and
accordingly, a special local needs registration may be granted for that
state only. In this way, FIFRA's flexibility allows registrations to be
tailored to the special agricultural, environmental, economic, or other
needs of a state.
Finally, the experimental use permit provision continued in FIFRA
section 5 is another example of the flexibility afforded by FIFRA in
tailoring the amount of data necessary to the level of risk resulting from a
particular use. FIFRA section 5 authorizes EPA to issue permits for the
field testing of pesticides necessary to generate data to support full
registration. 6 Thus, as the risk from exposure to a pesticide increases
(i.e., as it moves from lab testing, to small-scale field testing, to full-scale
use), progressively greater data requirements attach to ensure that
sufficient data are available to make an unreasonable adverse effects
determination for each level of use. Similarly, classification of a pesticide
as either general or restricted use allows EPA to adapt the amount of
regulation required to the risks associated with the particular pesticide.
By classifying a pesticide as restricted use, EPA ensures that users of the
pesticide will have at least some training and supervision to reduce the
risks associated with the use of that pesticide. With regard to taking
advantage of new information as it develops-or requiring new
information as new testing methodologies become available or new risk
scenarios are understood-FIFRA also contains some relatively ecopragmatic approaches. Because hundreds of pesticides on the market
were registered prior to the adoption of current registration data
requirements, FIFRA section 4 contains a detailed "reregistration"
process designed to ensure that older pesticides are reexamined in light of
more stringent regulatory standards and more sophisticated testing
methodologies developed since the early registrations of many
pesticides.36 The current reregistration provisions include a multi-phased
process with multiple deadlines which must be met to avoid suspension or
cancellation.363 This reregistration approach has been an extremely timeconsuming, burdensome, and expensive process.3" Future changes to the
registration standard, data requirements, or testing methodologies

361.
362.

Id.§ 136c.
7 U.S.C. § 136a-1 (2000).

363.

Id.

364.

See Rodgers, supranote 191, at 431-35.
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warranting another round of reregistration could also be extremely costly
in terms of time and resources. Nevertheless, such a process may be the
only way to comprehensively address significant changes.
While reregistration is required of all pesticides registered prior to
1984, a number of FIFRA data requirements apply to previously
registered pesticides in a more targeted manner. For example, FIFRA
section 3(c)(2)(B) authorizes EPA to require holders of existing
registrations to provide additional data whenever EPA finds that
"additional data are required to maintain in effect an existing registration
' Under section 6(a)(2) of FIFRA, if at any time after the
of a pesticide."365
registration of a pesticide the registrant obtains any factual information
regarding unreasonable adverse effects on the environment of the
pesticide, the registrant must submit such information to EPA.3"
Unreasonable adverse effects information submitted to EPA may lead to
EPA: requesting additional data under section 3(c)(2)(B); initiating a
cancellation or suspension action; reclassifying a general use pesticide as
a restricted use pesticide; or imposing some other form of regulation to
ensure that the pesticide will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment. Thus, FIFRA contemplates a process of ongoing
evaluations of pesticide risks as new information becomes available. With
regard to pesticidal GMOs, EPA has taken the section 6(a)(2) approach a
step farther to require ongoing reporting of adverse environmental
effects data, not only for registered pesticides, but also for pesticides that
qualify for a plant-incorporated protectant exemption.367 In its plantincorporated protectant rule, EPA requires any person who produces, for
sale or distribution, a plant-incorporated protectant exempt under the
rule, or who obtains any information regarding adverse effects on human
health or the environment alleged to have been caused by the plantincorporated protectant to submit such information to EPA.3"
V.

REINVENTING FIFRA THROUGH ECO-PRAGMATISM

Notwithstanding all of these promising elements, FIFRA has not
lived up to its eco-pragmatic promise. As described more fully below, a
365. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(B) (2000).
366. Id.§ 136d(a)(2).
367. 40 C.F.R. § 174.1 (2005).
368. Id.§ 174.71. This rule goes on to explain that, for the purposes of plant-incorporated
protectants:
[Aidverse effects on human health or the environment.. .means at a minimum
information about incidents affecting humans or other nontarget organisms where
both: (1) The producer is aware, or has been informed, that a person or nontarget
organism allegedly suffered a toxic or adverse effect due to exposure to (e.g., ingestion
of) a plant-incorporated protectant. (2) The producer has or could reasonably obtain
information concerning where the incident occurred.
Id.§ 174.71(b).
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combination of statutory shortcomings, unfortunate interpretations, and
problems with implementation and enforcement have resulted in
FIFRA's lack of success as an environmental protection statute.
Accordingly, there is considerable room for improvement. By revising
FIFRA to follow the eco-pragmatic approach and to more consciously
incorporate ecological principles, the statute could be improved
substantially.
A.

Reinventing the Cost/Benefit Balancing

To reinvent FIFRA in an eco-pragmatic mold, a number of changes
are indicated. First, as described above, EPA's cost/benefit approach to
registration and cancellation under FIFRA must be replaced with an
open-ended balancing approach consistent with Congress' apparent
intent in drafting the "unreasonable adverse effects on man and the
environment" standard. Under such an approach, although economic and
social costs would be considered in determining whether to allow a
pesticide to be sold or distributed in the United States, they could not be
used to "balance" away significant human health or environmental risks.
Such risks would only be permitted in cases of overriding benefits of the
pesticide, taking into account a number of specified considerations in the
open-ended balancing.
The plain language of FIFRA, as it currently stands, does not
mandate a strict cost/benefit balancing. Instead, as Shapiro and
Glicksman have suggested, on its face FIFRA contains an open-ended
balancing standard. As described above, FIFRA's definition of
"unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" means any
unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide. Congress' only direction to EPA was to "take into account"
economic and social as well as environmental considerations.
Nevertheless, EPA has interpreted and implemented this standard as
more of a strict cost/benefit balancing. 69 However, at least with regard to
pesticide registration, EPA does not engage in a true cost/benefit analysis
because it does not require applicants to demonstrate the benefits of the
pesticide. Moreover, as described above, EPA generally does not require
efficacy data prior to registering a pesticide. EPA has, by rule, waived all
requirements to submit efficacy data unless the pesticide product "bears a
claim to control pest microorganisms that pose a threat to human
health ...or a claim to control vertebrates (such as rodents, birds, bats,
369. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA (heptachlor-chlordane), 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 925 (1977); In re Chapman Chem. Co., FIFRA Docket No. 246, 1
E.A.D. 199 (EPA 1976); In re Protexall Prod., Inc., FIFRA Docket No. 625, 2 E.A.D.854 (EPA
1989).
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canids, and skunks) that may directly or indirectly transmit diseases to
37 Accordingly, at the time of a registration decision, EPA does
humans.""
not know how efficacious a particular pesticide is. Further, at the time of
registration, EPA does not determine whether more efficacious
alternatives, including non-chemical alternatives, exist. Thus, at the time
of registration, EPA does not know the extent of the benefits of the
pesticide. Instead, benefits are assumed.37' When coupled with the limited
cost data that EPA considers, EPA's cost/benefit analysis is not a true
cost/benefit analysis and is flawed in many respects.
Technology-based approaches, which have worked well in other
areas of pollution control law,37 may not work as well where the goal is to
release substances into the environment with the intent to kill living
organisms. Thus, a different approach may be necessary. FIFRA differs
from many other environmental laws in that the environmental risks
sought to be reduced by other such laws are by-products of activities
intended to produce some other product or service (e.g., air pollution
from energy production), whereas with FIFRA, the pesticide that poses
the risk is the intended product. Accordingly, under FIFRA, the
imposition of technology standards to reduce risks would take a different
form than other technological controls that seek, for example, to reduce
air pollution emissions. The FIFRA analogue of the technology-based
standard, therefore, is an alternative reduced-risk method of pest control.
Such an alterative can be either a lower risk chemical pesticide, or other
non-chemical methods of pest control, such as biological control or
373
cultural control.
FIFRA's balancing standard should be revised to make clear that it
is an open-ended balancing rather than a strict cost/benefit balancing. In
addition to the economic considerations that the statutory standard
directs EPA to consider in conducting this balancing, the statute should
be revised to explicitly direct EPA to consider additional factors aimed at
ensuring ecological concerns are adequately valued in the balancing. For
370. 40 C.F.R. § 158.640 (2005). The only pesticides for which EPA requires efficacy data
are pesticides intended to control microbial organisms that affect human health and certain
vectors of public health diseases. See id. (containing product performance data requirements for
antimicrobial agents, products for treating water systems, and pesticides intended to kill or repel
rodent, avian, and bat vectors). However, EPA has reserved the right to require, on a case-bycase basis, submission of efficacy data for other pesticides. Id.
371. In determining whether to register a pesticide, EPA assumes a manufacturer would not
invest the resources necessary to support registration and commercialization of the pesticide
unless the pesticide was efficacious and thus has benefits. Of course, the billions of dollars
consumers spend each year on weight loss products, anti-balding products, and wrinkle cream
suggest that marketability and efficacy are not necessarily one in the same.
372. See generallyWagner, supra note 95.
373. Biological controls include predator or parasites of pest insects. Cultural controls
include cultivation, sanitation, crop rotation, and sowing and harvesting practices. See supra
notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
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example, considerations such as the degree of uncertainty regarding risks,
the level of probability or risk, the degree of harm that could occur, and
the likelihood of a pesticide to spread or reproduce in the environment,
either through biological means as in the case of GMOs or physical
means, 374 are all factors that should be given serious consideration in any
open-ended cost/benefit balancing.
Another recommended revision to EPA's cost/benefit approach to
FIFRA registration is to require that the assumed benefits of a pesticide
actually be demonstrated. As discussed above, FIFRA does not mandate,
and EPA has opted not to require, that efficacy data be provided when
registering a pesticide.3 75 Nor does EPA require that applicants for
pesticide registration provide data showing that cost-effective alternative
pest control methods are not available. Likewise, EPA does not require
applicants to demonstrate that their proposed pesticide is relatively
beneficial, either environmentally or economically, over other existing
pesticides or pest control methods that are available to address the target
pest. EPA merely assumes that a pesticide manufacturer would not incur
the costs of developing and marketing a pesticide if it was not efficacious
and did not have benefits and that any pesticides that are not beneficial
will be eliminated through market forces. Consequently, a manufacturer
could obtain a registration for a pesticide without ever having to show
that the pesticide works for its intended purpose, let alone that the
pesticide is necessary for combating particular pests or that existing
chemical or non-chemical alternatives are not available. Virtually no
chemical pesticide is without at least some risk. Thus, it is at least
possible, if not likely, that registered pesticides pose some risks but have
not been demonstrated to have any significant environmental, economic,
or societal benefit.
It is not until EPA considers whether to cancel the registration of a
pesticide that it evaluates the benefits of the pesticide and whether there
are viable alternatives available. In determining whether to proceed with
cancellation, EPA necessarily makes a threshold determination that the
risks posed by a pesticide are significant. Once that determination is
made, EPA conducts a full cost/benefit analysis. It is only at this point
that EPA takes a look at the economic benefits of the pesticide.

374. Physical means of environmental dissemination include the tendency of a pesticide to
move great distances through soil, water, or air, and the tendency of a pesticide to
bioaccumulate.
375. The lack of a requirement for efficacy data is in contrast to other licensing statues such
as the licensing provisions of the FFDCA governing the approval of new drugs, which explicitly
requires a finding that a drug is "effective" as part of the premarket review process. A new drug
is considered to be "effective" if there is a general recognition among experts, founded on
substantial evidence, that the drug in fact produces the results claimed for it under prescribed
conditions. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
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However, when conducting a benefits analysis, EPA's analysis of
alternatives is typically limited to other registered pesticides for the same
use, which are assumed to be efficacious if they are registered. EPA's
consideration of non-chemical alternative pest control techniques, such as
cultural control, biological control, or organic farming practices, has
proven extremely limited and cursory. Moreover, when evaluating
whether existing chemical alternatives are available for the target pest,
EPA does not conduct a comparative risk analysis, which could lead to a
less risky pesticide being cancelled because other alternatives exist, but as
more and more pesticides are cancelled, the benefits of the remaining
pesticides grow. Thus, the benefits of the "last pesticide standing" will be
very high because no alternatives exist. Accordingly, the last pesticide
standing will have benefits that outweigh the risks even if the risks are
relatively high. This problem could be solved by requiring a true benefits
analysis for each registered pesticide, including a consideration of nonchemical alternatives, and conducting relative risk analysis that compares
the risks of pesticides targeted toward a particular pest. It should be
noted that although it does not routinely consider the relative risks of
alternative pesticides when making registration or cancellation decisions,
EPA has implemented certain policies to encourage development and
registration of lower risk pesticides. In 1997, EPA issued Pesticide
Registration (PR) Notice 97-3, which sets forth EPA's policy for the
expedited review of conventional pesticides under the reduced-risk
initiative and of biological pesticides.376 The goal of the policy is to
encourage the development, registration, and use of lower-risk pesticides
products "which would result in reduced risks to human health and the
environment, when compared to existing alternatives." To accomplish
this goal, EPA offers the incentive of an expedited registration review for
qualifying products. Qualifying pesticides include those that "may
reasonably be expected to accomplish [one] or more of the following: (i)
Reduce the risks of pesticides to human health; (ii) Reduce the risks of
pesticides to nontarget organisms; (iii) Reduce the potential for
contamination of groundwater, surface water, or other valued
environmental resources; and (iv) Broaden the adoption of integrated
3 77
pest management strategies.
376. This policy was developed partially in response to the 1996 Food Quality Protection
Act that mandates EPA to develop procedures and guidelines for expedited pesticide review.
The policy supersedes EPA's prior reduced-risk criteria published in Incentives for
Development and Registration of Reduced Risk Pesticides, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,140 (July 20, 1992);
and Incentives for Development and Registration of Reduced-Risk Pesticides Program, 58 Fed.
Reg. 5,854 (Jan. 22, 1993).
377. These criteria are found in FIFRA § 3(c)(10), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(10) (2000). EPA has
further interpreted these criteria to develop a list of factors that will most significantly contribute
to EPA's decision to grant reduced risk status. These factors include, in descending order of
importance: very low mammalian toxicity; toxicity generally lower than alternatives (10-10OX);
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Moreover, with regard to the costs side of the equation, EPA's
analyses, although more complete than for benefits, do not fully address
the suite of environmental risks posed by pesticides.378 Most of the
indirect environmental and economic costs of pesticide use are not
considered. 37 9 Environmental and economic costs not typically addressed
in any meaningful way in pesticide cost/benefit analyses include: domestic
animal poisonings and contaminated products; destruction of beneficial
natural predators and parasites; honeybee and wild bee poisonings and
reduced pollination; crop and product loss; ground and surface water
contamination; fishery losses; adverse effects on wild birds and mammals;
adverse effects on microorganisms and invertebrates; and adverse effects
on ecosystem services. In 1993, Cornell Professor David Pimmentel
estimated that if the full environmental and social costs of pesticide use
are taken into account, including indirect effects, the environmental and
social costs of pesticide use would be significantly greater than $8
billion/year." Pimentel estimated that of this $8 billion/year, users of
pesticides in agriculture pay only approximately $3 billion/year, leaving
the remaining $5 billion/year to be borne by society. 381 Moreover,
Pimentel points out that many of the true costs of pesticide use are either
not well understood or difficult to quantify. Thus, the true cost of
pesticide use may be even higher. Unfortunately, EPA considers very few
displaces chemicals that pose potential human health concerns [e.g., organophosphates, probable
carcinogens (B2s)]; reduces exposure to mixers, loaders, applicators, and reentry workers; very
low toxicity to birds; very low toxicity to honeybees, significantly less toxicity/risk to birds than
alternatives; not harmful to beneficial insects, highly selective pest impacts; very low toxicity to
fish; less toxicity/risk to fish than alternatives; potential toxicity/risk to fish mitigatable/ similar
toxicity to fish as alternatives, but significantly less exposure; low potential for groundwater
contamination; lower use rates than alternatives, fewer applications; low pest resistance potential
(i.e., new mode of action); highly compatible with IPM; and efficacy. EPA, Pesticide
Registration Notice, Notice to Manufacturers, Formulators,Producers and Registrants of
PesticideProducts(1997), availableat http://www.epa.gov/opppmsdl/PR Notices/pr97-3.html.
378. It is not clear why EPA has focused its attention on human health risks and has given
short shrift to ecological concerns. While EPA certainly has the legal authority to address
ecological concerns, its focus continues to be human health concerns. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the area of pesticide regulation. Professor Holly Doremus has raised the issue
of whether EPA's emphasis on human health concerns, as opposed to ecological concerns, stems
from the institutional setting of EPA's pesticide program. Letter from Holly Doremus,
Professor, U.C. Davis School of Law, to author (July 27, 2005) (on file with author). Although a
full evaluation of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, the history of the EPA pesticide
program may be a factor in creating such a bias. Prior to the creation of the EPA, pesticides, to
the extent they were regulated, were under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. When EPA was formed, many of the USDA employees working on pesticide issues
moved to the EPA pesticide office. Perhaps this created a culture focused on promoting
agriculture even at the expense of ecological harm. Another explanation for this institutional
bias may simply be that, from a political standpoint, it is easier to justify imposing costs on
industry or farms to protect human health than it is to protect ecological resources.
379. See generally Pimentel, supra note 225.
380. Id.at72.
381. Id.
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of these costs when conducting the cost/benefit analysis it relies on to
register a pesticide. Additionally, given the way EPA has interpreted
FIFRA, even a very small risk may warrant cancellation of a pesticide,
provided that the benefits are very low.3 2 Conversely, presumably, even a
very high risk may not trigger cancellation if the economic benefits to be
achieved are very high. By this logic, if a pesticide poses a great economic
benefit, high risks to vulnerable species or ecosystems will be tolerated.
Another area in which EPA's current approach to regulating
pesticides is lacking is with regard to threatened and endangered species.
The Center for Biological Diversity recently reported that EPA has
approved registrations for pesticides that put more than 375 Endangered
Species Act (ESA) listed species at risk.383 In the past several years, EPA
has come under considerable attack for its failure to adequately address
risks to certain species listed under the ESA 31 from pesticide uses. Since
the 1989 Defenders of Wildlife case, in which EPA was found liable for a
take under the ESA for allowing the continued registration of pesticides
containing strychnine, which harmed certain listed species, it has been
clear that EPA is not only obligated to comply with the consultation
requirements under the ESA when making decisions regarding pesticide
registration, but the agency is also obligated to ensure that the permitted
use of a registered pesticide will not result in an unauthorized take of a
listed species.
Nevertheless, in the years since the Defenders of Wildlife decision,
EPA's actions with regard to the protection of listed species from
pesticides have been limited and have failed to carry out the mandates of
the ESA. EPA's policy regarding pesticides and endangered species has
consisted of requiring certain pesticide product labels to direct users to
county bulletins, which identify on a map the range of listed species in the
county. In the past several years, EPA has come under increasing
criticism for is failure to fulfill its obligations under the ESA.3" In
382. In the Matter of Protexall Products, Inc., FIFRA Docket No. 625, 2 E.A.D. 854 (EPA
1989) (upholding cancellation of sodium arsenate ant baits which posed a small risk of minor
illness to children because the benefits of the pesticide were minimal).
383. BRIAN LITMANS & JEFF MILLER, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, SILENT SPRING
REVISITED:

PESTICIDE

USE

AND

ENDANGERED

SPECIES

(2004),

http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/REPORt.pdf.
384. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
385. While a detailed discussion of the issues related to the relationship between pesticide
laws and the Endangered Species Act is beyond the scope of this Article, those issues are the
subject of a forthcoming article by the author. For a further discussion of these an related issues,
see Patti A. Goldman, ProtectingEndangeredSpecies From Pesticides:Making the ESA Work
or FindingLoopholes, SJ023 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 31 (2003); Pierre Mineau, Birds and Pesticides:Are
Pesticide RegulatoryDecisions Consistent with the ProtectionAfforded MigratoryBird Species
Under the MigratoryBird Treaty Act?, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 313 (2004).
See also Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmersand Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the
EndangeredSpecies Act and Why t (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 441, 487-91
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particular, in September of 2004, environmentalists won a significant
victory when the Ninth Circuit affirmed a January 2004 U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington order which found that
EPA had violated the ESA because it had failed to take steps to ensure
that the registration of fifty-four pesticides would not jeopardize the
survival of listed salmon species. The appeals court's ruling upheld the
district court's injunction, which imposed detailed buffer zones restricting
the use of more than thirty pesticides along listed salmon supporting
waters in California, Oregon, and Washington states.3 6
The federal government's response to the criticisms regarding EPA's
failure to fully comply with the ESA, as well as its recent court losses, has
been to amend the joint regulations for consultation under section 7 of
the ESA. 7 On August 5, 2004, a final rule was published in the Federal
Register Final Rules that, in essence, allows EPA to avoid consultation
with the federal wildlife agencies regarding whether new pesticides could
cause harm to species listed under the ESA. Under the new rule, EPA
will conduct its own reviews, which will simplify the process.388 The
agencies' purported rationale for the new rules is to provide a more
efficient approach to make decisions on whether new pesticides will
"adversely affect" a listed species.3 89 However, environmental groups fear
that the new rule will undercut the ESA and put listed species at greater

(2004) (discussing a number of regulatory attempts to weaken the consultation process including
with regard to pesticide registration).
386. See Wash. Toxics Coalition v. EPA, No. C01-013132C (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.html. This order was the third in a series of
orders granting injunctive relief to the environmental plaintiffs in this matter. See also Wash.
Toxics Coalition v. EPA, No. C01-013132C (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.html.; Wash. Toxics Coalition v. EPA, No. Co1-013132C
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2003), availableathttp://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.html.
387. The two ESA consulting agencies, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture adopted
the new regulation as a joint regulation. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7
Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,732 (Aug. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
402).
388. According to EPA officials, the consultation process was not working. EPA frequently
ignored the consultation requirements because of the "complexity of considering thousands of
chemical's [sic] potential effects on 1,200 ESA-listed species. "Greenwire, Pesticides:EPA Will
No Longer Have to Consult Wildlife Agencies (July 30, 2004) available at
http://www.eenews.net.
389. According to EPA officials, FWS and NMFS have only completed approximately
twelve consultations on pesticides in the past ten years. Between 2002 and August of 2004, EPA
had sent the wildlife agencies approximately thirty pesticide consultations, but none have been
completed. EPA, Endangered Species Effects Determinationsand Consultations;An Interim
Process for Public Input, http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/endanger/effects/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2006).
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risk. Consequently, a number of environmental organizations have filed
suit alleging that the new rule violates the ESA.3"
Concerns with rare or sensitive species or ecosystems can be
addressed by an open-ended balancing approach, where the agency is
directed to consider costs, but not in a strict cost/benefit monetized
balancing. Under such an approach, although costs would be taken into
consideration, the agency could be directed to afford greater weight in its
balancing to other specified factors such as environmental justice
concerns, risks to threatened or endangered species, risks to rare species,
or risks to vulnerable ecosystems. It should be noted, however, that under
this proposal the analysis would not end with the open-ended balancing.
A second step, described more fully below, would require the
consideration of local factors, such as the presence of threatened or
endangered species, that could be effected by the use of the pesticide in
that location.391
FIFRA's cost/benefit approach also raises concerns with regard to
the pesticidal GMOs.39 EPA's cost/benefit approach raises particular
390. On September 23, 2004, a coalition of eight environmental groups filed suit challenging
the Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Regulation. Greenwire, Pesticides:Enviros Sue
Over New ConsultationRule (Sept. 24,2004) availableat http://www.eenews.net.
391. Although the possibility of harm to threatened or endangered species should be
considered and afforded weight in the open-ended balancing analysis, it would be noted that
under the ESA jeopardy to listed species can not be "balanced" away by cost considerations.
Accordingly, in the second-step localized decision-making process, specific risk to listed species
from the application of the particular pesticide in that particular locale must be evaluated under
the ESA. Pesticide applications that do not comply with the ESA would be prohibited.
392. The worldwide concern over the safety of biotechnology products is evidenced by the
significant role that biotechnology played in the negotiations of the United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity. The agreement eventually reached contained a number of provisions
relevant to biotechnology. Two provisions in particular, Article 8 (In-situ Conservation) and
Article 19 (Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of its Benefits), were directed at
addressing international concerns with biotechnology products. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000).
Article 8 of the Convention requires that Contracting Parties establish or maintain means
to regulate, manage or control the risks associated with the use and release of living modified
organisms resulting from biotechnology that could affect the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity. Neither FIFRA's export provisions nor EPA's plant-incorporated protectant
rule address the broader concern of risk to biological diversity internationally. It is conceivable
that a pesticide, particularly a plant-incorporated protectant, which does not pose an
unreasonable risk in the United States, could pose an unreasonable risk in another country. As
discussed above, many of the risk issues associated with plant-incorporated protectants relate to
their ability to outcross to wild relatives. This is a very different situation than that of
conventional pesticides. For conventional chemical pesticides, the risks posed by the substance
will tend to be similar regardless of the country or part of the world. For example, if a pesticide is
highly toxic to humans or other mammals in the United States, it will also be highly toxic to
humans or mammals in other countries. The risks associated with plant-incorporated
protectants, on the other hand, may vary more with location depending on a number of factors
such as the presence of wild relatives. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for EPA
to evaluate all risks of a plant-incorporated protectant in every country in the world. Moreover,
to conduct the unreasonable adverse effects analysis required by FIFRA, EPA also must look at
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concerns with regard to pesticidal GMOs that are exported, or that
naturally spread, to other parts of the world. For example, one risk
concern with plant-incorporated protectants is whether a favorable
ecological niche exists for the modified plant in its new environment that
will enable the plant to thrive, and perhaps become a pest or disrupt the
balance of ecosystems. EPA may evaluate a particular pesticidal GMO
under FIFRA and may find it will not pose an unreasonable
environmental risk in the United States because a suitable niche does not
exist for the modified plant in the United States that would allow the
creation of a pest. To determine whether the pesticidal GMO poses an
unreasonable risk in another country, however, the exporting company
(or EPA) would be required to identify the types of ecosystems that exist
in that country and the likelihood that the modified plant would thrive or
spread in that environment. To do this, the exporting company (or EPA)
would have to address a wide array of issues to determine whether the
pesticide produced by the plant gives it a selective advantage in the new
environment. Such a determination would depend on a number of
considerations such as whether the modified plant has wild relatives in
the new environment, how the modified plant is affected by factors such
as climate, what selective pressures-e.g., viruses or other pathogens that
normally keep the plant population in check-exist in the new
environment, and how the modified plant interacts with the types of
species present in the various ecosystems of the importing country. It
appears unreasonable to require such a site-specific risk assessment for
every country that imports U.S. pesticides. Nevertheless, international
concerns could be averted if the United States were to participate in
international efforts to provide advanced informed consent prior to
exporting GMOs to other countries. Such a process is contemplated by
the Rio Convention on Biodiversity, as well as the Cartagena Biosafety
Protocol, neither to which the United States is a signatory.3 93
the societal benefits associated with the pesticide. It would seem infeasible for EPA to conduct
such an analysis for every importing country. EPA is not in a position to evaluate, and place
value on, the economic and societal benefits that an importing country derives from a particular
pesticide or chemical substance.
Another impediment to EPA addressing risks of plant-incorporated protectants in
countries other than the United States is that FIFRA provides EPA with very limited authority
to regulate exported pesticides. The export of pesticides is regulated under section 17 of FIFRA.
See 7 U.S.C. § 136o (2000). The primary emphasis of this section is on the provision of
information by EPA to foreign governments. Id. Section 17 mandates two systems of
notification: a notice to the government of an importing country of the export of unregistered
pesticides, and a notice to all countries of cancellation or suspension actions taken by EPA. Id.
§§ 136o(a)(2),17o(b). Beyond these notification provisions, FIFRA does not provide EPA with
the authority to regulate exports.
393. Article 19(3) of the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity provides: "The Parties
shall consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures,
including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling
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B.

An EcologicalIntegrity Baseline

As described above, one cornerstone of eco-pragmatism is an
environmental baseline. By incorporating ecological principles into eco-

pragmatism,

the

notion of ecological

integrity

emerges

as the

environmental baseline. Consequently, any action taken under FIFRA

can be evaluated according to its effect on the ecological integrity
baseline. As with any baseline, however, such comparisons cannot be
made without good data and ongoing monitoring. To ensure that

pesticide usage does not undermine ecological integrity, a number of
revisions to the FIFRA program are necessary.
Perhaps most importantly in this regard, EPA's data requirements
must be revised to require data better designed to evaluate risks to
wildlife species, ESA listed species in particular, as well as ecosystem
services such as pollination, decomposition, nitrogen fixation, and other
ecological services provided by organisms that may be affected by
pesticides. Currently, EPA's data requirements for pesticide registration
only address some of these concerns.394 EPA's data requirements for

testing for ecological effects are limited, and not many such data
requirements have been developed. In addition to substantial data
requirements related to product chemistry,395 much of EPA's

requirements regarding data necessary to support the registration of a
pesticide focus on human health effects. For example, EPA has extensive

data requirements related to residue chemistry to estimate human
exposure to pesticides, acute human hazard, subchronic human hazard,
chronic human hazard, mutagenicity, metabolism studies, reentry hazard,

and use of any living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity." The Cartegena Protocol
on Biosafety implements this directive by including a provision that requires advanced informed
agreement by the importing party prior to the first international transboundary movement of
living modified organisms for intentional introduction into the environment. Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000).
394. The minimum data requirements for registration, experimental use permits, and
reregistration are set forth in 40 C.F.R. pt. 158 (2005). More detailed standards for conducting
tests, guidance on evaluation, and reporting of data and additional guidance is provided in a
series of advisory documents that EPA makes available to applicants and the public. See id. §
158.20(c). In its data requirement rules, EPA identifies some data as required and other data as
"conditionally required." Conditionally required data are required only if the product's
proposed pattern of use, results of other tests, or other factors meet the criteria specified in the
rules. See id. §§ 158.25(a), 158.101. EPA's rules also allow certain data requirements to be
waived if they are not applicable to the particular pesticide or use. See id. §§ 158.25(b) (setting
forth policy on flexibility and waiver); 158.35 (describing the flexibility in data requirements);
158.45 (regarding waiver of data requirements). In addition, EPA's rules set forth varying data
requirements for minor use of a pesticide-i.e., used on a minor crop-and biochemical and
microbial pesticides. See id.§§ 158.60, 158.65.
395. See id. §§ 158.150,158.153, 158.155, 158.160,158.162, 158.165, 158.167,158.170,158.175,
158.180, 158.190.
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and spray drift evaluation, as well as oncogenicity, teratogenicity,
neurotoxicity, and reproductive effects in humans.396
EPA also requires the submission of environmental fate data, which
are designed to "assess the presence of widely distributed and persistent
pesticides in the environment which may result in loss of usable land,
surface water, ground water, and wildlife resources; and, assess the
potential environmental exposure of other nontarget organisms, such as
fish and wildlife, to pesticides. '' 39 Environmental fate studies include
studies to determine the rate of pesticide degradation, metabolism studies
to determine the nature and availability of pesticides to rotational crops
and to aid in the evaluation of the persistence of a pesticide, mobility
studies pertaining to leaching, adsorption/desorption, and volatility of
pesticides, dissipation studies, and accumulation studies.398 Perhaps
because environmental fate data are used to evaluate human exposure to
pesticides, as well as wildlife exposure, these data requirements appear to
be fairly comprehensive. However, EPA's data requirements regarding
effects on wildlife and nontarget organisms are considerably less
comprehensive.
With regard to ecological effects, EPA has, by rule, developed
limited data requirements designed to evaluate wildlife and aquatic
organisms, environmental fate, and nontarget insects. EPA's data
requirements for effects on wildlife and aquatic organisms include avian
toxicity studies399 and freshwater fish and invertebrate acute toxicity
studies' for most pesticides intended for outdoor use. Wild mammal
toxicity, avian reproduction, simulated and actual field testing of
mammals and birds, acute toxicity to estuarine and marine organisms,
fish early life stage, aquatic invertebrate life cycle, fish life cycle and
aquatic organisms accumulation, and simulated or actual field testing of
aquatic organisms are only conditionally required"° for most outdoor
uses. As illustrated by EPA's primary focus on acute toxicity testing,
EPA does not generally require data related to potential adverse effects
of pesticides on wildlife behavior, neurology, reproduction, birth defects,

396. See id.§§ 158.202(a), (c), (e), (f), (g), 158.240, 158.390, 158.440, 158.340; see also id. §
158.34 (providing that certain human health effects data submitted to EPA must be flagged as
indicating potential adverse effects).
397. Id. § 158.202(d)(1).
398. Id. § 158.202(d)(2)-(6). See also id.§ 158.290.
399. Avian oral LD50 and dietary LC50s are required when using the preferred test animal
species-the mallard and the bobwhite. Id. § 158.490.
400. Freshwater fish LC50 studies are required, with the preferred test species being the
rainbow and bluegill fish and acute LC50 studies are required on freshwater invertebrates, with
the preferred test species being Daphnia. Id.
401. Id.Conditionally required studies are required only on a case-by-case basis depending
on the results of lower tier studies, such as acute and subacute testing, intended use pattern and
environmental fate characteristics, or if certain specified criteria are met.
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or other non-acute effects. Moreover, EPA's data requirements do not
contain any studies aimed at evaluating effects on other species such as
amphibians or reptiles or other species not specifically identified in the
rules. Accordingly, EPA's wildlife data requirements should be revisited
to determine what additional data requirements would more fully address
the wide range of potential effects on fish and wildlife that may result
from exposure to pesticides.
Likewise, EPA's data requirements for nontarget insects are limited.
EPA does conditionally require acute toxicity testing for honey bees and
other pollinators if the proposed use will result in honeybee or other
pollinator exposure. However, EPA does not have any data requirements
related to honeybee subacute feeding studies,' nontarget aquatic insects,
or non-target predatory or parasitic insects." 3 Moreover, EPA does not
have any data requirements whatsoever related to soil microorganisms,
which provide critical ecological services such as decomposition and
nitrogen fixation, or any data requirements designed to evaluate the
effects of pesticides on any other ecological services.
Although EPA's data requirements include some studies designed to
evaluate risks to fish, wildlife, aquatic organisms, and nontarget insects,
EPA's primary purpose in requiring such studies is not to determine
whether to register a pesticide product but instead is to "provide data
which determines the need for (and appropriate wording for)
precautionary label statements to minimize the potential adverse effects
to nontarget organisms."'' 4° However, label requirements do not always
provide sufficient protection against the environmental harms resulting
from pesticides use.
Despite all of the testing and labeling that EPA imposes, large
numbers of birds, insects, amphibians, and aquatic species, including
threatened and endangered species, continue to be harmed by EPAregistered pesticides. 4 5 While many label requirements that EPA imposes
are aimed at protecting human users of pesticides,' and children who

402. In its data requirements rule, EPA identifies this type of requirement as "reserved
pending development of test methodology." Id. § 158.590.
403. In its data requirements rule, EPA identifies these types of requirements as "reserved
pending further evaluation to determine what and when data should be required, and to develop
appropriate test methods." Id.
404. Id.§ 158.202(h)(1).
405. See BRIAN LITMANS & JEFF MILLER, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, SILENT
SPRING
REVISITED:
PESTICIDE
USE
AND
ENDANGERED
SPECIES
(2004),
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/report.pdf.
406. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 156.10 (general labeling requirements), 156.60 (human hazard and
precautionary statements), 156.62 (human hazard toxicity categories), 156.64 (signal words for
human hazard toxicity categories), 156.68 (first aid statement), 156.70 (precautionary statements
for human hazards), 156.78 (precautionary statements of physical or chemical hazards), 156.200
-212 (worker protection statements) (2005).

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33:105

may inadvertently be exposed to pesticides,' from accidental poisonings,
EPA does require certain environmental hazard information to appear
on pesticide labels. For example, if a pesticide intended for outdoor use
contains an active ingredient with a specified level of acute mammalian or
avian toxicity, the label must bear a precautionary statement such as "this
pesticide is toxic to wildlife." 4' If either accident history or field studies
demonstrate that the use of the pesticide may result in fatality to birds,
fish, or mammals, the pesticide label must bear a precautionary statement
such as "this pesticide is extremely toxic to wildlife (fish)."' Similarly, if
a product intended for certain uses contains an active ingredient toxic to
pollinating insects, the label must bear an appropriate label caution.41
Finally, if a product is intended for outdoor use other than aquatic
applications, the label must bear the precautionary statement "keep out
of lakes, ponds or streams. Do not contaminate water by cleaning of
equipment or disposal of wastes.. 4 .
Although EPA requires these precautionary statements on labels,
their practical effect is unclear. For example, if a farmer intends to apply
a particular pesticide to combat a particular pest of her crops and the
pesticide label indicates it is toxic to wildlife, how will this information
influence the farmer's behavior? It is unlikely that the farmer will choose
not to apply the pesticide, because virtually all of the major chemical
pesticides use in agriculture today are acutely toxic to at least some
nontarget organisms. It is difficult to imagine that a statement on a label
indicating that a product is toxic to wildlife will have any significant
influence on user behavior. Without more specific directions about when,
where, or how it is appropriate to apply the pesticide to minimize risks to
wildlife, the farmer is left with an essentially useless warning. The lack of
more useful directions to minimize risk is likely due to the fact that,
because most chemical pesticides are acutely toxic to at least some
wildlife, it is impossible to release them into the environment in large
amounts without creating the possibility for harm to wildlife.
C

Addressing Uncertaintyand Change

As described above, eco-pragmatism argues in favor of feasibility
approaches rather than cost/benefit approaches. While this Article
407. See id. § 156.66 (child hazard warning).
408. The specified level of acute toxicity for mammals warranting such a statement is an oral
LD50 of 100mg/kg or less. The specified level of acute toxicity for fish warranting such a
statement is an LC50 of lppm or less. The specified level of acute toxicity for birds warranting
such a statement is an oral LD50 of 100 mg/kg or less or a subacute dietary LC50 of 500 ppm or
less. Id. § 156.85(b)(1), (2), (3).
409. Id. § 156.85(b)(4).
410. Id § 156.85(b)(5).
411. Id. § 156.85(b)(6).
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proposes a modified cost/benefit analysis-open-ended balancing-for
the registration of a pesticide under FIFRA, it also proposes that a
feasibility analysis be conducted for significant pesticide "use." Currently,
no federal system is in place and only very limited state or local systems
exist that regulate the "uses" of pesticides registered under FIFRA other
than the label instructions on each registered pesticide. These label
instructions are generally the same nationwide. Thus, there is not
currently a widespread system for considering local factors to determine
what pest control method should be used in what location under what
circumstances.
As described above, for an environmental regulatory system to be
eco-pragmatic it must be flexible and able to adapt to new information
and changed circumstances. Transferring some decision-making authority
to a local level is one way to accomplish this goal. The consideration of
local factors in making the determination of whether or how to use a
specific pesticide in a specific location is of particular import. The benefit
of local control over pesticide use is that decisions can be made based on
local factors. Such factors could include presence of threatened,
endangered, or otherwise rare species, presence of sensitive species, soil
conditions, climatic conditions, proximity to environmentally sensitive
lands, types of crops grown, types of farming practices used, severity of
pest infestations, or other relevant site-specific factors. 12
A variety of potential mechanisms are available for achieving local
decision-making regarding actual pesticide use. One such mechanism is to
encourage local government regulation of pesticide use. Another
mechanism is to provide better training to certified applicators using
integrated pest management (IPM) and non-chemical controls and better
information regarding endangered species, ecological processes, the role
of predators and parasites, and other local environmental conditions.
Similarly, better training could be provided to local agricultural extension
agents. A variation on this theme would be to empower local officialswhether they are local government officials or extension agent officialsto make case-by-case or season-by-season decisions on the actual use of
pesticides. For example, a local official could be required to evaluate the
local conditions -including the particular pest concerns, the climatic
conditions, and a wide variety of local environmental factors-before
"prescribing" that a particular pesticide be used. This idea is similar to
that of a medical doctor prescribing that a patient take a particular
medication. Prior to issuing such a prescription, the doctor would

412. Because ecological impacts are necessarily contextual and local, whereas human health
impacts are not, EPA's failure to adequately address local ecological effects of pesticides may be
further evidence of an institutional bias away from ecological protection. See infra note 378 and
accompanying text.
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consider a number of factors such as the patient's overall health, other
medical conditions, other medications the patient is taking, any allergies
or sensitivities the patient may have to certain types of medications, the
patient's age, the patient's health and lifestyle objectives, and the
patient's willingness to accept certain risks to achieve such goals.
Moreover, the doctor could adjust the type or amount of medication over
time to fine-tune the treatment in accordance with changing
circumstances or new information. A prescription-type approach to
pesticide application could similarly adjust over time after consideration
of changed local conditions or new information about local
environmental
factors.
Of
course,
the
physician-prescribed
pharmaceutical system is not without its shortcomings. High pressure
sales tactics by representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, glossy
advertisements on television and in magazines promising that a
wonderful life can be achieved merely by popping a pill, the public's
desire for an "easy fix" in the form of a pill, and industry-sponsored
research all may contribute to the trend of physicians over-prescribing
medications. With a pesticide prescription system in place, pesticide
manufacturers will likely be able to convince decision-makers to
prescribe their pesticides. Nevertheless, such a system, if properly
instituted, could result in at least some level of informed decision-making
prior to the release of large amounts of pesticides into the environment.
The likely criticisms of such a system would be that instituting such a
system could entail high costs and possibly the creation of a new
bureaucracy. However, relying on existing infrastructure to facilitate such
a system without the need for a completely new institution or significant
additional personnel may be possible. Perhaps the existing agricultural
extension services could be used to administer such a system.
Alternatively, existing state requirements for certified applicator training
and certification could be expanded to better educate applicators about
local environmental factors that should be taken into account and nonchemical alternative pest control mechanisms that in many cases may be
preferable to chemical approaches. Such an approach might also rely on
existing extension infrastructure and resources.
Although FIFRA provides a regulatory system that applies to any
pesticide sold or distributed in the United States, FIFRA does not
generally preempt state or local government regulation of pesticide use.
In 1991, the right of a local government to regulate pesticide use was
clearly established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin
413
Public Intervenor v. Mortier.
In that case, a Wisconsin local
government had adopted an ordinance which required a permit from the
local government prior to certain types of pesticide use. Prior to the
413.

501 U.S. 597 (1991).
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Mortier decision only a small number of states had in place laws that
preempted local governments from regulating pesticide use. After
Mortier, all but eleven states have laws preempting local regulation of
pesticides.4" 4
Justice White, writing for the majority in the Mortier decision,
recognized the benefit of local decision-making for the actual use of
pesticides when he wrote: "FIFRA nowhere seeks to establish an
affirmative permit scheme for the actual use of pesticides. It certainly
does not equate registration and labeling requirements with a general
approval to apply pesticides throughout the [n]ation without regard to
regional and local factors like climate, population, geography, and water
' Yet this is, in practice, what FIFRA does. Once a pesticide
supply."415
receives a FIFRA registration, unless a particular state actively seeks to
further regulate such a pesticide, it can be used anywhere in the United
States with the only limitation that it must be used in accordance with the
FIFRA label instructions. As is described more fully below, most states
do not have detailed environmental permitting requirements for pesticide
use.416 Although EPA attempts to impose risk reducing measures on users
through detailed labeling requirements, a set of instructions on a
container that has been drafted to apply to the entire United States is a
poor substitute for a site-specific, circumstance-specific decision on what
pesticide to use where, when, and how.
The issue of localized decision-making regarding pesticide use has
arisen in another context in recent years. Beginning with Headwaters,
Inc. v. Talent IrrigationDistric 7 in 2002, the courts and EPA have been
grappling with whether, and under what circumstances, a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems (NPDES) permit is required
under the Clean Water Act for the application of pesticides into waters of
the United States.418 Historically, EPA had not required NPDES permits
for such pesticide applications. Thus, although EPA, at least arguably,
414. Haight, supra note 208, at 39. The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed FIFRA
preemption again in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (holding that FIFRA
does not preempt claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, breach of
express warranty, and violation of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and remanding the
issue of whether FIFRA preempts fraud and failure-to-warn claims).
415. 501 U.S. at 613-14.
416. See infra notes 424-26 and accompanying text.
417. 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the application of an aquatic pesticide to
irrigation canals in compliance with the registration and labeling requirements under FIFRA did
not eliminate the need for an NPDES permit).
418. For a detailed discussion of the judicial decisions and EPA's position on the issue of
requiring NPDES permits for aquatic pesticide application, see Kelly C. Connelly, Note,
Pesticidesand Permits: Clean Water Act v. FederalInsecticide, Fungicideand Rodenticide Act,
8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (2003) and Paul Herran, Note, Headwaters,Inc. v.
Talent IrrigationDistrict:Application of Aquatic Pesticides to Irrigation Canals, a Discharge,
Which Requires a Clean Water Act Permit?, 25 U. HAW. L. REv. 629 (2003).
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has the legal authority to require permits that would consider localized
environmental factors for applications of pesticides to waters, EPA has
chosen not to do so. Even after the Headwaters decision, EPA has
steadfastly refused to require NPDES permits for the application of
pesticides directly to waters of the United States for the purpose of
controlling pests in or over such waters.419
In addition, as described above, nationwide decision-making
regarding pesticides can lead to disproportionate risks being placed on
vulnerable populations of people and on vulnerable species or
ecosystems. While an overall cost/benefit analysis for a particular
pesticide may weigh in favor of use of the pesticide, geographic or
ecological "hot spots" may occur where the risks outweigh the benefits on
those localized geographic areas or for those particular species. Without
some way to bring localized concerns into the decision-making process,
risks will continue to fall disproportionately on the most vulnerable
human and ecological resources. Although over one-half of all registered
agricultural pesticides are restricted-use pesticides,42 which must be
applied only under the supervision of a certified applicator, the certified
applicator requirement does not provide the level of oversight,
consideration of local ecological factors, and consideration of lower risk
alternatives needed to adequately address ecological risks. First, certified
applicators do not necessarily directly oversee the application of
pesticides, but instead typically serve as "arm chair" supervisors.421
Second, certified applicators are not required to receive any particular
training in local ecological systems and their vulnerability to particular
pesticides.4 22 Finally, although FIFRA section 11 requires EPA and states
to make available to certified applicators instructional materials
concerning IPM, the statute expressly states certified applicators are not
required to receive instruction on IPM and are not required to
demonstrate competence with respect to such techniques." 3 Thus,
419. See Interim Statement and Guidance on Application of Pesticides to Waters of the
United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Aug. 13, 2003).
420. RODGERS, supra note 191, at 458.
421. See infra note 426 and accompanying text.
422. For a description of certified applicator training programs, see RODGERS, supra note
191, at 462-63.
423. 7 U.S.C. § 136i(c) (2000), regarding instruction in integrated pest management,
provides:
Standards prescribed by the Administrator for the certification of applicators of
pesticides under subsection (a) of this section, and state plans submitted to the
Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, shall include provisions for making
instructional materials concerning integrated pest management techniques available
to individuals at their request in accordance with the provisions of section 136u(c) of
this title, but such plans may not require that any individual receive instruction
concerning such techniques or to be shown to be competent with respect to the use of
such techniques. The Administrator and States implementing such plans shall provide
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certified applicators are not required to know about less risky pest
control techniques, let alone to consider them in making decisions
regarding which options to choose to control a particular pest. In fact, a
certified applicator's job is not to decide what approach to take to control
a pest but is merely to ensure that once a particular pesticide is chosen, it
is applied properly in accordance with label instructions.
Unfortunately, despite compelling reasons for considering local
conditions in determining what pesticides to use in what locations and
under what conditions, and the fact that FIFRA allows state and local
governments to regulate pesticide use, state regulation of pesticides is
minimal. Most states do not have regulatory systems more
environmentally protective than FIFRA's basic nationwide protections.
Most states do not have any significant regulations addressing the use of
pesticides under localized conditions. For example, most states do not
require obtaining site-specific permits before a pesticide can be applied,
even for large scale agricultural pesticide application into the
environment.424 Likewise, most states do not require anyone with
specialized knowledge of the presence of threatened or endangered
species or rare or sensitive ecosystems to make any evaluation prior to
the release of pesticides into the environment. What state pesticide
regulatory programs generally do is treat farmers as "private
applicators," who are required to obtain a state certification that
demonstrates that they have attained a level of practical knowledge of
pesticide use and hazards, before such farmer is allowed to apply
pesticides. Some states have more stringent requirements for
chemigation, fertigation, and aerial application,4" but generally, once a
that all interested individuals are notified on the availability of such instructional
materials.
424. Some states do have limited permitting requirements for pesticide use, however these
requirements generally apply only to aerial application of pesticides and generally a permit is not
issued for each application. For example, in Hawaii, a permit is required prior to aerial
application of pesticides. HAW. CODE R. § 4-66-64 (Weil 2004). However, the permit can be
issued for repeated uses or for a specified length of time. Id. at § 4-66-64 (a)(4). Consequently,
changing local environmental conditions are not likely to be adequately addressed for each
application. In Massachusetts, a permit is required for the aerial application of pesticides.
However, the permit is for a one-year duration and is not specific to the date or time of
application. 333 MASS. CODE REGS. 13.05(3)(b) (2006). Nevertheless, a site inspection is
required prior to permit issuance, which presumably means that local condition are assessed
prior to issuing the permit. Id. In addition, in Massachusetts, a special permit is required for
application of restricted-use pesticides to an area greater than twenty-five acres. Id. § 13.03(18).
Similarly, in Vermont, one-year duration permits are required for aerial application of
pesticides. 20-031-012 VT. CODE R. § IV (5) (2006).
425. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5E-9.019(2)(a) (2005) (aerial applicators require
a separate certification); HAW. CODE R. § 4-66-64(6) (2004) (mandating a notice requirement
prior to any aerial application); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 02.03.03.310,.320 (2006) (placing specific
restrictions on aerial application geared primarily toward minimizing spray drift); 302 KY.
ADMIN. REGS. 27:050 § 2(8) (2005) (requiring separate certification for aerial applicators); LA.
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farmer has obtained the required training and certification, he is free to
apply pesticides at will, provided it is done in accordance with FIFRA or
state label directions and restrictions. What is more, generally the
certified private applicator can "supervise" the application of pesticides
by non-certified persons. In most states, "direct supervision" means that
the certified private applicator is within a telephone call away from his
supervisees.426 Some states do have specific pesticide regulations aimed at
protecting groundwater or surface waterbodies. However, even these
states do not generally require any form of site-specific permitting
evaluation prior to pesticide use. By establishing a prescription-type
system to large-scale pesticide use, not only will local environmental
factors receive due consideration, but the system would have the

ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, pt. XXIII § 145 (2005) (detailing specific requirements regarding aerial
application, including the requirement to adjust flight patterns to avoid sensitive areas and
prohibitions on aerial application if wind velocity exceeds ten mph or if it is raining or rain is
imminent); 333 MASS. CODE REGS. 13.05(3)(b), (c) (2006) (requiring a permit for aerial
application, as well as prohibiting aerial application within 250 feet of a water body and
requirements that aerial spraying cease if spray drift occurs); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 285.637.10
(2005) (detailing specific requirements regarding aerial spray drift, including a requirement for
applicators to have a written spray draft plan in place and restrictions to protect sensitive areas);
25 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 2-005.02B(1) (2005) (mandating separate certification requirements for
application of restricted-use pesticides via chemigation); 2 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 9L.1002,.1003
(2006) (detailing spray drift control regulations and a prohibition on aerial application to
restricted areas); 20-031-012 VT. CODE R. § IV (1)(b) (2006) (detailing rules regulating pesticide
drift); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 16-202-2001 to -2021 (2006) (detailing rules regulating fertigation);
WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 29.50(2) (2005) (listing restrictions to prevent significant spray drift).
426. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 487.021(64) (2005) ("under direct supervision" means that the
licensed applicator is available "if and when needed"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-3401(34) (2005)
(stating that a supervisory certified applicator must be available as needed even though the
"certified applicator is not physically present at the time and place the pesticide is applied");
MD. CODE REGS. 15.05.01.01(b)(23)(b) (2006) (stating that the supervisory certified applicator
must be available if needed); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-2642(5)(c) (2005) (defining "direct
supervision" as available by voice or electronic means and the ability to be physically present if
needed); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 7:30-1.2 (2005) (defining "available if and when needed" to mean
that the direct supervisor must be able to be immediately contacted and no more than three
hours away via ground transportation); OR. ADMIN. R. 603-057-0001(10) (2005) ("immediate
supervision" defined as no more than five minutes away); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-249.27 (2005)
("under the direct supervision of' means the certified applicator is responsible for supervisees'
actions); WIS. STAT. § 94.67(10m) (2005) (allowing private applicators to "direct the use of'
restricted-use pesticides provided they are available if and when needed during the application).
Nevertheless, a few states do have more stringent supervisory requirements for certified
applicators. See e.g., 355 IND. ADMIN. CODE 4-2-1(2)(A) and 4-2-3 (2006) (stating that if an
applicator has never worked with a pesticide before or is not a "registered technician," the
certified applicator must be both physically present and in direct voice contact during the
application); 333 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.07 (2006) (requiring that the supervision of non-certified
applicators increase based upon the hazard of the given pesticide being used); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 325.7 (2005) (defining "under the direct supervision" to mean that the
certified applicator must be physically present and within voice contact); and 20-031-012 VT.
CODE R. § I(7)(17) and VII(l) (2006) (certified applicators must be physically present and
actively supervise non-certified applicators).
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flexibility necessary to adapt to changing circumstances and new
information.4 7
As described above, one cornerstone of eco-pragmatism as well as
conservation biology is adaptive management. Because of the complexity
and changing nature of ecological systems, as well as our ever-increasing
understanding of those systems, any system designed to address
ecological risks must be flexible and able to adapt to changed
circumstances and new information. Accordingly, a prescription
approach, whereby a prescription for pesticide use is written based on a
feasibility analysis for each large-scale application-or perhaps series of
applications during a growing season-could serve as an adaptive
management approach. Each time a localized decision must be made to
prescribe a pesticide, current local conditions can be evaluated to
determine the pest control that would maximize ecological protection to
the extent feasible.42 Moreover, as new pesticides and non-chemical pest
control techniques develop, they can be considered when determining
what to prescribe.42 9
427. A possible alternative to a registration approach would be a reporting requirement on
farms. Such an approach would be similar to the Toxics Release Inventory under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000). J.B. Ruhl
has suggested such an approach as a way to provide regulators and local communities with
information on pesticide releases. See J.B. Ruh], Farms, Thneir Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 337-38 (2000). Although such an approach would
not directly require the consideration of local ecological factors prior to use of a pesticide, by
bringing pesticide releases under the scrutiny of regulators and communities, such an approach
could result in long-term changes to pesticide usage.
428. For example, if in year two, an American Bald Eagle, or other listed species, builds a
nest near the field to be sprayed, it may not be appropriate to prescribe the same pesticide used
in year one if that pesticide is toxic to avian species. Likewise, if a listed species is no longer
present near the field, it may be appropriate to go back to the more toxic pesticide. Similarly, if
new information about the surrounding ecosystem is discovered, it could effect the decision of
what pesticide to prescribe.
429. Although a detailed analysis of discounting environmental benefits is beyond the scope
of this Article, as described in Part III above, many risks of pesticides are long-term risks. For
example, the tendency of certain pesticides to bioaccumulate as they work their way up the food
chain poses risks that may not be realized for many years after the initial release of the pesticide
into the environment. Similarly, the harms from certain pesticides that pose reproductive effects,
such as the endocrine disruptors, may not be to the animals exposed but may instead be to the
offspring or even subsequent generations of the animals exposed. Moreover, many of the
potential harms to ecological systems and services that pesticides pose, including disruptions of
predator/prey relationships, harm to pollinators, and harm to microorganisms that perform
decomposition and nutrient cycling services may not be evident in the short-term but may have
significant long-term impacts. Accordingly, any pesticide regulation that reduces these long-term
harms may not demonstrate immediate benefits. Consequently, as Farber suggests, it is
important to ensure that the long-term benefits of pesticide risk reduction measures are
adequately valued through the use of low discount rates. The idea of intergenerational equity
further supports this notion. To ensure that future generations inherit functioning ecosystems,
including functioning agricultural systems, it is incumbent upon this generation to ensure that
the long-term benefits of pesticide-risk reduction measures are properly valued though
appropriate low discounting.
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CONCLUSION

Despite its early successes protecting ecological resources at the
beginning of the environmental movement in the United States, FIFRA
has virtually lain dormant with regard to ecological resource protection
for the past twenty-five years. Ironically, if any area of environmental law
should be tailored specifically to address ecological concerns, it is
pesticide law, where substances intended to kill and disrupt species and
natural systems are intentionally released into the environment in large
quantities. Moreover, pesticide law has failed to keep pace with recent
advances in ecology and conservation biology. The eco-pragmatic
framework proposed by Professor Daniel Farber and elaborated upon by
others may serve as useful approach to reinventing pesticide law to better
address ecological concerns. To accomplish this, several steps are
required. First, the prevailing interpretation of FIFRA's "unreasonable
adverse effects standard" as mandating strict cost/benefit balancing
should be reevaluated and adjusted to a more open-ended balancing
standard, as contemplated by the drafters of the standard. Related to this
idea, EPA's approach to evaluating whether a particular pesticide poses
an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment should be modified
so that registrants are required to demonstrate the true benefits of a
pesticide by demonstrating efficacy and by evaluating the relative
benefits of the pesticide to the benefits provided by other available pest
control methods, including lower-risk chemical pesticides as well as nonchemical pest control methods. Second, to account for the uncertainties
and long-term effects of pesticides on the environment, a low discount
rate should be used in conducting the open-ended balancing analysis.
Third, to ensure that pesticides released into the environment do not
undermine a baseline of ecological integrity, the data requirements under
FIFRA should be strengthened to require information about the
potential effects on a wider variety of wildlife species as well as ecological
services such as pollination, decomposition, and nitrogen fixation. Finally,
an adaptive management approach should be developed to allow
flexibility and adjustments to the choice of pest control method
appropriate for a given situation. An adaptive management mechanism
could be based on a medical prescription model which would allow for
fine-tuning and adjustment as circumstances change over time or as new
information becomes available. The prescription approach should be
developed to allow localized decision-making regarding which pesticide is
best for a given situation considering local environmental factors to
determine the maximum level of environmental protection feasible for
any given situation. The eco-pragmatic approach may provide the
necessary framework for modifying U.S. pesticide law just enough so that
we "do the best we can" to protect critical ecological resources.

